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The American pragmatist tradition associated with John Dewey, William James, and 
others promises to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, abstract and 
generalizable analyses of political life and, on the other hand, practical efforts to 
redress political problems that are always specific in their context and effects. A 
persistent criticism of pragmatism has been that its problem-centric liberalism has 
tended to obscure from view issues of social, economic, and political power. This 
dissertation attempts to articulate a “power pragmatism” that combines Dewey’s 
skepticism of abstraction with a Foucauldian understanding of public problems as 
traversed by shifting relations of power and resistance. Such a perspective draws 
attention to the specific feedback loops that sustain a given situation and produce a 
particular set of consequences and to how these feedback loops are conditioned by 
and reinforce power differentials among social groups. Shulamith Firestone, I argue, 
exemplifies this Deweyan-Foucauldian combination. Her Dialectic of Sex contends that 
technoscientific tools like contraception and artificial wombs can be used to shift the 
responsibility of childbearing from women and dissolve sex-class domination at the 
root. Firestone focuses on relations of domination as a structuring feature of social 
reality, and she offers a disarmingly straightforward attempt to reconstruct pregnancy 
and gender through technology.  The practical radicalism that results does not shy 
away from the liberatory potential within some forms of technology. I develop this 
point further in the last chapter, a discussion of how the technical-material 
infrastructure of a society might be arranged to maximize the spaces for survival, 
resistance, and autonomy. 
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Introduction | Escape from eminence 
The ‘best’ theories do not constitute a very 
effective protection against disastrous 
political choices. 
— Michel Foucault 
Does the labor of drawing sophisticated associations between ideas have political or 
social correlates? John Dewey had his doubts. “The social philosopher,” he writes, 
“dwelling in the region of his concepts, ‘solves,’ problems by showing the 
relationship of ideas instead of helping men solve problems in the concrete by 
supplying them with hypotheses to be used and tested in projects of reform. 
Meanwhile, of course, the concrete troubles and evils remain.”1 That’s not to say, 
however, that political and social theorists remain indifferent to concrete troubles and 
evils. The question of what actually happens—in political struggles, to the planet, 
with experiments in self-governance large and small, to the wellbeing of humans and 
the other animals—motivates much of the published work in political theory. Often, 
however, this concern for what happens tends to appear, like a waved handkerchief, 
at the end of books and articles. After long, careful parsing of sophisticated texts and 
abstruse debates, works in political theory often conclude by turning toward certain 
necessities: “to ensure the meeting of needs and to foster human flourishing,”2 “to 
                                                 
1 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 191-94. 




take better care of things, ourselves, and others,”3 “to bring about a new 
configuration of the world,”4 and so forth. 
What would political theory look like if these concerns for what actually happens and 
the relationship our work assumes toward what actually happens were set at the 
center of political theory instead of at the margin?5 
                                                 
3 Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 136. 
4 Samuel Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 169. 
5 For related debate in another field, see Paul Romer, “The Trouble with Macroeconomics,” 
forthcoming, 2016, 
http://ccl.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/The%20Trouble%20with%20Macroeconomics.pdf. 
Romer argues that macroeconomists are overly reliant on sophisticated mathematical models that 
bear little relation to reality. “All I’m asking,” he remarks when asked about his paper, “is that 
macroeconomists acknowledge that facts are relevant to what they do.” Romer’s argument parallels 
an earlier argument made in my own field by Jeffrey Isaac’s “The Strange Silence of Political 
Theory,” Political Theory 23, no. 4 (1995): 636-652. Writing in 1995, Isaac asks why top journals in 
political theory have published little work on the collapse of the USSR. He writes that “one would 
have expected that such dramatic and consequential events would have been grist for the mill of 
American political theorists,” but that, on the contrary, “in the four years following the revolutions 
of 1989 political theorists published a total of 384 articles, of which a mere 2… dealt with dramatic 
current events of earth-shattering importance.” (Isaac’s numbers are drawn from issues of Political 
Theory, the APSR, PPA, and Ethics.) For Isaac, this elision flags political theory’s too-keen interest in 
abstruse debates about how to interpret canonical authors and the way this approach obscures 
analysis of occurent politics. Theorists “have become ensnared in their various disciplinary matrices,” 
Isaac argues. “Preoccupied with situating ourselves vis-a-vis the writing of Strauss and Arendt, 
Adorno and Lyotard, we have become puzzle solvers of the problems of others, focusing on 
approved topics, following academic conventions.” Isaac avers that this state of affairs applies to 
mainstream liberal political theory, to be sure, but also to traditions that understand themselves as 
more “radical,” whose practitioners, he argues, “have managed to constitute a thoroughly normalized 
discourse of ‘subversion,’ whereby theoretical puzzles—the problematics of identity, the effectivity of 
desire, the transgression of boundaries—get worked out in connection with Plato, Augustine, 
Machiavelli, Arendt, ad infinitum. The same theorists—Nietzsche, Foucault—establish the terms of 
reference, the same vocabularies and metaphors are deployed and redeployed, the same texts 
continually cited.” Isaac’s paper mirrors Romer’s argument that macroeconomics’ attachment to 
prevailing disciplinary norms—e.g., the macroeconomists’ use of recondite mathematical models that 




Dewey and Michel Foucault have, at different points in their work, thought carefully 
about the connections between political struggle and the labor of drawing 
connections between abstractions. Dewey has argued for moving social inquiry away 
from “‘solv[ing]’ problems by showing the relationship of ideas.”6 Foucault, too, 
criticized Jacques Derrida on similar grounds, writing that Derrida “supposes… that 
all knowledge, or in an even broader sense all rational discourse, entertains a 
fundamental relation with philosophy…. To free the implicit philosophy of a 
discourse, to reveal its contradictions, its limits, or its naivety, is to operate a fortiori 
and by the shortest possible route a critique of all that is said within it.”7 Foucault 
rejects an associational practice of analysis whose task is to reveal the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                 
its ability to incorporate facts about the world, or indeed any kind of sedulous attention to the world, 
into macroeconomic analyses. Romer, referencing similar debates in theoretical physics, warns that 
“the evolution of macroeconomics mirrors developments in string theory from physics, which 
suggests that they are examples of a general failure mode of for [sic] fields of science that rely on 
mathematical theory in which facts can end up being subordinated to the theoretical preferences of 
revered leaders.” Isaac, I think, would suggest that this “general failure mode” is not restricted to 
disciplines that employ math. 
For further reflection on the techniques Romer discusses, see Olivier Blanchard, “Do DSGE Models 
Have a Future?” PIIE, 2016, https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb16-11.pdf. For similar 
arguments within theoretical physics, see Lee Smolin, The Trouble With Physics (Wilmington, MA: 
Mariner Books, 2007). For replies to Isaac’s article, see Samuel Chambers, Untimely Politics 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 73-76, 84-87, and 90-93, as well as responses by 
Seyla Benhabib, William E. Connolly, Kristie M. McClure, Elizabeth Kiss, and Michael Gillespie in 
Political Theory 23, no. 4 (1995). 
6 Dewey, Reconstruction, 191-94. 
7 Michel Foucault, “Reply to Derrida,” in History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 575-78. 
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between deeply-set, essential ideas at the heart of one text and deeply-set, essential 
ideas at the heart of another. Moreover, Foucault brings forward questions about the 
relationship between theory and what happens in the world.8 He is often quite frank, 
as when he says that “the ‘best’ theories do not constitute a very effective protection 
against disastrous political choices.” Just before making that remark, Foucault relates 
this story, which stems from a conversation he’d had with Habermas: 
After explaining how Heidegger’s thought indeed constituted a “political 
disaster,” [Habermas] mentioned one of his professors who was a great 
Kantian, very well-known in the ’30s, and he explained how astonished and 
disappointed he had been when, while looking through card catalogues one 
day, he found some texts from around 1934 by this illustrious Kantian that 
were thoroughly Nazi in orientation. 
I have just recently had the same experience with Max Pohlenz, who heralded 
the universal values of Stoicism all his life. I came across a text of his from 
1934 devoted to Führertum in Stoicism. You should reread the introductory 
page and the book’s closing remarks on the Führersideal and on the true 
humanism constituted by the Volk under the inspiration of the leader’s 
direction—Heidegger never wrote anything more disturbing. Nothing in this 
condemns Stoicism or Kantianism, needless to say.9 
Foucault then invites his interviewer to “reckon with several facts,” including the 
“tenuous ‘analytic’ link between a philosophical conception and the concrete political 
attitude of someone who is appealing to it,” and that “certain great themes… can be 
                                                 
8 I don’t mean to imply with this “theory vs. what happens in the world” phrasing that theory does 
not count as something that happens in the world. Hardly! It might be more accurate to write, 
instead of theory vs. the world, what happens inside seminar rooms/the skulls of grad students and 
professors/journals in political theory vs. what happens outside of them. 
9 Foucault, Foucault Reader, 374. 
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used to any end whatever.” He pauses, then, and swerves away from the temptation 
to separate theory and world: 
I do not conclude from this that one may say just anything within the order of 
theory, but, on the contrary, that a demanding, prudent, “experimental” 
attitude is neces[s]ary; at every moment, step by step, one must confront what 
one is thinking and saying with what one is doing, with what one is. I have 
never been too concerned about people who say: “You are borrowing ideas 
from Nietzsche; well, Nietzsche was used by the Nazis, therefore…”; but, on 
the other hand, I have always been concerned with linking together as tightly 
as possible the historical and theoretical analysis of power relations, 
institutions, and knowledge, to the movements, critiques, and experiences that 
call them into question in reality. If I have insisted on all this “practice,” it has 
not been in order to “apply” ideas, but in order to put them to the test and 
modify them. The key to the personal poetic attitude of a philosopher is not 
to be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but rather in his 
philosophy-as-life, in his philosophical life, his ethos.10 
In my view, Foucault is knocking his shovel against a problem fundamental for 
political theory. To conclude, in response to the tenuous connection between theory 
and concrete political views, that the practice of theory does nothing and has no 
relation to what happens in the world remains an unsatisfactory withdrawal.  
As an explanatory or descriptive tool, moreover, theory seems to have no built-in 
procedures or mechanisms for figuring out when it has accurately understood the 
ramifications of real-world developments and when it has not (on the contrary, really-
existing theory seems to possess an infinite plasticity for explaining how a new 
development is a demonstration or exegesis of what it has always known). What 




Foucault gestures at is the prospect for a technology or set of practices for theory to 
take up as a mechanism for, among other things, getting a sense of when it’s missed 
the mark. Or, in extreme cases, when it’s sliding in the directions that Pohlenz, 
Heidegger, or Habermas’s renowned Kantian did. Well, you might object, that last 
point about Pohlenz and Heidegger is hyperbolic—I think we’d know if that were 
happening. But how would we know? How do you tell the difference between Slavoj 
Žižek endorsing Donald Trump as a clever performance of a particular left-wing 
indictment of liberalism and Richard Spencer endorsing Donald Trump as a clever 
performance of a particular right-wing indictment of liberalism? I don’t doubt that 
there is a difference, but I am interested in how we know we know that there is one. 
Foucault’s reflections on Pohlenz suggest that theory will not be able to develop any 
early warning or feedback system in the realm of ideas working on other ideas for 
indicating when it is off the mark or moving in Pohlenzian directions. If these 
warning systems are to be found, they lie (for Foucault, for Dewey, and for me) in 
engagement with what actually happens—with “the movements, critiques, and 
experiences” that arise in concrete situations. This difficulty does not only confront 
Kantians, Heideggerians, or the other major hierophantic traditions: it applies to 
“minor theory” as well, to works that explore open-world cosmologies and celebrate 
contestation and seek to “light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind… catch 
the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it… [that] multiply, not judgments, but signs of 
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existence… a criticism of scintillating leaps of the imagination… [that] bear[s] the 
lightning of possible storms.”11 
That’s fine for you to criticize the practices of associational critique and abstraction, 
someone might object (again), but what then is political theory supposed to do? It has 
“theory” right in the name. It is true that Foucault does say that he is not interested in 
a theory that “guides” practice as if from above, but this is only en route to saying 
that theory and practice are and must be plaited together in the braid of experience, 
of “philosophy-as-life, in… philosophical life, [in] ethos.” Recall that Foucault says 
too that “equipment… is the medium through which logos is transformed into 
ethos” and that Paul Rabinow, exploring what this Foucauldian “equipment” might 
consist of, suggests the work of building a “toolkit of concepts for conducting 
inquiries into the contemporary world in its actuality” and working so that those 
inquiries should make “the relations, connections, and disjunction between logos and 
ethos apparent and available… to make those relations part of inquiry itself as well as 
part of a life.”12 Foucault’s and Rabinow’s search for concretely-grounded 
philosophical equipment finds further elaboration in William C. Wimsatt’s work on 
putting practice at the center of theory rather than the other way around: “We also 
need a context of real problems, keeping us honest in ways that idealizations and toy 
                                                 
11 Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 1 
(New York: New Press, 1997), 323. 
12 Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 12. The original logos/ethos quote is the epigraph of that book. 
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examples common in philosophy often fail to do. In practice we use surprisingly 
powerful heuristic tools rather than such idealizations to structure our search. These 
new tools are sources of inspiration for an alternative, robust, naturalistic, and 
scientifically motivated realist philosophy.”13 Wimsatt urges the development of 
concrete, grounded heuristic techniques rather than reliance on abstraction: 
we start with our actual practice—but seeing these practices for their strengths 
as evolved cognitive adaptations rather than as compromised attempts to 
pursue our ideals. These ‘deviations’ are not failings, but the source of our 
peculiar strengths in this uncertain world of complex, evolving beings, 
technologies, and institutions… [These practices are] neither axioms nor 
algorithms… they are re-tuned, re-modulated, re-contextualized, and often 
newly reconnected piecemeal rearrangements of existing adaptations or 
exaptations, and they encourage us to do likewise with whatever we 
construct.14 
This project pursues a more heuristic, flexible, and grounded theoretical practice, one 
in which our drive for a different world lies at the center of our work rather than at 
the end. 
* 
I am not arguing that all theory is useless, only that most theoretical work entertains 
by necessity a vexed relationship with what is occurent and that theoretical practice 
going forward ought to map and incorporate the feedback loops that operate 
                                                 
13 William C. Wimsatt, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 5. 
14 Ibid., 10. Some emphasis removed. 
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between theory and the real world as a point of departure for further inquiry. This 
task, of course, harks back to Antonio Gramsci’s questions about theory and practice 
in his prison notebooks and his call for a “study of how ‘situations’ should be 
analysed, a.k.a. how to establish the various levels of the relations of force [and] the 
science and art of politics… understood as a body of practical rules for research and 
of detailed observations useful for awakening an interest in effective reality and for 
stimulating more rigorous and more vigorous political insights.” Gramsci further 
argues that “this [type of inquiry] should be accompanied by the explanation of what 
is meant in politics by strategy and tactics, by strategic ‘plan,’ by propaganda and 
agitation, by command structure or science of political organisation and 
administration.”15 In a sense, the starting point I am proposing here is by necessity a 
rearticulation of Gramsci’s interest in a concrete philosophy of praxis, albeit laden 
with a different political context and spanning different theoretical boundaries. The 
undertaking I am suggesting encompasses a variety of theoretical practices, many of 
which are guaranteed to be not just unanticipated but unanticipatable. Examples of 
plausible paths forward in this area might include J.K. Gibson-Graham’s work on the 
Latrobe Valley and in producing a handbook like Take Back the Economy,16 Reza 
Negarestani’s interest in cognitive mapping as a technique for directing concrete 
                                                 
15 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers Co., 1971), 
176-77. 
16 J.K. Gibson-Graham, A Postcapitalist Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) and 
Take Back the Economy: An Ethical Guide to Transforming Our Communities (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2013). 
10 
 
action,17 Tiziana Terranova’s work on reprogramming existing technosocial systems 
“away from recent trends towards corporatisation and monetization” and “draw[ing] 
together current experimentation with hardware able to support a new breed of 
‘imaginary apps’” that might facilitate ends such as “allow[ing] migrants to bypass 
border controls… or… to track the origin of commodities, their degrees of 
exploitation,”18 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor’s work on how the movement for black 
lives can be linked to further projects for black liberation,19 and, of course, Gramsci’s 
own arguments that, e.g., “elements of empirical observation which are habitually 
included higgledy-piggledy in works of political science… ought, in so far as they are 
not abstract and illusory, to be inserted into the context of the relations of force, on 
one level or another.”20 This dissertation, which combines the work of Dewey and 
Foucault to build a power-sensitive pragmatist political theory capable of contributing 
to more survivable futures, hopes to draw from these projects’ theoretically-informed 
                                                 
17 “Unlike classical Marxism,” Michael Albert writes of accelerationists and neorationalists like 
Negarestani, “which posited deterministic laws and claimed to know the course of history, this 
navigational conception of rational agency [advanced by accelerationist and neorationalist thought] is 
one that aims to  ‘cognitively map’ society as a complex phase space of cross cutting trajectories in 
order to render social complexity intelligible and enhance left capacities for strategic action.” See 
Michael Albert, “Praxis, Technology, Hegemony: The Challenge of Left Accelerationism,” 
forthcoming, 2017, and Reza Negarestani, “The Labor of the Inhuman,” parts I and II, E-flux, no. 
53, 2013. 
18 Tiziana Terranova, “Red Stack Attack! Algorithms, capital, and the automation of the commons,” 
in Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, ed. Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (Falmouth, UK: 
Urbanomic, 2014), 381-99. See also the fourth chapter of this dissertation, which pursues a project 
related to the one Terranova advocates. 
19 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
2016). 
20 Gramsci, Notebooks, 176. 
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engagements with the world and to affirm Emerson’s dictum that “the existing world 
is not a dream, and cannot with impunity be treated as a dream.”21 
This undertaking draws on three problematics active in contemporary political theory. 
The first area of inquiry works with resonances between Dewey’s pragmatism and 
Foucault’s work on power relations. The connections between Dewey and Foucault 
have been examined by John Stuhr, Colin Koopman, and others22 in the last two 
decades, but essential questions remain underexplored, especially those having to do 
with each thinker’s treatment of power relations. 
The second problematic is more closely related to the discussion of Foucault that 
began this introduction. It has to do with a way of discussing the relationship 
between political theory and politics. In recent years, Raymond Geuss and William A. 
Galston23 have identified an unexpected “realist” streak in political theory spanning 
thinkers like Bonnie Honig, Bernard Williams, Jeremy Waldron, William E. Connolly, 
                                                 
21 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Conservative,” in Nature; Addresses and Lectures (Boston: James 
Munroe and Co., 1849), 293. 
22 See inter alia John Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997); John Stuhr, 
Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and the Future of Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2003); a collection edited 
by Paul Fairfield entitled John Dewey and Continental Philosophy (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2013); and much of Colin Koopman’s work, perhaps starting with “Genealogical 
Pragmatism: How History Matters for Foucault and Dewey,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 
(2011): 533–561. 
23 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); William 
A. Galston, “Realism in Political Theory,” Brookings Institution draft, 2007. 
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and others.24 For these small-r realists, the “high liberalism” of Rawls, Dworkin, and 
their hierophants “evades” rather than engages with politics.25 The realists remain 
skeptical of attempts to construct ideal theories of politics or formulas for justice that 
exceed social and material contexts. Instead, they emphasize the context and 
embedded status of political problems, the question of what actually happens in a 
political situation, and a careful attention to power relations.26 Theory realism moves 
the relationship between theory and politics away from an approach in which 
theorists draw conclusions about the “nature” of this or that political idea or draw 
and redraw borders and connections between ideas on a conceptual field while 
implying that some indelible but inarticulable relationship to politics inheres in this 
work. Power pragmatism builds from the realist rejection of abstracted theoretical 
work to offer an alternative conception of the relationship between politics and 
theory: one that is heuristic, problem-oriented, concerned about the real operations 
of power, and interested in abstractions only insofar as they lead to or make possible 
certain real outcomes. 
The third problematic has to do with how feminist attention to science, technology, 
and society can generate new tactics and roadmaps for how to develop more 
egalitarian relations between humans. In The Dialectic of Sex, Shulamith Firestone 
                                                 
24 Galston, “Realism.” 
25 Ibid., 1-3, and following Honig’s remark that liberal theorists often seek “the displacement of 
politics in political theory.” 
26 Geuss, Real, 11-16. 
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advocates the aggressive use of reproductive technology to relieve women from the 
burden of child-bearing and, eventually, to reshuffle gender itself. I argue that 
Firestone’s radical approach is more than a curio of ’70s-era feminism: it shows how 
radical political programs must turn their attention to the interrelations of science, 
technology, and society and begin to rework them for political ends. Firestone’s 
work, in short, shows one route for linking power pragmatism as a political theory to 
really-existing political problems. This path can be extended, I will argue, further than 
Firestone took it, toward an analysis of the technology stacks and critical 
infrastructure services that make human lives and lifestyles possible. 
* 
Chapter one shows how Dewey’s pragmatism offers a flexible, holistic, forward-
looking, reconstructive, problem-oriented approach to social and political problems. 
This framework makes it possible to say sophisticated things about hard problems, 
like the constitution of the self or what a “public” is, largely without recourse to 
foundational claims, systems of abstract propositions, or inflexible “first principles.” 
Pragmatism gets caught up in metaphysical or eristic debates less often than it might 
in part because of its forward-moving, problem-oriented, and reconstructive 
character. Dewey encourages political actors “to focus on the meliorative attunement 
to difficulties at hand, and to furnish for ourselves possibilities of improvement on 
14 
 
the basis of resources made available to us by the wider environments.”27 As 
appealing as this approach might sound in summary, American pragmatism is 
hindered by a longstanding blind spot. Pragmatists like Dewey tend not to adequately 
address unequal relations between human beings or the structures that countenance 
these inequalities. As R. W. Hildreth tells us, “one of the most enduring criticisms of 
John Dewey’s political thought is that it is unsuspicious of power.”28 
If Deweyan pragmatism offers an attractive approach to social and political problems 
but is hamstrung by its relative blindness to power, how do you go about mixing in—
like introducing a stabilizing species into an ecosystem—an account of power? And 
how do you pick an analysis of power that fits in the pragmatist biome? After all, 
many available accounts of power invoke broad sets of claims incompatible with the 
pragmatist approach. What I’m looking for is a sophisticated account of power—an 
analysis of how relations of domination, say, distort the social field—situated in a 
framework that complements rather than conflicts with Dewey’s outlook. 
Enter Foucault. “Dewey and Foucault,” Richard Rorty argues, “make exactly the 
same criticism of the tradition. They agree, right down the line, about the need to 
abandon traditional notions of rationality, objectivity, method, and truth…. They 
agree that rationality is what history and society make it—that there is no overarching 
                                                 
27 Colin Koopman, “Foucault and Pragmatism: Introductory Notes on Metaphilosophical 
Methodology” Foucault Studies, no. 11 (2011): 3-10. 
28 R.W. Hildreth, “Reconstructing Dewey on Power,” Political Theory 37, no. 6 (2009): 780. 
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ahistorical structure (the Nature of Man, the laws of human behavior, the Moral Law, 
the Nature of Society) to be discovered.”29 Rorty is neither the first nor last 
commenter to make this observation. Chapter one will be concerned in part with 
complicating this basic insight while departing from other Rortian claims (particularly 
those that understand Foucault as corrosively skeptical). The most important 
resonance between Dewey and Foucault for my purposes has to do with the way 
Foucault’s analysis of power is both compatible and in tension with a Deweyan 
framework. The insight of Foucault’s that structures contemporary discussions of 
power involves viewing power as a function of relations between people rather than a 
centrally-kept substance or bedrock of authority.30 Power no longer rests with 
monarchs and judges, jealously guarded, doled out here and there. Instead, power 
tessellates through humans, institutions, social formations: fields of power as the 
patterns made by iron filings among shifting magnets rather than whatever was once 
meant by overfull words like “sovereignty,” “authority,” or “might.” Foucault offers a 
view of power that does not overwrite pragmatist claims (or lack thereof) about 
epistemology, the possibility of fundaments for knowledge and ethics, and so on. 
Therefore, I offer Foucault’s treatment of power—with special attention to his 
formulation in the first volume of his History of Sexuality—as a corrective to Dewey’s 
relative blindness to power relations. 
                                                 
29 Richard Rorty, “Method, Social Science, and Social Hope,” in Consequences of Pragmatism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 582. 
30 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, No. 4 (1982): 777-795. 
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Chapter one, therefore, describes (i) what Deweyan pragmatism has to offer, (ii) how 
it is hindered by its weak account of power, (iii) strengths and limitations of the 
current literature putting Dewey and Foucault into conversation, and (iv) the 
transition to chapter two, where power pragmatism is developed. 
Chapter two links Dewey and Foucault on the basis of their shared skepticism toward 
purity and profundity, views of tragedy and futurity, interest in applied technology 
and social relations, and work on power. Dewey and Foucault both hold purity and 
profundity, as elements of philosophical and political projects, in skeptical regard. 
Dewey suspects that the combination and recombination of concepts in absence of 
sustained engagement with concrete experience has limited usefulness. Foucault, 
meanwhile, distances his work from a kind of purist antideviationism in which one 
method or principle holds sway and all aberrations to it are to be exposed and rooted 
out. Eddie Glaude writes that Dewey helps guide you away from the drive “to 
uncover one single principle of morality” in part because “these efforts [at one single 
principle], in whatever form, fail to acknowledge the centrality of uncertainty and 
conflict to our moral experiences.”31 Glaude builds from this Deweyan skepticism of 
moral purity a description of how pragmatism fits with a tragic worldview. Tragedy, 
in this sense, involves the recognition of being wounded but of having to go on. 
James Baldwin, as Glaude notes, has given famous expression to this sentiment. 
When asked if he consider himself a pessimist, Baldwin says that he cannot be a 
                                                 
31 Eddie Glaude, In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 26-27. 
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pessimist because he remains alive. “To be a pessimist,” he continues, “means that 
you have agreed that human life is an academic matter, so I’m forced to be an 
optimist.” Dewey, Glaude, and I would say meliorist in the place of Baldwin’s 
“optimist,” but the sentiment otherwise rings true. Foucault, for his part, exhibits a 
kind of tragic awareness when he writes and speaks about the prospect of using 
available political tools—including rights—to foment forms “of resistance against 
domination” and “intensification[s] of power relations.”32 Chapter two concludes 
with a discussion of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). I acknowledge that social 
theory has long exchanged ideas with psychoanalytic theory and suggest that it might 
benefit from a similar exchange with cognitive-behavioral therapy. I argue that CBT’s 
interest in concrete procedures and intervening in feedback loops makes it an 
interesting, if unexpected, fit with a power-pragmatist approach. Chapter two closes 
with a discussion of the prospect of a cognitive-behavioral political theory. 
I begin to “apply” power pragmatism in chapters three and four. Rather than 
immediately dropping the theory wholesale onto some unsuspecting situation or 
problem, I look to the recent history of political thought for work that exemplifies 
power-pragmatist engagement. Chapter three, therefore, centers on Shulamith 
Firestone’s Dialectic of Sex. 
                                                 
32 Joan Reynolds, “‘Pragmatic Humanism’ in Foucault’s Later Work,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 37, no. 4 (2004): 972-73 and Michel Foucault, “What is 
Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 48. 
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Firestone argues for using new reproductive technologies to shift the burden of child-
bearing away from women as part of a strategy for ending domination based on sex. 
Her vision of a future in which redistributing human reproductive capacity leads to 
changed social and economic conditions exemplifies a power-pragmatist approach to 
science, technology, and social relations. I argue that Firestone mobilizes a Deweyan 
sense of how science works and can be reworked (emphasizing instrumental doing-
power rather than nomological deduction), a Deweyan sense of the possibility and 
necessity of holistic social change, and a deep sensitivity to unequal power relations. 
Firestone demonstrates how to reconceptualize and remake science-technology-social 
relations triads: register the deep and multiple interconnections between material 
forces and social relations, recognize science-technology as the enactment, 
recognition, manipulation, perforation, and remaking of material and social forces 
and assemblages, and remanipulate science-technology with the aim of reordering the 
social. (As the xenofeminists, following Firestone, write: “If nature is unjust, change 
nature!”)33 
Finally, chapter four shows how a power-pragmatist, Firestone-inspired use of 
science for egalitarian projects opens onto ways of thinking about the importance of 
infrastructure and life-support technology. I write about a way of thinking called 
“stacktivism” that examines how the interleaved stacks of technology that make your 
lifestyle possible also condition the political possibilities available to you. Stacktivists 
                                                 




are inclined to ask questions like, “Who owns the means of not dying?” and “How 
can humans secure calories and heat without being subject to a sprawling national-
security apparatus that secures the infrastructure that delivers food and electricity?” 
This focus on material realities and technical problems broadens Firestone’s interest 
in applied technology and insists on the importance of concrete pragmatism for 
radical politics. 
One of the aspirations of this project is to contribute to attempts to strategically 
instrumentalize (so as to deform and free) science and technology. Currently, 
technolibertarians, venture capitalists, and military-industrial actors own the 
vocabulary around advances in technological know-how. The Left needs this 
vocabulary, however, and we’re coming to take it. The hope of this project is that a 
power-sensitive pragmatism can reshuffle the interrelations among science-
technology-society, and can work to repurpose these relations toward securing a 












§1.1 Power pragmatism 
Should I offer my congratulations? You 
have corralled a gorgeous mess of 
problems…. It’s unclear how long this 
odd good fortune will last, however. So I 
suggest you act decisively to take 
maximum advantage of the opportunities 
that your dilemmas have cracked open. If 
anyone can turn the heartache of 
misplaced energy into practical wisdom, 
it’s you. Is it possible to be both cunning 
and conscientious, both strategic and 
ethical? For you right now, I think it is. 
— Leo horoscope, week of 
9/27/15, City Paper 
The broad thesis of this study is that political theory at its best is encumbered by 
politics. I explore the idea that a significant part of the value of a political theory is 
pragmatic. That is to say, the relations a theory assumes with really-existing political 
problems matter a great deal.34 In order to specify the contours and limits of the 
                                                 
34 Sussing out what sorts of entities are invoked by “relations” in this sentence is no small task. See 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power,” in Language, Counter-Memory, and 
Practice, ed. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 208; Colin Koopman, Genealogy 
as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 133-34; 
John Dewey, “The Quest for Certainty,” in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1984), 181, 194; for an obliquely related view, Ludwig 
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relationship between political theory and politics, I draw from the pragmatist 
tradition, especially John Dewey, but also from the work of Michel Foucault, because 
of his focus on how theory and politics occur in fields of power and shifting relations 
of force. My aim is to articulate a problem-oriented, power-sensitive, purposeful 
relationship between theory and politics, a “power pragmatism.” 
 
§1.2 Coloring in pragmatism 
What tools does Dewey offer for understanding political situations and developing a 
sense of what it means to live as a political being? Deweyan pragmatism offers a 
flexible, consilient, holistic, purposeful, forward-looking, reconstructive, resource-
sensitive, meliorative approach to social and political problems. I’ll explain each of 
these characteristics in order to paint a fuller picture of what Dewey’s pragmatism is 
and what it’s meant to do. 
Pragmatism is flexible. The Deweyan approach opposes rigidity in thought, action, 
and method. Take Dewey’s definition of freedom. For Dewey, freedom “consists in a 
trend of conduct that causes choices to be more diversified and flexible, more plastic 
and more cognizant of their own meaning, while it enlarges their range of unimpeded 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2011), §§109, 133.  
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operation.”35 Note the methodological flexibility at work: rather than an apodictic 
definition, gnomic pronouncement, or preexisting source that free selves draw on, 
freedom “consists in a trend of conduct.” In the first six words of his definition, 
Dewey evades and unsettles received definitions of freedom. Understanding freedom 
as a trend of conduct introduces a new degree of flexibility. Discussing trends of 
conduct means accounting for successions of situations and their particulars rather 
                                                 
35 John Dewey, “Philosophies of Freedom,” in The Essential Dewey: Ethics, Logic, Psychology, vol. 2, ed. 
Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 311. What 
does a “trend of conduct” consist of? Characteristically, Dewey does not give an account of what a 
trend “really is,” or posit “tendencies” that broadly guide social life (as in Bergson’s two tendencies 
of instinct and intelligence in Creative Evolution or the “open” and “closed” moral tendencies from The 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion). Instead, a trend of conduct involves a shifting array of context-
dependent dispositions, action, value judgments, material conditions, institutions, historically-
assembled feedback loops, technics, and so on. If I bicycle to work this week, a roil of inputs 
(unseasonably warm weather has cleared the bike lane of snow, a road diet has calmed traffic on the 
residential throughway near my house, ground-level ozone has dropped) render this a “freer” trend 
of conduct not because it accords with an a priori definition of either “freedom” or “trend of 
conduct,” but because the constituents that make it up, the context within which it occurs, the 
reciprocal relations it enters into, and the effects it has make it so. My cycling to work makes it safer 
for others to do so. This encourages more ridership, further lowering cycling fatalities, making way 
for still more humans on bikes. (See Rune Elvik, “The non-linearity of risk and the promotion of 
environmentally sustainable transport,” Accident Analysis & Prevention 41, no. 4 [2009]: 849–855; 
Grégory Vandenbulcke et al., “Mapping bicycle use and the risk of accidents for commuters who 
cycle to work in Belgium,” Transport Policy 16, no. 2 [2009]: 77–87; Judy Geyer et al., “Safety in 
Numbers: Data from Oakland, California,” Transportation Research Record, no. 1982 [2006]: 150–154.) 
This brings into being a flowing constituency with determinate legal-material effects (traffic calming, 
the conversion of street parking into bike and bus lanes, year-over-year declines in childhood asthma) 
that also makes possible ways of being in the world that disrupt the commuter-consumer carbon-
intensive system-environment hybrid. Often humble “trends of conduct” reach much further than 
anticipated. Recall Dewey’s rejection of habit as merely “a recurrent external mode of action, like 
smoking or swearing…. Habit reaches even more significantly down into the very structure of the 
self; it signifies the building up and solidifying of certain desires; and increased sensitiveness and 
responsiveness to certain stimuli, a confirmed or an impaired capacity to attend to and think” (see 
Later Works, vol. 7, 170-71). I join Dewey in the expectation that when putatively radical social 
change is examined, there flow at its heart interlaced streams of conduct swollen with material 
constraints, social structures, changing inclinations, meteorological trends, rear derailleurs, human 




than formulating a thin and timeless maxim, as in, e.g., certain negative-freedom 
accounts that identify freedom with the absence of constraint36 (as every Libertarian 
knows, you are never more free than when fired into the vacuum of space). Dewey 
emphasizes “a common-sense practical belief in freedom” as an effective way of 
realizing a substantive, responsive flexibility for navigating and growing within the 
world: “what men actually cherish under the name of freedom,” he writes, “is that 
power of varied and flexible growth, of change of disposition of character.”37 
Freedom’s flexibility is crucial not only because humans must constantly respond to a 
changing world, but also because of its recursive qualities: flexibility means being able 
to evaluate information and make choices that deepen and extend one’s future ability 
to evaluate information and make choices.38 Freedom involves the constant moving 
uptake, repurposing, and plasticizing of disparate resources, strategies, tools.39 This is 
impossible without a flexible approach not only to social-scientific inquiry, but also to 
                                                 
36 Sometimes literally: “For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move within a certain 
space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty 
to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or 
chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels that otherwise would spread itself into 
a larger space, we use to say, that they are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those 
external impediments they would.” See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1994), 136. 
37 Dewey, “Freedom,” 313. “Men” sic. 
38 Ibid., 311-14. 
39 Ibid., 314. 
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everyday conduct and situational judgments. As Shulamith Firestone writes, “The 
most important characteristic to be maintained in any revolution is flexibility.”40 
Pragmatism is consilient. Consilience refers to the convergence of evidence from 
different sources, some of which are spotty and none of which is definitive, toward 
an improved way of understanding.41 Two important features of consilience surface 
in Dewey: no one source of evidence, reason, or line of argument is definitive (in fact, 
the quest for definitiveness is a red herring) and heterogeneous forms of evidence, 
produced by diverse means of verification, observation, testing, and judgment, guide 
outcomes. Different forms of evidence “mutually reinforce” one another, producing 
dappled solutions.42 Dewey argues that “seemingly incoherent and disconnected facts 
are brought together” so as to determine which conceptions are best “at clarifying 
dark spots, untying hard knots,” irrespective of which ideas appear best “in the 
abstract.”43 This evidential pluralism contributes to pragmatism’s ability to offer 
guidance in complex situations without sclerotic formalization, cheap shortcuts, or 
abstractions that only shift problems to higher levels of generality. Deweyan 
consilience works to loosen the Gordian knot from different angles rather than 
purporting to cut it with one sudden stroke. 
                                                 
40 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), 257. 
41 Occasionally, as in E. O. Wilson’s Consilience, consilience  is associated with convergence toward a 
something like universal truth. I do not take this view. 
42 Hugh McDonald, John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY, 2004), 119. 
43 Dewey, Essential Dewey, vol. 2, 146-47. 
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Pragmatism is holistic.44 Dewey’s holism is well-documented. Hugh McDonald, 
discussing a Deweyan approach to moral decisions in an ecological context, writes 
that “Dewey is holistic and no one element is more important than the whole web of 
relations in moral deliberation.”45 Dewey’s holism helps his flexible, plastic method 
avoid slipping into an ad hocery that floats free of structural elements or 
considerations of value: “Dewey is careful to relate these [elements of moral 
deliberation] to one another in a mutually reinforcing way. Thus circumstances are 
not the ultimate test, for their resolution is in terms of a positive direction of change, 
which includes both values, inclusive, overall goods, and reference to 
consequences….  Moral activities are incorporated into the overall activity of the 
organism.”46 The literature on ecology and pragmatism highlights the ways that 
Dewey’s holism extends to his understanding of ethical judgment and to his 
naturalism. A moral judgment, for Dewey, convokes rules, ends, means, outcomes, 
context, and character. These together guide moral action. Where consequentialist 
theories of morality prize the outcome of a given action, deontological accounts 
examine an act’s relationship with a duty or law, and virtue ethics emphasize the 
development of moral character, Dewey holds that no type of moral claim prevails on 
its own. But none is discarded, either. The values you or I associate with different 
actions, to take one example, weigh on decision-making but do not determine it. Our 
                                                 
44 For further discussion about the relationship between pragmatism and holism, see Richard Rorty 
and E. P. Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart?” Philosophy and Literature 26, no. 2 (2002): 369-71. 




values enter into holistic, mutual exchanges with context, intention, consequences, 
and so forth.47 This account of interlinked, plural sources for moral situations links 
up with Dewey’s holistic naturalism in at least two ways.48 First, Dewey maintains 
that moral claims and living cannot be separated: “moral values, regulations, 
principles and objects… are part and parcel of a normal development of a life 
process.”49 Second, and partly because of the connection between living and morality, 
the convocation of the components of a moral choice echoes Dewey’s holistic 
account of organic existence in which “the whole organism is concerned in every act 
to some extent and in some fashion…. Since the total state of the organism is never 
exactly twice alike, in so far the phenomena of hunger and sex are never twice the 
same in fact.”50 This holism among diverse parts extends to the environment in 
which organisms act.51 To isolate, decontextualize, or make singular any moral value, 
biological capability, or material fact is to neglect the holistic character of moral 
choices, environments, and organic life. Action, thought, and ethics are rooted in 
                                                 
47 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Carlton House, 1922), 39-41, 45-46, 48. 
48 Recall that Dewey’s naturalism involves the non-reductive observation that to speak of human 
action is to speak of exchanges by organic entities in a natural context. Subject-object distinctions, for 
example, cannot be formulated in such a way as to ignore the mutually-constitutive relationship 
between an organism and its environment. No action, principle, or entity can be distinguished from 
its implication in different levels of naturalistic exchanges. See Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 51-
53; Richard J. Bernstein, “Dewey’s Naturalism,” The Review of Metaphysics 13, no. 2 (1959): 340-353. 
49 Dewey, Conduct, 184-85. 
50 Ibid., 149-51.  
51 Ibid., 150-151.  
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organic and moral contexts with which they make a whole and from which they 
cannot be separated. 
Pragmatism is purposeful. Much of Dewey’s work offers, as Richard Bernstein 
argues, “a cosmological vision of an open universe in which there is irreducible 
novelty, chance, and contingency.”52 How does Dewey balance his inclination toward 
an open universe with his endorsement of the capacity, in humans, for considered 
action in service of social transformation? Democratic purposiveness and open-
universe cosmologies aren’t baldy incompatible, of course, but neither do they fit 
together seamlessly.53 Dewey’s sense of melioristic purpose doesn’t break from his 
view of a universe in flux, but instead imposes a transient, ad-hoc, recursive ordering 
within an open-universe conceptual frame. Dewey’s sense of stick-to-itiveness is not 
best understood as a slip into credulity or technocracy. Instead, Dewey’s 
purposiveness is inseparable from and made possible by his emphasis on a dynamic 
world that is underdetermined but not devoid of patterns. There remains space in the 
cosmos for human purpose as a practice of navigation. The ongoing and imperfect 
attempt to act intelligently within the world derives its importance in large part from 
                                                 
52 Richard Bernstein, “The Resurgence of Pragmatism,” Social Research 59 (1992): 814. See also John 
Dewey, “The Development of American Pragmatism,” in The Essential Dewey: Pragmatism, Education, 
Democracy, vol. 1, ed. Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander (Indianapolis: Indiana, 1998), 6. 
53 Witness as one attempt to make them fit Richard Rorty’s infamous public liberal/private ironist 
distinction, in which educated democrats read Nietzsche at home and forget him when they go to the 




the fact that the world evades attempts to anatomize it. Actions matter.54 The 
concrete effects of a given action make a difference to the whole and must be taken 
into account in any further attempt to alter the scene and its effects. Considered 
action is “distinctively moral” in large part because it is possible to make better or 
worse decisions about what to do.55 Moreover, it is possible to take action that 
strengthens or destroys the capacity to formulate and discern better or worse courses 
of action to begin with. 
Pragmatism is forward-looking. This characteristic follows closely from the point 
about the possibility of making better and worse decisions. Dewey argues that 
“instead of saying that a man requires a motive in order to induce him to act, we 
should say that when a man is going to act he needs to know what he is going to do—
what the quality of his act is in terms of consequences to follow…. [That is, a] 
forward-looking reference to results.”56 Dewey departs from viewing action as having 
psychological or metaphysical priors like “motive” from which it retroactively draws 
impetus, meaning, and justification. Instead, actions are taken with reference to their 
effect on the future: a “forward-looking reference to results.” If “motive” coheres, it 
is because it accretes forward, through action and decision-making, not because it 
                                                 
54 Dewey, Conduct, 278-79. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 121. “Man” sic. 
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preexists them.57 Dewey’s example here is quotidian, but the pragmatic emphasis on 
looking forward extends beyond this everyday sense. A social theorist with this 
forward-looking approach, for example, is primarily interested in interventions into 
the history of philosophy and social theory insofar as they change the resources 
available for understanding present conditions and working toward more favorable 
futures. 
Pragmatism is reconstructive and resource-sensitive. Dewey’s reconstructive 
approach draws on the historical, material, social conditions assembled by prior 
events to transform a given situation or state of affairs going forward.58 “Transform” 
is characteristically context-dependent, referring to the holistic moral dimensions at 
play and the resources available for changing a given situation. “Situation” and “state 
of affairs” are similarly contingent, referring as they do to the interacting material 
factors, social conditions, actants, values, and so on that grow and sustain the 
problems you confront and the milieux in which you confront them. Dewey points 
out that what’s available (psychologically, technologically, culturally) in a given 
situation for handling a problem matters. Reconstruction means resituating, 
deforming, shuffling, and reinterpreting present material, social, historical, and 
intellectual circumstances so as to engender better rather than worse outcomes. It 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 122-3. 
58 For a related treatment of reconstruction in Dewey’s thought, see Colin Koopman, “Genealogical 




means disconnecting certain feedback loops and building in new ones. “Concrete 
suggestions arising from past experiences,” Dewey (picking up steam) writes, 
“developed and matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, 
employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or 
failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment, suffice.”59 Solutions, decision 
procedures, tools for understanding, and so on cannot be summoned whole-cloth, 
nor brought into existence by the sudden apprehension of truth, the sure application 
of rationality, or any approach deriving from radical disconnection from present 
conditions and resources.60 To undertake a Deweyan approach to problems is to 
attend to and engage in detailed empirical and theoretical analyses of the situation at 
hand, its available resources, its obstructed routes. No theory of politics can spin 
frictionlessly, unencumbered by concrete situations. 
 
A pragmatic meliorism emerges from these characteristics. It is crucial to distinguish 
meliorism from optimism. Though Dewey stands accused of inveterate optimism, his 
orientation is different. Optimism, at its weakest, connotes an inclination toward 
viewing the world favorably and, at its strongest, the Panglossian insistence that you 
                                                 
59 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 95-96. 
60 See §2.1. 
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live and act in “the best of all possible worlds.”61 Meliorism’s claim is narrower. 
Dewey writes that “if we form general ideas and if we put them in action, 
consequences are produced which could not be produced otherwise. Under these 
conditions the world will be different from what it would have been if thought had 
not intervened. This consideration confirms the human and moral importance of 
thought and its reflective operation in experience.”62 For Dewey, this point, which 
authorizes a species of meliorism, extends beyond “reason, thought and knowledge” 
and into the many interconnected constituents of action.63 A meliorist argues that a 
given condition can usually be better or worse, relatively speaking, and that a given 
action can make that condition better or worse. The skeptic objects that 
circumstances exceed my control: I can sometimes know what I do, but not what I 
do does, to paraphrase Foucault. Any action I take is caught up in a set of material, 
natural, and historical forces that deform my intentions. However, the fact that 
actions become involved in a set of effects beyond them is not sufficient to damn 
action generally.64 On the contrary, the difficulty and complexity of action only 
                                                 
61 Voltaire, Candide (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); Gottfried Leibniz, Théodicée (New York: 
Routledge, 1951), 288. 
62 John Dewey, “American Pragmatism,” 8-9. In this passage, Dewey is defending William James 
from the charge that James’s work has no place for thought. 
63 Ibid. 
64 For Dewey, acting despite this knowledge involves a kind of “humility,” that is, “the sense of our 
slight inability even with our best intelligence and effort to command events; a sense of our 
dependence on forces that go their way without our wish and plan. Its purport is not to relax effort 
but to make us prize every opportunity.” We do not act despite the knowledge that our actions are 
beset by difficulty. We act via that knowledge. See Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 289-291. 
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reinforces the necessity of critical consideration and attentiveness on my part.65 Such 
attentiveness is indispensable to the melioristic work pragmatism urges. 
 
§1.3 Dewey’s shortcomings 
The foregoing discussion of the central traits of Deweyan pragmatism is doubly 
positive: it describes plans for action and it’s upbeat. Although there is an awareness 
of how available resources limit meliorist projects, and Dewey acknowledges that to 
argue that things could be better means taking seriously the prospect that they could 
be worse, the tone of much of Dewey’s work is confident about the power of human 
ingenuity and rationality to address problems. At the same time, unequal power 
relations make little appearance in Dewey’s account. 
The pragmatism described above tends to imagine those who engage in meliorative 
work as coming to problems with a standard, freely-available set of capabilities, like 
someone trying to open a pickle jar who has ten healthy fingers, running water, a 
kitchen drawer full of rubber jar openers. Material, emotional, bodily, historical, and 
nutritional preconditions have to be in place for Dewey’s reconstructive meliorism to 
be thinkable, let alone functional.66 Moreover, the problems pragmatism confronts 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Dewey himself levels a version of this charge against “classic Liberalism” and negative conceptions 
of freedom. See Dewey, Essential Dewey, vol. 2, 305-308. 
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are never fully exterior to those who wish to solve them, and Dewey gives insufficient 
attention to this, though he does give some.67 They contain vicious recursive68 
dimensions: too often the stuck pickle jar turns out to be in some way constitutive of 
who you are and your capability to loosen anything. 
To be fair, Dewey does give an involved account of the way that personal 
development, education, and experience contribute to the making and remaking of a 
self capable of meliorative work.69 He argues that 
in order that education of the young be efficacious in inducing an improved 
society, it is not necessary for adults to have a formulated definite ideal of 
some better state. An educational enterprise conducted in this spirit would 
probably end merely in substituting one rigidity for another. What is necessary 
is that habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively 
percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, 
more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current. 
Then they will meet their own problems and propose their own 
improvements.70 
Dewey further notes that “educative development of the young is not the only way in 
which the life of impulse may be employed to effect social ameliorations…. No adult 
                                                 
67 E.g., “Courses of action which put the blame exclusively on a person as if his evil will were the sole 
cause of wrong-doing and those which condone offense on account of the share of social conditions 
in producing bad disposition, are equally ways of making an unreal separation of man from his 
surroundings, mind from the world…. Our entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends to 
prevent recognition of social partnership in producing crime” (Dewey, Conduct, 17-19). 
68 A commodius vicus of recirculation, even. See James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York: Penguin, 
1999), 1. 
69 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 16-18, 121-122, 128-130. 
70 Ibid., 16-17, 128. 
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environment is all of one piece. The more complex a culture is, the more certain it is 
to include habits formed on differing, even conflicting patterns. Each custom may be 
rigid, unintelligent in itself, and yet this rigidity may cause it to wear upon others. The 
resulting attrition may release impulse for new adventures.”71 Even if, however, 
Dewey offers tools for addressing problems of recursivity, and helps to dissolve the 
overly sharp distinction between problems and solvers that pervades my earlier 
discussion, he still lacks a sophisticated account of power as domination. Moreover, he 
neglects the relationship between power as capacity and power as domination. Do 
asymmetric relations of power result in the uneven distribution of reconstructive 
capacities across populations? If I can’t eat tonight, does it matter much whether I 
should take a meliorist or impossibilist approach to social problems? If the formative 
event of my childhood was to be priced and sold, how does this affect my capacity to 
develop something called a “self” capable of reconstructive melioration? If I’m taught 
from an early age to describe myself as an I—to the extent that I look in the blue-
eyed mirror at eight and think “I’m an individual” as naturally as I’d think “snow is 
white”—does that carve out a space in me for the disposition to one day dissolve the 
structures of power that individuated that eight-year-old, or does this fact render the 
attempt to loosen those structures only an act, a surface play that leaves depths 
untouched? 
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It’s not clear how pragmatism answers questions of domination and unequal degrees 
of social power. Commenters have indicted pragmatism, and Dewey specifically, for 
being “unsuspicious of structures of power,”72 having no account of power at all, or 
offering strategies that are open to cooptation by dominant groups.73 We can 
understand the weight of these charges by critically discussing a few of the 
characteristics of Deweyan pragmatism put forward in the preceding section. 
In the passage on Deweyan flexibility, I argued that Dewey puts forward responsive 
flexibility as a central practice for navigating political and ethical situations. Dewey 
holds that the valuable core of the too-abstract term “freedom” is “that power of 
varied and flexible growth, of change of disposition and character, that springs from 
intelligent choice.”74 Varied and flexible growth constitutes a “sound base for the 
common-sense practical belief in freedom.”75 Dewey expands this point when, 
defending pragmatism from the charge that it ratifies dominant interests, he writes 
that “the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends—to free 
experience from routine and from caprice. Not… to accomplish purposes already 
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given.”76 Dewey parries the charges being made against him by insisting that 
pragmatic freedom involves not only the invention of new means (which, critics 
maintained, could be put to any purpose), but also the ongoing creation of new ends. 
However, Dewey’s defense overestimates the independence, robustness, and 
neutrality of the processes for creating means and ends alike. He gives a sophisticated 
account of power as positive capacity, but overlooks the role played by power as 
domination.77 The capabilities, identities, and self-understandings that the critical, 
flexible freedom described above attaches to are unevenly distributed across 
populations. In many cases, these capabilities are actively blocked. Bodies think and 
act through different subjectivities as different locations, healths, economic situations, 
moods, and actor-networks move through them.78 Moreover, many of the capabilities 
Dewey endorses are implicated at their deepest levels with unequal structures of 
power. Dewey imagines a listener who, via pragmatism, becomes “more thoughtful; 
more cognizant of possible alternatives… thereby rendering his future choices more 
varied, flexible, and apt.”79 Yet, this deepening of a listener’s capacity for intelligent 
action does not occur in a neutral medium. A body comes to posses the capacity to 
                                                 
76 John Dewey, “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” in Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic 
Attitude, ed. John Dewey (New York: Holt, 1917), 63. 
77 For an overview and critique of the extensive literature on the difference between power as 
capacity and power as domination (sometimes “power-to” versus “power-over”), see Michael 
Karlberg, “The Power of Discourse and the Discourse of Power,” International Journal of Peace Studies 
10, no. 1 (2005). 
78 See, as one example, Jane Bennett’s ecological reading of The Public and its Problems in Vibrant Matter 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 100-102. 
79 Dewey, “Freedom,” 313. 
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do meliorative work only within and via specific conditions of subjectivation. 
Everyday examples of this point abound: the fact that I understand myself as an “I” 
stems from certain relays, experiences, and power differentials, and reproduces them 
in turn.80 Because the shifting agencies and self-understandings that make possible 
the action a body takes are enmeshed in historical, material, and social contexts, any 
attempt at melioristic work is capillarized head-to-foot by power relations. Dewey’s 
account of how capacities like “intelligent action” or “flexible freedom” are cultivated 
in subjects neglects the constitutive role power—as both capacity and domination—
plays in this process.81 
Dewey’s effort to fold different constituencies, life-worlds, and actors into a 
holistically-understood social whole82 is susceptible to the objection that there may be 
compelling reasons to draw hard distinctions across the social field. Joel Olson, 
following W.E.B. Du Bois, understands the social order in the United States not as a 
pluralist whole but as “two worlds cut by a color line.”83 To recognize this split 
between “two principal racial categories, white and non-white” is to better “pinpoint 
                                                 
80 The “I” you understand yourself to be shifts in mundane circumstances, too. If you have worked a 
service job, you know intuitively the difference between helping a customer on your first day, your 
last day, when you’re on break, when you’re two minutes to closing, when you have a stomach virus 
but know you’d better not call in sick. 
81 For an account of the human-centered nature of Dewey’s account, see Bennett, Vibrant, 102-103. 
82 John Dewey, “Psychology and Social Practice,” Psychological Review 7 (1900): 123; Dewey, Essential 
Dewey, vol. 2, 349-350; Gary A. Cook, “George Herbert Mead” in A Companion to Pragmatism, ed. John 
R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 76. 
83 Joel Olson, The Abolition of White Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 3. 
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the locus of political tensions” and to account for the “conflict, power, and alienation 
at the heart of the racial order.”84 Dualisms are analytically and politically powerful: 
“In explaining how one category defines the other, dualisms emphasize social 
relations and the role of power and conflict in them. This emphasis is not always 
found in models of difference or pluralism, given their tendency toward tolerance of 
different positions.”85 
Olson reveals how a focus on structures of domination challenges Dewey’s holism 
and sense of community. A pluralist holism is all well and good if one is inclined to 
tolerate the various viewpoints, constituencies, life-worlds, and value systems that are 
to be assimilated into the whole. In reality, this assimilation risks paving over 
smoldering histories of violence and division. These histories matter because they 
structure relations of domination and exploitation in the present. Dewey’s 
assimilation, if it is insufficiently attentive to histories of domination, risks reiterating 
structures and ways of understanding that perpetuate domination and exploitation. 
The risk of uncritically repeating exploitative gestures in the name of pluralist holism 
threatens to fracture Dewey’s vision of different constituencies “in harmony with the 
interests and goods which are common.”86 James Baldwin expresses this worry from 
a different perspective when he asks, “Do I really want to be integrated into a 
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86 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1954), 147. 
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burning house?”87 The social order is fraught with “conflict, power, and alienation,” 
not just as lesions to be cleanly excised, but as constitutive and constantly-
metastasizing elements of social life.88 To recommend, as Dewey does, “better 
education”89 as a way of combatting entrenched racism risks missing how the 
categories and assumptions (what education is “for,” how it should be undertaken, 
how a person can be “well-educated”) that injunction relies upon are themselves 
forged and sustained by racial hierarchies.90 A social theory without a strong sense of 
domination, violence, and division risks acquiescing to or repeating the same. 
For Dewey, “concrete suggestions arising from past experiences, developed and 
matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, employed as 
aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or failure in 
accomplishing this task of readjustment, suffice.”91 But Dewey does not adequately 
acknowledge the possibility that the “concrete suggestions” of past experience are not 
illuminated by the light “of the needs and deficient of the present.” Too often, what 
                                                 
87 James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (New York: Dial Press, 1963), 108. (Echoing, of course, Martin 
Luther King, Jr.) 
88 Olson, Abolition, 26. 
89 John Dewey, The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 7, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1979), 339-40. 
90 For a critical evaluation of Dewey’s educational prescriptions with respect to race, see Frank 
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are understood to be the needs of the present are manipulated, played for shadows 
and false depths.92 History, too, does not offer unambiguous lessons. It accretes in 
the present, a rolling lightshow of smoke and violence. Dewey’s process of self-
correction is fragile and contingent. Worse still, self-correction isn’t vexed by well-
identified malefactors. Procedures, relays, and feedback loops flowing through 
psychic and hylic systems scramble the prospect of clearly evaluating success and 
failure. Too often the reflective equilibrium between a conceptual approach and 
concrete problems is not “tested by success or failure” the way Dewey imagines. 
More often, actions aimed at transforming social conditions succeed or fail for 
reasons unconnected to fungible or well-understood criteria for success. The counter-
criteria at play can be actively hostile to what Dewey understands as “success.” Many 
rationalities operate through history besides a humble, pragmatic meliorism. 
Structures of domination can have their deepest roots in the “commonsense” notions 
that Dewey celebrates. Dewey’s melioristic pragmatism fails time and again to 




                                                 
92 For criticism of Dewey along these lines, see Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 36-37. 
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§1.4 Responses internal to Dewey 
Are there Deweyan resources for responding to Dewey’s limitations and oversights? I 
am sympathetic to applying Dewey’s reconstructive meliorism to his own work, a task 
of which he’d approve. This undertaking has the additional benefit of highlighting 
sophisticated features of Dewey’s thought that are often overlooked. 
In recent years, R.W. Hildreth and Joel Wolfe have undertaken the project of finding 
and developing an account of power relations within Dewey’s work. Hildreth argues 
that “we can find critical traction and normative standards…. [to establish] the ability 
of Dewey’s pragmatism to address power relations and political conflict precisely 
within Dewey’s conception of experience.”93 Hildreth rereads central Deweyan 
concepts like experience and inquiry as involving currents of power that are “enacted 
through experience… every experience is itself situated and structured by a complex 
transactional field of forces.”94 The power Hildreth reads into Dewey appears “as a 
dynamic, fluid, and relational field of forces.”95 He writes that Dewey shows us how 
“power relations constitute individuals.”96 
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These formulations of power as a relational field and as productive of subjects are 
canonical Foucauldian formulations. Herein lies the difficulty with Hildreth’s 
reconstruction. Hildreth argues that we do not need to venture beyond Dewey to find 
a more sophisticated account of power, citing Foucault as a thinker whom he does 
not intend to visit.97 Yet, when Hildreth draws an account of power from Dewey, his 
argument reads as if someone had combined Dewey and Foucault then deleted the 
Foucault citations.98 The reading, e.g., that Dewey demonstrates how “power 
relations constitute individuals” scans like a clear importation of Foucault, but one of 
Hildreth’s central points is that the resources for this argument come from Dewey. Is 
Hildreth’s implicit claim that it’s unnecessary to refer to Foucault because a notion 
like “power is productive of subjects” now circulates freely enough that it 
retroactively activates certain ideas in Dewey? But even this claim relies obliquely on 
Foucault. 
Joel Wolfe takes a similar textual route to finding an “indirect, intrinsic or 
transactional account” of power in Dewey.99 He describes how Dewey “provides a 
theory of praxis that is in essence a tacit theory of power.”100 On Wolfe’s account, 
“Dewey’s philosophical starting point centers on praxis and the ways human action 
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makes differences within and through a social medium” in such a way as to “in 
effect” offer “a tacit theory of power.”101 But offering an account of 
habit/practice/inquiry that is sensitive, embedded, and interested in the constituents 
and consequences of human action is not the same as offering an account of power 
relations. Both Hildreth and Wolfe run into this problem. Wolfe macerates the issue 
with careful phrasing in which Dewey offers “in effect” a “tacit” theory of power. 
Hildreth solves the problem by attributing crypto-Foucauldian formulations to 
Dewey, turning him into a kind of Foucauldian avant la lettre. 
I find both of these arguments substantially correct. Wolfe is right: Dewey describes 
the social order and social actors in such a way as to tacitly involve himself in what 
are now broadly understood to be questions about power relations. Hildreth is right: 
Dewey’s work substantially agrees with what are today canonical Foucauldian 
formulations. Neither Wolfe nor Hildreth offers a distinctly Deweyan theory of 
power, however. They offer, instead, something quite valuable: sites in Dewey’s 
thought where a robust account of power can attach. A hinge, of sorts, that will come 
into play later.102 
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§1.5 Bringing in Foucault: Stuhr and Koopman 
This project joins other attempts to put John Dewey and Michel Foucault into 
conversation, of which there are too few. The two most important thinkers in this 
area are John Stuhr and Colin Koopman. In what follows I suggest how my project 
joins and departs from theirs. 
Stuhr combines Dewey and Foucault under the rubric of “genealogical pragmatism,” 
a “pragmatism that takes seriously the temperament of postmodernism, a genealogy 
that takes seriously the temperament of pragmatism.”103 For Stuhr, genealogical 
pragmatism is “a pragmatism that disrupts, ‘eventalizes,’ and problematizes. It is also 
a pragmatism that suspects itself, that critically inspects its own methods, including 
logic and science.”104 Stuhr emphasizes the meta-methodological capability of 
genealogical pragmatism to “attend to the difference and oppositionalities” that 
define it as an intellectual practice.105 This attention to difference, Stuhr notes, 
heightens awareness of “issues of race, ethnicity, gender, age, class, sexual orientation, 
                                                 
103 John Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 89. The practice of grouping the 
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body.”106 Stuhr does not develop the point further, however. What is the relationship 
between a self-aware methodological approach and the specific structures of 
domination Stuhr points to? 
Stuhr’s genealogical pragmatism has been taken up in the past two decades by Colin 
Koopman. Koopman argues that “pragmatism and genealogy stand in need of one 
another. Any full-scale practice of critical inquiry requires the fulfillment of both 
intellectual desiderata of reconstruction and problematization—hence critical inquiry 
itself calls for something like pragmatism that provides a reconstructive service as 
well as something like genealogy that performs a diagnostic service. To perform only 
one of these services is to chagrin the responsibilities we have assumed in embracing 
the task of thought as work. We must kick up the dust, and then work to settle it 
again.”107 Koopman emphasizes the transitional-meliorative potential of pragmatism 
and genealogy: the idea that pragmatism and genealogy work like a road crew, with 
genealogy jackhammering old ways of thinking and pragmatism laying fresh 
asphalt.108 
To this end, Koopman argues that Foucault doesn’t practice genealogy simply to 
demonstrate that present practices are wicked (as Nancy Fraser and others have 
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argued),109 but to show what these practices are made up of and to offer avenues for 
dissolving them by reconstructing the constituents and feedback loops that genealogy 
allows one to better see.110 Genealogy, for Koopman, is diagnostic. It helps you 
discover what’s wrong and how. Pragmatism, on the other hand, offers tools for 
treatment. Koopman repeatedly distinguishes between Foucault as observer and 
Dewey as doer. This distinction can be understood by examining how Koopman 
rearticulates Stuhr’s “genealogical pragmatism.” Genealogical pragmatism is primarily 
a methodological and epistemological project. Its potential lies in “providing 
contemporary philosophy a forward motion and momentum.”111 Koopman writes 
that “genealogy, pragmatism, and critical theory offer a turning of philosophy…. To 
thusly renew philosophy… we will have to muster the courage to confront a set of 
entrenched assumptions about ourselves as philosophers and critical inquirers.”112 It 
is philosophy that must be renewed, refreshed, and rendered more perceptive. The 
relationship between this philosophical renewal and politics is not clear.113 For 
example, Koopman does not fully explain the normative stakes of genealogical 
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pragmatism. Koopman writes that this is not because politically-oriented work is 
“secondary in relation to clarifying… methodological issues,” but because he hopes 
that “methodological clarification can in some way assist the practices of critical 
cultural philosophy already under way.”114 A great deal hinges on this “in some 
way.”115 
Foucault and Deleuze’s remarks on the place and function of theory show just how 
complicated the relationship between practice, theory, and methodology can be, and 
consequently how much is packed into Koopman’s claim that “methodological 
clarification can in some way assist the practices of critical cultural philosophy.”116 
Koopman writes that methodological clarification supports “practices of critical 
cultural philosophy,” which practices further assume a supporting or clarifying role 
with respect to politics. Koopman’s understanding of the relations between 
methodological work, cultural philosophy, and politics invites questions about how 
genealogical pragmatism transmits itself between these zones: is genealogical 
pragmatism confined to methodological clarification? if it moves beyond 
methodology, how do its aims and functions change as it filters into more engaged 
“cultural critical philosophy”? does it filter all the way to politics as it’s practiced day 
to day? what would it mean for a theory like genealogical pragmatism to be operative 
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in “politics day to day”? is the idea of a theory operative in everyday practice, an 
“active theory,” a contradiction in terms? to what extent does the language of a 
theory “filtering” into the world misstate the process? should Koopman’s levels 
(methodological clarification to cultural critical philosophy to concrete politics) be 
understood as sealed, autonomous layers or as porous zones of thought, 
comportment, and action? does genealogical pragmatism dissolve the borders 
between the levels that it traverses? Finally, how does genealogical pragmatism 
address itself to politics? Recall Foucault’s remark that “the intellectual’s role is no 
longer to place himself ‘somewhat ahead and to the side’… rather, it is to struggle 
against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the 
sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘discourse.’”117 Foucault’s 
statement contains elements consonant with genealogical pragmatism and elements 
inimical to it. Congenial to genealogical pragmatism is the idea that by being more 
critical, more genealogical, about the methodology of philosophical inquiry, a 
philosopher is better able to resist “the forms of power that transform him into its 
object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’” truth, and so on.118 Genealogy 
“makes facile gestures difficult” by giving a history to what appeared ahistorical, a 
temporality to what seemed timeless.119 The difficulties introduced by genealogical 
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analysis can disrupt the process whereby a thinker becomes an instrument of 
knowledge. 
Genealogical pragmatism has a more ambiguous relationship with Foucault’s remark 
that theory is not best placed “‘ahead and to the side,’” that is, in an epistemological 
clearing from which the theorist can better see society, history, and so on. One of the 
ways genealogical pragmatism does what Koopman (and Stuhr) hope it can do 
(realize a newly self-reflexive methodology for philosophy) is by interrogating power 
mechanisms at the heart of the process by which intellectuals become the “object[s] 
and instrument[s]” of knowledge. Koopman’s analysis belies the degree to which 
genealogical pragmatism must involve an interrogation of power relations and, by 
extension, concrete political questions and sites of contestation. By stopping short of 
politics, Koopman’s methodological clearing leaves genealogical pragmatism open to 
the familiar charge that it is dangerously indeterminate in political and ethical content. 
It remains unclear what guidance a combination of pragmatism and poststructuralism 
formulated to ameliorate epistemological dilemmas or methodological barrenness can 
offer politics.120 Stuhr and Koopman are philosophy professors using genealogy and 
pragmatism to deal with what each sees as certain roadblocks within philosophy.121  
                                                 
120 For a discussion about the fraught nature of trying to extract programmatic methodological 
statements from Foucault, see Samuel A. Chambers, “Foucault’s Evasive Maneuvers,” Angelaki: 
Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 6, no. 3 (2001): 104-108. 
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But Deweyan reconstruction (as both Stuhr and Koopman know) is not only for 
methodological problems.122 There is little discussion of why Stuhr and Koopman 
need Foucault to do genealogical pragmatism. Generally, Stuhr and Koopman’s story 
is that “we” (philosophy professors? antiracists? leftists? democrats? Democrats?) 
require Foucault to better understand the histories of present conditions, the way that 
the constituents of a given situation are themselves constituted and contingent rather 
than neutral or natural. Genealogical work of this sort is not the heart of Foucault’s 
contribution to pragmatism. Dewey lacks most acutely a sharp and sensitive approach 
to power relations. I believe Koopman and Stuhr intend power to be folded in, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Camps of philosophers cordon themselves off from one another by drawing lines in the still 
sands of a breezeless desert…. They forget about the philosophers on the other side of the 
line, and when the occasional hawkeyed upstart or pesky defector announces the existence 
of a seeming country of philosophers not too far away, they retort that those on the other 
side of the line are not ‘real’ philosophers…. After a generation or two, nobody remembers 
why the line was drawn, or what function it serves. But it is defended as vigorously as ever. 
Sometime soon thereafter, newly-indoctrinated apprentices begin asking questions that those 
keeping the line can barely comprehend, let alone answer. “Why don’t we read Deleuze 
here? Have you read him? He’s really interesting to me. And what about Foucault?” “Why 
do you insist that Quine is dry and unimportant? Have you read him? He’s really quite 
interesting to me. And what about Dewey?” Soon the line-keepers abandon their 
fortifications, but of course nearly everyone continues to talk only to those philosophers in 
their immediate proximity. The apprentices, meanwhile, begin building bridges over the lines 
in the sand. Even though they are but thin lines in a breezeless desert, nobody knows how to 
cross over them… the only way the apprentices can manage to muster a conversation is to 
carefully artifice means of passage from one camp to the other. These bridges, sometimes 
quite garish constructions, mediate…. Eventually, it is hoped, the bridges will begin to seem 
unnecessary, and philosophers will effortlessly walk across those tiny little lines, eventually 
rubbing them out with their footprints, as they stare up in wonder at the spectacular 
sculptures above that stand as a memorial to a not-too-distant time when all philosophers 
were afraid to walk paths that are now frequently trod by just about everyone. 
(See Colin Koopman, “Foucault and Pragmatism,” 4-5.) 
122 For an account of why the same goes for Foucault (i.e., why Foucaultian genealogy is also not 
only for methodological problems), see Chambers, “Evasive Maneuvers,” 104-117. 
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some way, with the word “genealogical.” Genealogies can be used to show how a 
concept or practice is inflected with power and not natural or neutral. But Koopman 
and Stuhr leave this point underexplored. As long as Foucault’s contribution to 
Dewey is understood as primarily methodological, it fails to exploit the promise of 
power pragmatism to contribute to more egalitarian futures. 
This methodological-epistemological focus is partly disciplinary. Stuhr and Koopman 
are philosophers, not political theorists. But my project is to see what pragmatism 
looks like when directed toward a concrete political context. 
 
The existing literature would also benefit from a more nuts-and-bolts account of how 
Foucault and Dewey overlap and conflict, where the joints of power pragmatism 
articulate. Koopman does distinguish between Foucauldian problematization as “an 
act of critical inquiry” and as “a nominal object of inquiry” (e.g., the difference 
between “let’s problematize that” and “the carceral problematization uses discipline 
in this way”), but he does not connect Foucault to Dewey, or either of them to 
political problems.123 
The nature of the attachment between Dewey and Foucault, along with the way their 
combination touches concrete political questions, remains unclear in Koopman’s and 
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Stuhr’s work. In chapter two, I discuss Dewey and Foucault’s connections across four 
areas (purity, tragedy, science, and power). In chapters three and four, I explore the 
political implications of power pragmatism with respect to Shulamith Firestone’s 
attempt to regender social relations and contemporary theorists’ efforts to render 
plausible a postcapitalist world. 
 
§1.6 Bridge to chapter two 
I have given a preliminary account of why Dewey’s pragmatism ought to catch the 
eye of political theorists who are interested in tackling political and social problems, 
and why pragmatism stumbles when it fails to attend to power differentials. 
I have discussed several attempts to correct Dewey’s failure to account for the ways 
that power as capacity and power as domination intermingle. One strategy mobilizes 
resources within Dewey to bring forward a theory of power relations. This sort of 
undertaking is valuable because it shows how and where a theory of power can attach 
to Dewey: the existing sensitivities, textual sockets, and loose wires that allow 
Dewey’s thought to enter into feedback loops and new relations with other ways 
thinking about power. These attempts, however, fall short of their aim to offer a self-
sufficiently Deweyan theory of power relations. They either smuggle in formulations 
external to Dewey or offer a cocoon instead of a butterfly. 
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I agree with Koopman and Stuhr that Foucault offers tools for pragmatism’s 
reconstructive surgery. But I think that the project of renewing pragmatism by 
supplementing Dewey with Foucault is best pursued, and best avoids the charge of 
political and moral indeterminacy, when it affirms its political aims and values. The 
literature (and this project) stands in need of more elbow grease to show how Dewey 




















§2.1 Developing power pragmatism 
I would encourage clinicians to always 
include a “reasons for living coping card” in 
the kit. The “reasons for living coping card” 
(RFL) is simply a list of reasons for living in 
written and accessible format. Identifying 
specific and multiple reasons for living helps 
undermine suicide intent, capitalizing on 
ambivalence about death that persists for the 
overwhelming majority of suicidal patients in 
active treatment. 
– M. David Rudd, “Brief Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy for Suicidality 
in Military Populations” 
This chapter stages four encounters between Dewey and Foucault on the topics of 
purity and profundity (§2.1.1), tragedy (§2.1.2), the sciences (§2.1.3), and power 
(§2.1.4). Dewey and Foucault’s skepticism about purity and profundity provides a 
roadmap for identifying and avoiding tropes in contemporary theory that lock 
criticism into a search for a point of refusal exterior to power—and into a sense of 
disappointment when such a point is not achieved, and bitterness toward efforts that 
are seen as insufficiently radical, compromised and compromising. Dewey and 
Foucault’s tragic understanding of politics as involving urgent threats to survival and 
tradeoffs checks pragmatism, restrains it from slipping into mere incrementalism or 
the ratification of dominant interests. Foucault, in particular, mobilizes discourses he 
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is skeptical of (like rights-talk) in the face of concrete threats to human health and 
survival. Dewey and Foucault also think of science as a bundle of procedures and 
techniques that can be repurposed. This view lends itself to chapter three’s 
exploration of Shulamith Firestone as a pragmatist who is sensitive to power relations 
and who seeks to repurpose the techniques and tools of the sciences toward ending 
domination based on sex. Several commenters have suggested that Dewey contains a 
freestanding theory of power. I argue that Dewey instead contains passages that, 
when combined with supplements from Foucault, can furnish a theory of power in 
pragmatism. Dewey’s work requires a Foucauldian reworking in order to sensitize it 
to the fact that pragmatic proposals for altering a given situation occur within shifting 
fields of power. 
As a way of further contextualizing and explaining the power pragmatist project, I 
close this chapter by discussing how power pragmatism relates to “realist” political 
theory and outlining the prospect of cognitive-behavioral political theory. Debates 
over realism in political theory raise questions about the relationship between theory 
and what goes on in the world. Questions about what sort of relationship theoretical 
projects assume with the world ought to be, I argue, central to theoretical practice. I 
suggest one way of answering this claim with cognitive-behavioral political theory. In 
much in the same way that political theory has imported “astrologically lush”124 
systems of abstraction from psychoanalytic theory, theorists should consider lifting 
                                                 
124  Eve Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 23-24. 
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from cognitive-behavioral therapy an interest in thinking systemically and concretely 
about everyday procedures for survival. 
 
§2.1.1 Pure and profound 
Dewey and Foucault share a skepticism toward purity and profundity as 
methodological, epistemological, and political goals. Foucault, for his part, is skeptical 
about ways of practicing philosophy that understand themselves to be seeking, deep 
in the heart of texts, a revelatory flaw that forever exposes or compromises the 
philosophical enterprise of which they are a part. Dewey exercises caution around the 
capacity of “abstract formulas” to understand or pace social change. Specifically, he 
thinks that rigid theoretical formulations—he cites “orthodox Marxian” accounts—
cannot account for the complex unfolding of actual life primarily because they are 
formulated with the purity of ideas set in relation to other ideas and because they seek 
to excavate profound truths about history and human nature instead of the 
contingent and quotidian combinations of desires, purposes, and action that shape 
societies.  
Consider Foucault’s responses to Jacques Derrida’s criticisms of History of Madness. 
Although much of Foucault’s final response is given over to close-reading a few lines 
in Descartes’s Meditations, Foucault makes several remarks that relate to Derrida’s 
philosophical and methodological orientation more broadly. Derrida had previously 
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performed his own close reading of three pages in Madness concerning an 
interpretation of Descartes (which interpretation Foucault later wrote that he should 
not have included at all, regretting that he had not been more consistent “in my 
casual indifference towards philosophy”).125 “Derrida,” Foucault begins, “thinks he 
can capture the meaning of my book or its ‘project’ from three pages.”126 Derrida 
thinks he can do this, Foucault argues, because he operates under three postulates 
that structure philosophical inquiry in France at the time. First, Derrida “supposes… 
that all knowledge, or in an even broader sense all rational discourse, entertains a 
fundamental relation with philosophy…. To free the implicit philosophy of a 
discourse, to reveal its contradictions, its limits, or its naivety, is to operate a fortiori 
and by the shortest possible route a critique of all that is said within it.”127 Second, 
Derrida “supposes that one commits ‘faults’ of a singular nature… in relation to this 
philosophy, which eminently holds the ‘law’ of all discourse.”128 These errors, in 
Derrida’s view, aren’t “so much faults of logic or reasoning, which bring errors that 
might be isolated in a material fashion, but rather faults that are something like a 
blend of a Christian sin and a Freudian slip…. one single sin is enough to 
compromise a whole life.”129 There is no recovery from the sort of flaw that Derrida 
                                                 
125 Michel Foucault, “Reply to Derrida,” in History of Madness, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean 
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purports to uncover: “Because the fault against philosophy is close to the slip, it will 
be ‘revelatory’ in the same way: the smallest ‘snag’ will suffice for the whole apparatus 
to be laid bare.”130 Third, Derrida practices a philosophy that “is only the repetition 
of an origin that is more than originary, and which infinitely exceeds, in its retreat, 
anything that it could say in any of its historical discourses.”131 
For Foucault, purity and profundity operate as central coordinates in Derrida’s 
conception of philosophy. Foucault writes that “it should now be clear why my book 
inevitably appeared quite exterior and superficial compared to the profound 
philosophical interiority of Derrida’s work.”132 Derrida’s three authorizing 
postulates—philosophical fundamentalism, telling errors, and a glimmering, retreating 
origin—install a drive for philosophical profundity at the heart of deconstruction. 
Texts are endowed with an inner essence rendered available for judgment by crucial 
flaws or slips. This inner essence is accessible via a system of inversions and 
counterinversions, unveiled by close-reading after close-reading, which disclose an 
essential relationship between a text and the philosophical apparatus used to read it. 
Foucault, by contrast, conducts “naïve” analyses of “police regulations in the 
seventeenth century, unemployment in the classical era, Pinel’s reform and psychiatric 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., 577. 
132 Ibid., 578. 
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asylums of the nineteenth century,” and other minutiae.133 He maintains, against 
Derrida, that philosophy “is neither historically nor logically a foundation of 
knowledge; but that there are conditions and rules for the formation of 
knowledge.”134 His position emerges quite clearly when he expresses ambivalence 
toward being described as a positivist: “If, by substituting the analysis of rarity for the 
search for totalities, the description of relations of exteriority for the theme of 
transcendental foundation, the analysis of accumulations for the quest of the origin, 
one is a positivist, then I am quite happy to be one.”135 Philosophical profundity 
dissolves in the face of concrete historical phenomena. Philosophical purity is set 
aside for messy empirical study. 
Foucault’s antipathy toward what I have called “purity” runs through his criticism of 
theoretical efforts to locate a “single locus of great Refusal, soul of revolt… pure law 
of the revolutionary.”136 Near the end of the first volume of his History of Sexuality, 
Foucault reiterates his point that power is not purely repressive. Instead, it flows 
through a variety of practices, and where fields of power operate, sites of resistance 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 576. 
134 Ibid., 578. The important task is not to show that this or that entity contains some flaw in its 
originary relation to philosophy, but to show how things are constructed and of what they’re made. A 
similar point appears in Dewey’s reconstructive pragmatism: there is no problematic situation a priori, 
no Problem generally. 
135  Quoted in Benjamin Noys, “Between Two Vampires,” forthcoming, 2016. 




come into being.137 Points of resistance are distributed across society as operations of 
power are, in unassuming sites as well as prominent ones. It is misguided to search 
for a singular point of refusal exterior to power. Foucault’s analysis indicts 
contemporary practices in political and social theory that involve fixating on the idea 
of an exterior point of refusal (and finding in all other measures of resistance a fatal 
complicity). What I have called Foucault’s skepticism of “purity” is skepticism of, in 
particular, the idea that the task of criticism is to uncover, via a finely-tuned system of 
readings, “faults that are something like a blend of a Christian sin and a Freudian 
slip…. [a] sin [that] is enough to compromise a whole life.”138 What Foucault objects 
to is both quasi-metaphysical claims about these sins’ “originary relation to 
philosophy” (and, therefore, their evasion of the detail of everyday practices) and to 
this form of criticism’s Catholic hostility to deviation. Texts must be interrogated 
(tortured, if necessary) until they give up their sins. When they have done so, they can 
be excommunicated. This purism is defined, therefore, by a combination of a fixation 
on favored or disfavored essences susceptible to discovery by careful inquisitors (this 
text actually relies on the metaphysics of presence!) and by a vigorous antideviationism 
in which variation from a certain position constitutes a basis for scandal (this isn’t 
truly radical—it’s mere reformism!).  Before discussing a few examples of this fixation 
on purity and profundity in contemporary theory, it’s worth considering Dewey’s 
discussion of this sort of thinking in his own time. 
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In the summer of 1928, Dewey visited post-revolutionary Russia. Leningrad appears 
in his writing as “a splendid dress in rags,” where “one has the impression of 
movement, vitality, energy. The people go about as if some mighty and oppressive 
load had been removed, as if they were newly awakened to the consciousness of 
released energies.”139 Dewey briefly discusses the relationship between Marxism as a 
political theory and post-revolutionary life as it was unfolding in front of him. “It is, 
of course, conceivable that Communism in some form may be the issue of the 
present ‘transition,’” he writes. “But the feeling is forced upon one that, if it does 
finally emerge, it will not be because of the elaborate and now stereotyped formulae 
of Marxian philosophy, but because something of that sort is congenial to a people 
that a revolution has awakened to themselves, and that it will emerge in a form 
dictated by their own desires.”140 Though Dewey’s antipathy toward “elaborate” and 
abstract formulas for social transformation runs through the book, he does not 
discount the prospect of broad social and historical change generally. This change, 
however, is unlikely to square with neat Marxist or capitalist accounts that center on 
abstract models or on the “logic” of an economic system or historical process that 
resists being deformed by actually-existing conditions: 
Towards what it is a transition [is] a still wholly undetermined matter. To the 
orthodox Marxian, the goal is… certain; it is just the communistic institutions 
his special philosophy of history requires. But personally, I am strongly of the 
impression that the more successful are the efforts to create a new mentality 
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and a new morality of a coöperative social type, the more dubious is the 
nature of the goal that will be attained. For, I am wholly inclined to believe, 
this new attitude of mind, in just the degree in which it is really new and 
revolutionary, will create its own future society according to its own desires 
and purposes. This future society will undoubtedly be highly unlike the régime 
characteristic of the western world of private capital and individual profit. But 
I think the chances are that it will be equally unlike the society which orthodox 
Marxian formulæ call for.141 
The outcomes predicted by and produced in concert with ideas about social change 
are unlikely to mirror those ideas’ abstract structure. The actual course of social 
change is likely to be contingent and quotidian in a way that orthodox formulas are 
not. Dewey, like Foucault, finds nothing to fear in actual deviation from an abstract 
set of propositions. Indeed, he regards the way that actual events take leave of 
abstract formulas as a source of political and social possibility. “Any predictions 
about the Russian future has to take into account the contradiction and conflict 
between rigid dogmas on one side and an experimental spirit on the other,” and as 
the Russian people lay down new forms of life whose relationship to orthodox 
Marxism is increasingly unclear, “it is likely that the outcome, whatever it may be in 
fact, will be called communism and will be taken as a realization of the creed of its 
initial authors.”142 For Dewey, theoretical apparatuses retroactively lay claim to 
concrete situations rather than determine them in advance. A theoretical purism can 
only constrain and immobilize social inquiry and efforts to effect social 
transformation. 
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Dewey and Foucault remain wary of the types of political-theoretical purism and 
profundity encapsulated by “profound philosophical interiority” and “abstract 
formulae.”143 A power pragmatism that draws on Dewey and Foucault would put no 
stock in divining deep philosophical truths, in developing pure methods, in a locating 
an exteriority that cannot be ingested or a revolution that cannot be coöpted. These 
objects of attention are mostly the epiphenomena of prior methodological choices. 
Recall Wendy Brown’s diagnosis of “left melancholy” fifteen years ago: “If the 
contemporary Left often clings to the formations and formulations of another epoch, 
one in which the notion of unified movements, social totalities, and class-based 
politics appeared to be viable categories of political and theoretical analysis, this 
means that it literally renders itself a conservative force in history—one that not only 
misreads the present but installs traditionalism in the very heart of its praxis, in the 
place where commitment to risk and upheaval belongs.”144 This line of criticism is 
implicit in Foucault’s discussion of Derrida’s profound philosophical interiority and 
his criticism of the search for a means of pure resistance in The History of Sexuality, and 
in Dewey’s skepticism that orthodox Marxist formulas could delimit social change in 
post-revolutionary Russia. 
One contemporary manifestation of the sort of theory that Brown, Foucault, and 
Dewey criticize emerges in the rejection of certain courses of action as insufficiently 
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radical, as too closely-bound to present political, economic, and social structures. The 
left must think and act from a profoundly radical exterior position, this line of 
thinking goes. To fall short—by, e.g., compromising or aiming for “mere reform”—is 
to scuttle the possibility of social change. The desired social and political 
transformation, however, is also understood as the only way to secure the radical 
exterior from which it must be initiated. A bootstrap paradox shins up: the conditions 
for radical transformation will never be in place because they can only be achieved by 
the radical transformation they are meant to effect. This loop can engender a 
pervasive sense of both confidence and panic,145 as well as conceptual one-
upmanship146 (that’s not the truly radical move, this is; the problem with Hitler was 
that he was not violent enough).147 As these ways of thinking and writing settle in, 
they constrict the solution set available to egalitarian and democratic movements, 
alienating the left from a rich variety of workarounds, direction action, half-measures, 
reform, lawmaking, lying, stealing, tinkering, bargaining, legerdemain, and aggressive 
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tickling. The theoretical trope of dividing solutions rooted in existing social 
conditions (those that arise from considering problematic situations in their concrete 
actuality, Dewey might say) from those that are purer, deeper, and more total because 
of their estrangement from really-existing structures can be observed in various 
strains of left academic theory. I’ll discuss Adrian Parr’s Wrath of Capital as one 
example. 
Parr treats solutions rooted within extant social conditions with suspicion. She warns, 
for example, that “the principle at the core of veganism—the individual’s power to 
choose and take responsibility for what he or she consumes—has unfortunately 
already been co-opted by neoliberal capitalism in its principles of individualism and 
competition.”148 Parr does not explain what the fact that a given development is 
linked at economic, cognitive, social, and emotional levels with global capital is meant 
to say about the development itself. She summarizes veganism’s conceptual 
underpinnings in this way: “some argue that the current situation [of industrial 
slaughter] is the result of treating animals as commodities; others connect patriarchal 
forms of violence to animal cruelty; and some maintain that we just do not seem to 
recognize that animals also have moral worth. None of these positions is wrong…. 
That said, however, the political trajectory they all offer is veganism. Modifying 
individual eating habits is understood to be either an act of solidarity for the plight of 
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animals raised for food or an act of protest against the institutionalized violence 
perpetrated against them both.” Viewing veganism as an act of solidarity or protest 
means understanding veganism in terms of certain non-concrete abstractions with 
which the idea of “veganism” is linked. For example, Parr ties veganism with “the 
cultural project of identity politics.” She echoes Nancy Fraser’s argument that 
“privileging the cultural project of identity politics over measures to counter poverty 
and redistributive justice has had the unfortunate consequence of serving the interests 
of neoliberal capitalism.”149 
It seems idiosyncratic to view veganism as high-minded protest against factory 
farming or as action taken “in solidarity” with murdered poultry. More likely, the 
primary motivation for (and primary effect of) not eating animals is to avoid 
facilitating the killing of animals. What figures centrally is not whether veganism as an 
ethos assumes this or that relation with an abstraction like “individualism” (or has 
some kind of inner essence that “boils down” to individualism or doesn’t), but 
instead concrete situations in which pigs have their skulls beaten to jelly, cows have 
their tails twisted off, live chickens are tossed into grinders. Not eating animal 
products means that these things no longer happen on one’s behalf, and that they 
happen less frequently in general. As Chris J. Cuomo and Brooke Schueneman write, 
“it seems likely that the principle of harm reduction rather than individualism is the 
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moral core of vegetarianism/veganism.”150 It is possible to think about this harm 
reduction in concrete terms: in 2014, declining meat consumption lead to 450 million 
fewer animals’ being consumed compared to 2008.151 A theoretical treatment of 
global capitalism like Parr’s must ask if 450 million fewer slaughtered animals (and 
attendant reductions in carbon and methane emissions, soil degradation, antibiotic 
spraying, and so on) can be discounted because those eating fewer animal products 
may have “already been co-opted by neoliberal capitalism in its principles of 
individualism and competition.”152 Why is it important to construct an 
incompatibility between ways of living better within existing structures (e.g., Parr 
herself notes that she eats vegan “three times a week”153) with efforts to reconfigure 
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or destroy these structures?154 And, as Eve Sedgwick asks, “what makes… 
amelioration so ‘mere’?”155 
Parr sets “the development of new machinery, more climate resilient seeds, and new 
agricultural management strategies” against solutions that “fully address the economic 
life of the free market.”156 She associates the first solution set with “free-market 
capitalism,” criticizes these approaches, and suggests “common solutions” instead.157 
What is the nature of the incompatibility between “common” solutions and seeds 
that grow in warmer weather, or resist bollworms? It may be the case that, as with 
Bacillus thuringiensis cotton among smallholder farmers in Burkina Faso and the 
Makhathini Flats region of South Africa, making transgenic seeds available to 
smallholders leads to pesticide reduction and also to the rise of increasingly fragile 
monocultures, boosted yields mixed with increased income inequality, and rising 
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standards of living dependent upon a monopsony.158 If mixed outcomes such as these 
characterize the adoption of transgenic crops and new agricultural techniques, a 
concerted effort to pursue “common” solutions demands sedulous attention to the 
technical and material capabilities contributing to better and worse outcomes,159 the 
social and institutional feedback loops that sustain a given situation, and the use of all 
available means to begin to ease knots and interrupt vicious cycles. Detail-oriented, 
partial solutions that can be repurposed to contribute to broader transformations 
rather than the golden blare of high theory. 
The Earth-devouring capitalism described by Parr appropriates values, procedures, 
and technics as it needs them and discards what it is no longer useful. It has adopted 
and shorted a million contradictory positions in the time it has taken me to type this 
sentence.160 The theoretical task that follows from this description of global 
capitalism is not to abstract values from concrete situations and code them “inside” or 
“outside” capitalism, compromised or incorruptible, radical or merely reformist. This 
converts critical theory into an assembly line for false dichotomies and leads to the 
surrender of whole vocabularies: don’t say you chose to become a vegan—that’s a 
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neoliberal way of thinking.161 This is an exaggerated form of what Sedgwick calls 
paranoid reading in which, e.g., veganism, because it involves a degree of choice, 
furthers neoliberalism.162 The availability of contraception accelerates exploitation. 
New planting techniques retrench capital. For the paranoid reader, “there must be no 
bad surprises.”163 It is better to anticipate, with unstinting vigilance, every conceivable 
angle from which undoing may come, every possible mask under which it can hide, 
than to risk even mild surprise. Concomitantly, paranoid reading “places its faith in 
exposure.”164 The central paranoid task is to uncover hiding places, to show its readers 
that fraudulent ways of thinking and writing are fraudulent. To expose the sin. 
“Paranoia for all its vaunted suspicion,” Sedgwick writes, “acts as though its work 
would be accomplished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly 
known.”165 It is not clear how paranoid theory finds solace if exposure fails to do 
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much of anything. What happens if, after decades in the withering light of academic 
scrutiny, the exposed violence only blossoms? “The force of any interpretive project 
of unveiling hidden violence,” Sedgwick argues, “would seem to depend on a cultural 
context, like the one assumed in Foucault’s early works, in which violence would be 
deprecated and hence hidden in the first place. Why bother exposing the ruses of 
power in a country where, at any given moment, 40 percent of young black men are 
enmeshed in the penal system?”166 
This ineffectuality indicates that paranoid reading is not quite as invested in the 
transmission of revelatory knowledge as it might seem: 
The paranoid trust in exposure seemingly depends… on an infinite reservoir of 
naïveté in those who make up the audience for these unveilings. What is the 
basis for assuming that it will surprise or disturb, never mind motivate, anyone 
to learn that a given social manifestation is artificial, self-contradictory, 
imitative, phantasmatic, or even violent?... How television-starved would 
someone have to be to find it shocking that ideologies contradict themselves, 
that simulacra don’t have originals, or that gender representations are 
artificial?... Some exposes, some demystifications, some bearings of witness do 
have great effectual force (though often of an unanticipated kind). Many that 
are just as true and convincing have none at all, however, and as long as that is 
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72 
 
so, we must admit that the efficacy and directionality of such acts reside 
somewhere else than in their relation to knowledge per se.167 
The weak relationship between paranoid reading and what actually transpires in the 
world is further vexed by paranoid theory’s inability to anticipate and respond flexibly 
to what goes on around it. As Sedgwick notes, “while its general tenor of ‘things are 
bad and getting worse’ is immune to refutation, any more specific predictive value—
and as a result, arguably, any value for making oppositional strategy—has been nil. 
Such accelerating failure to anticipate change is, moreover, as I’ve discussed, entirely 
in the nature of the paranoid process, whose sphere of influence… only expands as 
each unanticipated disaster seems to demonstrate more conclusively that, guess what, 
you can never be paranoid enough.”168 Moreover, paranoid work tends to “masquerade as 
the very stuff of truth” and to supplant other, more reparative forms of theory: 
the present paranoid consensus… may… have required a certain 
disarticulation, disavowal, and misrecognition of other ways of knowing, ways 
less oriented around suspicion, that are actually being practiced, often by the 
same theorists and as part of the same projects. The monopolistic program of 
paranoid knowing systematically disallows any explicit recourse to reparative 
motives, no sooner to be articulated than subject to methodical uprooting. 
Reparative motives, once they become explicit, are inadmissible in paranoid 
theory both because they are about pleasure (‘merely aesthetic’) and because 
they are frankly ameliorative (‘merely reformist’).169 
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What is the nature of the link between the technosocial developments Parr criticizes 
and the patterns of exploitation and despoliation she aims to resist? This link emerges 
from sets of connections drawn between concepts set in relation to each other in a 
theoretical field. If a concrete development can be dissolved upward into abstractions 
like “choice” or “individual action,”170 then those nodes can be linked in a theoretical 
field with immense, flexible, composed abstractions (what Latour calls “social 
stuff”)171 like “capitalism” or “late liberalism.” The theorist calls on sedimented 
associations to show that patterns of behavior and thought occurring in concrete 
material, quotidian, and institutional circumstances are in fact the tendrils of a 
deathless abstract entity. What the naïve activist, farmer, scientist, or social worker 
thought of as positive was secreting capital all along. Postulating and linking objects 
of analysis in a conceptual field becomes the central game of critical inquiry.172 The 
                                                 
170 Another difficulty with poisoning individualist vocabulary crops up near the end of Wrath: it is 
hard not to recur to this vocabulary. The final paragraph of Parr’s book begins: “In many respects, 
writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of 
environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution 
of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has 
certain skills that we can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate 
change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic” (147). We individuals—
each of us making our way in the world, developing skill sets we can put to work if we so choose—
all have a role to play. The fact that it is so easy to play gotcha with this particular vocabulary of 
individualism does not suggest that the gotcha game is useful. Instead, it suggests the opposite: 
because the game has been played so freely, its capacity for insight has frayed. 
171 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor–Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 47-48, 64-66. 
172 “Homoeopathic magic,” Frazer writes in The Golden Bough, “commits the mistake of assuming that 
things which resemble each other are the same: contagious magic commits the mistake of assuming 
that things which have once been in contact with each other are always in contact… Both branches 
of magic, the homoeopathic and the contagious, may conveniently be comprehended under the 
general name of Sympathetic Magic, since both assume that things act on each other at a distance 
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critical task is to gather radical, profound (because unconnected in the conceptual 
field with disfavored abstractions) accounts and expose compromised, superficial 
(because associated with disfavored abstractions) accounts. (And, conveniently, the 
theorist herself becomes indispensable to this process. Ranciére once criticized 
Althusser along these lines: “If everyone dwells in illusion… then the solution can 
only come from a kind of muscular theoretical heroism on the part of the lone 
theorist.”)173 
Constructing a politics with this approach is like bailing with a sieve, however, 
because no social phenomenon is ever pure, ever free of influence by a wide variety 
of contradictory forces and tendencies. The “outside” of an abstract whole, e.g. 
capitalism or rationality, is a constitutive outside, as Judith Butler and others have 
discussed.174 This is partly why inversion theses rarely fail: as Stuart Hall wrote, “you 
can always put it another way if you try hard enough.”175 The right has taken advantage of 
                                                                                                                                                 
through a secret sympathy, the impulse being transmitted from one to the other by means of what 
we may conceive as a kind of invisible ether, not unlike that which is postulated by modern science 
for a precisely similar purpose, namely, to explain how things can physically affect each other 
through a space which appears to be empty.” See The Golden Bough (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1995), 14. 
173 Ross’s introduction to Ignorant Schoolmaster, xvii. See also Sasha Lilley, “Left Catastrophism,” in 
Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth (London: Specter, 2012), 44-76, and Lee 
Quinby’s discussion of the role masculinity plays in left apocalypticism in Quinby, “The Deployment 
of Apocalyptic Masculinity,” Journal of Millenial Studies 2 (1999).  
174 Butler, Bodies that Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993); Ernesto Laclau, “Subject of Politics, 
Politics of the Subject,” differences 7 (1995): 146-164. 
175 Hall offers this to the Left as one lesson of Thatcherism. Stuart Hall, “Thatcher’s Lessons,” 
Marxism Today, March 1988, 21. Emphasis his. 
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Hall’s lesson, turning “market solutions,” “deregulation,” “privatization,” and so 
forth into ambidextrous, robust membranes that make claims to social good and coat 
everything in reach. Too often the critical Left has done the opposite, expelling like 
so much oxygen everything from veganism to the language of rights to the word 
“individual.”176 Whole vocabularies burn as fuel in the search for a “single locus of 
great Refusal.”177 
The tasks of reconstruction and transformation, following Dewey, are more likely to 
involve an arduous picking-through rather than a clean sprint from the ruins of the 
old order. Moreover, there are good reasons to exercise caution around radical 
transformations, not least because pining for ruptures overlooks the dangers that may 
arise in a world remade. Samera Esmeir, for example, ends her discussion of the way 
colonial law in Egypt created juridical persons with the point that “the terror, then, is 
in the answer to the following question: If the juridical human contains both the 
natural subject and the legal person while at the same time erasing the distinction 
between them, to what plane does the human degenerate upon the withdrawal of the 
law?”178 Even when systems leave much to be desired—even when they bring about 
the deaths of those within them—they may countenance legal and material life-
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Harvard Civil Liberties—Civil Rights Law Review 401 (1987). 
177 Foucault, Sexuality, 95-96. 




support systems. James Baldwin relates a similar worry when he reflects on his visit 
with Elijah Muhammad in Chicago. He writes that “when I sat at Elijah’s table and 
watched the baby, the women, and the men, and we talked about God’s—or 
Allah’s—vengeance, I wondered, when that vengeance was achieved, What will happen 
to all that beauty then?”179 Baldwin worries that the revolution prophesied by the Nation 
of Islam has the potential to destroy what is worth keeping. (Baldwin recognizes, 
however, that there may be no choice, that revolutionary vengeance cannot be stayed: 
“I could also see that the intransigence and ignorance of the white world might make 
that vengeance inevitable.” The coming violence promised by this vengeance, 
however, gives cause for lament, not celebration.)180 
There is no reason to conflate programs for action that situate themselves as exterior 
to existing social conditions with those most capable of disrupting existing social 
conditions. On the contrary, action that takes as its means and object really-existing 
material and technosocial currents bears a greater capacity for transforming or 
exploding present social conditions and collective self-understandings than do 
hypothetical radical-exterior moves.181 
                                                 
179 James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (New York: Dial Press, 1963), 119. Emphasis his. 
180 See also Space is the Place, John Coney (Berkeley, CA: Rhapsody Films, 1974). 
181 Surely, however, an essential step for the transformation of a social condition involves 
transforming not only the content of circulating meanings and values, but also changing their very 
form. A transvaluation not just of all values, but of what it means to value. In fact, these meaning-
mechanisms are changed by being worked and reworked, palimpsest-like, until they deform and 
admit new meanings. What would a truly exogenous transvaluation even look like? I imagine 
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Retreating into a kind of hermetic arch-impossibilism is perfectly defensible for the 
same reasons that it is perfectly useless. To shirk engagement for putatively principled 
reasons is to assume an invulnerable, sealed critical position with no exit or entrance, 
a glass-walled garden.182 One thinks of Baldwin’s story of being refused service at a 
crowded Chicago bar. There’s an argument. The white customers ignore the 
commotion. “The three of us,” Baldwin writes, 
stood at the bar trembling with rage and frustration, and drinking—and 
trapped, now in the airport, for we had deliberately come early in order to have 
a few drinks and to eat… a young white man standing near us asked if we were 
students…. I told him that he hadn’t wanted to talk to us earlier and we didn’t 
want to talk to him now. The reply visibly hurt his feelings, and this, in turn, 
caused me to despise him. But when one of us, a Korean War veteran, told this 
young man that the fight we had been having in the bar had been his fight, too, 
the young man said, ‘I lost my conscience a long time ago,’ and turned and 
walked out.183 
One hears this sort of high-minded disengagement from young Americans who 
refuse to vote because “both options are the same” (or because “the answer is 
somewhere in the middle”), from those who disdain direct action because “it won’t 
accomplish anything” or because “nothing will change,” from those who shirk 
responding to climate change because “it’s too late; there’s nothing we can do.” One 
sentiment, common enough to graduate students (and professors) in the humanities 
                                                                                                                                                 
something like alien-invasion movies that take colonialism as their metaphorical tenor: contact 
between foreign systems in which one is stripped right down to its roots. 
182 “Happiness is a garden walled with glass: there’s no way in or out,” Margaret Atwood writes. 
183 Baldwin, Fire, 70. 
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and social sciences, is the idea that “things” (by which is meant: other people’s lives) 
have to get worse before they can get better. Sedgwick points out that this sentiment 
is undergirded by “the cruel and contemptuous assumption that the one thing lacking 
for global revolution, explosion of gender roles, or whatever, is people’s (that is, 
other people’s) having the painful effects of their oppression, poverty, or deludedness 
sufficiently exacerbated to make the pain conscious (as if otherwise it wouldn’t have 
been) and intolerable (as if intolerable situations were famous for generating excellent 
solutions).”184 
To explain the various ways that sentiments like “both parties are the same” or 
“nothing will change” are empirically wrong is beside the point. These statements do 
not reflect judgments about the concrete effects a given pattern of action may have. 
They perform and reinforce a conceptual link between cynicism and 
perceptiveness.185 The link between cynicism and perceptiveness is, to put it as 
straightforwardly as Peter Sloterdijk does, a “universally widespread way in which 
enlightened people see to it that they are not taken for suckers.”186 Sedgwick argues 
that this kind of relentlessly negative ideation also “has [a] thorough practice of 
                                                 
184 Sedgwick, “Paranoid,” 144. 
185 If you would like to convince someone to abandon this high-minded disengagement, you are 
better off trying to swap nodes on the conceptual field by arguing that the truly radical position to 
take is not “A is actually ~A” but instead “A is actually ~~A.” E.g., that voting or direct action are 
actually truly radical because of some theoretical triple Lutz. This will last until someone else lands a 
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wait long. (Q.v. note 146.) 
186 Quoted in Sedgwick, “Paranoid,” 141. 
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disavowing its affective motive and force and masquerading as the very stuff of 
truth.”187 To get away from paranoia is also, in part, to get away from purity and 
profundity. Thankfully, there are ways of thinking outside this paranoid discourse, 
not least because “for someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppressions 
does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of 
epistemological or narrative consequences.”188 
Dewey and Foucault’s shared resistance to purity and profundity crystallizes into lines 
of criticism against Derrida’s philosophical interiority, the clean rigidity of orthodox 
Marxism, and energetically paranoid leftist searches for radical exteriority. Phrased in 
the terms Sedgwick offers, power pragmatism represents an attempt to combine an 
unmystified view of power relations with a reparative and ameliorative sense of 
inquiry (rather than a paranoiac one). 
To undertake an ameliorative project, moreover, is not to blind oneself to the 
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§2.1.2 Tragedy and futurity 
What can a sense of the tragic do for a political theory? How do the tragic tones in 
Dewey and Foucault’s work inform their understandings of political life? I can begin 
to answer this question by noting that “tragic” as it is used here begins with the 
recognition that every course of action in a political-ethical context is subject to a 
balancing test: everything necessarily involves tradeoffs. There is no perfect decision 
from every perspective in a given field or situation. Every decision is compromised, 
carries with it the knowledge of past errors and wrongs and a painful awareness that 
the current decision will engender further wrongs. We don’t only screw up when we 
err. We screw up when we do the right thing. 
Dewey and Foucault rarely get explicit about tragedy. It’s necessary to bring out the 
role of the tragic in each thinker. Eddie Glaude has done a great deal to excavate 
Dewey’s sense of the tragic in the context of black politics.189 Glaude, following 
Dewey, Baldwin, and Toni Morrison, argues that the tragic nature of a moral choice 
resides in the banal-sounding fact that “we confront situations that demand of us a 
choice between competing values.”190 This formulation—of confronting a situation 
in which we must choose between better and worse alternatives—is distinctly 
                                                 
189 Other notable work in this area includes Sidney Hook, “Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life” 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 33 (1960): 5-26 and Cornel West’s 
discussion of that essay in The American Evasion of Philosophy (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1989), 119-124. 
190 Eddie Glaude, In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 26. 
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Deweyan. Glaude (echoing criticisms of profundity and purity) warns against efforts 
“to uncover one single principle of morality. These efforts, in whatever form, fail to 
acknowledge the centrality of uncertainty and conflict to our moral experiences. 
Instead, a litany of dualities—good and evil, justice and injustice, duty and caprice, 
virtue and vice—render moral conflict as only specious and apparent, not as an 
inherent part of the good, the obligatory, and the virtuous. In such a view, with its 
ready-made distinctions and dualities, ‘the only force which can oppose the moral is 
the immoral.’”191 Painful and essential choices confront those who engage in 
meliorative work. Sacrifice and conflict cannot be avoided, contained, or neutralized. 
The task of a pragmatist political theory is not to shirk strife,192 but to offer tools for 
the flexible, tough-minded, and intelligent navigation of problematic situations: to 
recognize that pain and strife are built into political life, and not simply as procedural 
necessities,193 but as wounding and irresolvable elements of politics. Don’t these 
wounds fade as we struggle forward, however? Is it not true that what doesn’t kill you 
makes you stronger? Isn’t my position that politics involves short- and medium-term 
stressors that can be damped through the sure application of a critical intelligence? 
                                                 
191 Ibid., 26-27. 
192 But neither is it to amplify strife for its own sake, unless such moves are understood as tactical 
necessities. 
193 See Alison Kadlec and Will Friedman, “Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Power,” 
Journal of Public Deliberation 3 (2007). 
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Regrettably, many wounds are permanent. Pragmatism’s task is not to erase 
wounding, only to move forward with wounds, even terminal ones, and to engender 
conditions under which present and future wounds can be shallower, fewer, less 
often terminal. Glaude finds in Toni Morison’s Beloved deep expression of the weight 
of this task. In the bravura moment of both his and Morrison’s book, he gives us this 
passage, in which Baby Suggs recites a litany of wounds but urges Denver to go on 
anyway: 
You mean I never told you nothing about Carolina? About your daddy? You 
don’t remember about how come I walk the way I do and about mother’s feet, 
not to speak of her back? I never told you all that? Is that why you can’t walk 
down the steps? My Jesus my. 
But you said there was no defense. 
There ain’t. 
Then what do I do? 
Know it, but go on out the yard. Go on.194 
 
Baby Suggs, Glaude argues, recites unhealable wounds “not to elicit resignation, but 
to urge Denver to act intelligently in the world: ‘Know it, but go on out the yard.’ 
The ‘it’ refers to the pain and suffering that is constitutive of black experiences in the 
United States…. Tragedy is understood, then, as an ineliminable part of what it 
                                                 
194 Toni Morrison, Beloved (New York: Vintage, 2004), 244. Quoted in Glaude, Blue, 43. 
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means to be a black agent in this world.”195 Glaude does not deny centuries of chattel 
slavery and institutional racism. In a Shade of Blue is never far from mourning, never 
out from under poplar trees. Yet, Glaude carries forward a commitment to pragmatic 
meliorism as a way of moving into a future worth living: “Beloved doesn’t end with 
satisfactory outcomes guaranteed. At the end of the story, we are faced with broken 
human beings trying to piece together a life with one another. No grace still, real or 
imagined…. In the end, I believe Morrison’s novel brilliantly realizes what I have 
called the pragmatic view of tragedy: we must look the tragedy of our moral 
experiences squarely in the face and, with little certainty as to the outcomes, humbly 
act to make a better world for ourselves and our children.”196 
Glaude draws on James Baldwin to elaborate the task of limping into better futures. 
Baldwin mourns “this past, the Negro’s past, of rope, fire, torture, castration, 
infanticide, rape; death and humiliation; fear by day and night, fear as deep as the 
marrow of the bone; doubt that he was worthy of life… rage, hatred, and murder, 
hatred for white men so deep that it often turned against him and his own, and made 
all love, all trust, all joy impossible.”197 Baldwin does not salve or sentimentalize. He 
writes time and again of the need to continue living with unhealable wounds, the 
necessity “that we, with love, shall force our brothers to see themselves as they are, to 
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cease fleeing from reality and begin to change it.”198 Baldwin’s commitment to the 
world as it is cannot be avoided: “Here we are, at the center of the arc, trapped in the 
gaudiest, most valuable, and most improbable water wheel the world has ever seen. 
Everything now, we must assume is in our hands; we have no right to assume 
otherwise.”199 
Baldwin’s second sentiment is not designed to redeem his first. The wounds and 
crimes remain unforgivable, even by those wounded, even by time.200 Even by 
Baldwin’s own formulation of the need to keep going. That Baldwin offers no solution 
to his own problem is unsettling. He offers perseverance not as a fix nor as penance, 
but as a constant accompaniment to and condition of black life. The two coexist not 
because perseverance soothes what has come before, but because each, separately, 
cannot be denied. No relationship of resolution or overcoming exists between them. 
You are wounded, and you are going to keep breathing. This unfixability establishes 
the tragic nature of action taken now and in the future. 
The coexistence of Baldwin’s senses of wounding and perseverance is crucial to take 
into the heart of a power pragmatism because it troubles the “problem-solution” 
vocabulary I have at times employed. It teaches pragmatism about its limits by 
offering a tragic sensibility as a powerful centering tool. This sensibility suggests that 
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everything is to various degrees a balancing test. Do not expect to be able to get 
something for nothing, no matter how clever you are. Expect instead that putting 
forward a proposition, achieving a goal, or loosening a material constraint involves 
giving something else up. This maxim is temporally loose: the sacrifice may have 
happened long ago, or it could still be on its way. It is possible to mistake what has 
been lost for what has been gained. Pointing out that a course of action secrets an 
undesirable way of thinking is not sufficient to have shown that course to be 
undesirable full stop. It is only to have shown it to be one stream of action among 
others, implicated as everything is in conflicting webs of choices, resources, and 
histories. As Dewey writes, “Unless one gives up the whole struggle as hopeless, one 
has to choose between alternatives.”201 Bravery lies in choosing, not in refusal. 
A tragic sensibility also helps pragmatism avoid congealing into a viscous 
incrementalism. By understanding power, violence, and domination not as symptoms 
to be palliated but as constitutive and irresolvable elements of living together, power 
pragmatism highlights rather than shirks the urgency of responding to specific 
horrors. Equal concern, respect, and fairness are not understood as abstract liberal 
principles that gradually permeate society, but instead as tools and techniques for 
disrupting all manner of pernicious and recirculating cycles of violence. To think 
pragmatically involves using all the tools available to you to confront specters both 
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immediate and deep, from slaughterhouse cholera202 to preteens killed for playing 
with airsoft guns203 to being taught to hate the color you see in the mirror.204 
Incrementalism and idealism are equally inadequate in the face of these horrors. No 
one who has seen her own blood is not a pragmatist. 
Pragmatism’s tragic dimension, then, takes account of histories of violence, 
permanent wounds, necessary sacrifices, and lifesaving compromises.205 Where in 
Dewey and Foucault does this tragic dimension emerge? Though Foucault offers a 
fleeting discussion of a tragic dimension to subjectivity in his History of Madness,206 I 
focus on how his mobilization of rights-talk in the final years of his life reflects his 
sense of the urgent, tragic dimensions of politics. 
Starting in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, Foucault begins to employ 
the language of rights in different political and intellectual settings, including his 
criticism of “all abuses of rights” in French prisons in the late ’70s.207 Foucault’s late 
                                                 
202 Paula Young Lee, Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse (Lebanon, NH: University of 
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206 Foucault, History of Madness, 26-28. 
207 Quoted in Thomas Keenan, “The ‘Paradox’ of Knowledge and Power: Foucault on the Bias,” in 
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“turn toward rights” is much discussed.208 It presents something of an intellectual and 
historical puzzle. Is it simply the case that, as Richard Wolin argues, Foucault 
abandoned previous postructuralist commitments, especially his critiques of an 
autonomous subject, in turning “increasingly toward a politics of human rights”?209 Is 
Foucault’s late mobilization of rights-talk a kind of recantation? 
Joan Reynolds and Ben Golder contest this reading. Reynolds interprets rights-talk in 
Foucault as a sort of “pragmatic humanism” that “seek[s] to transgress present limits 
through practices of self-mastery and interaction with others who share certain 
historical experiences… [and] gives Foucault’s subjects the means to be active agents 
in the construction of their own meaning.”210 Reynolds holds that Foucault has good 
reasons for invoking the language of rights and other “humanist” figments. These 
reasons have to do with the lived experiences of those enmeshed in power relations. 
Reynolds offers several criticisms against those who read Foucault’s invocation of 
rights as a rapprochement with liberalism,211 but one argument she does not make is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 1997), 168; see also Ben Golder, Foucault and the Politics of Rights (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
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(New York: Routledge, 2006); Joan Reynolds, “‘Pragmatic Humanism’ in Foucault’s Later Work,” 
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that the recantation thesis is only plausible within a reading concerned with 
connections between theoretical nodes in a conceptual field212 to the exclusion of 
Foucault’s concerns about “the need for collective rights as a form of resistance 
against domination” and “enabling, positive practices in which the freedom of the 
present might secure its autonomy.”213 My earlier arguments about The Wrath of 
Capital apply in part to Wolin’s reading of Foucault: the practice of using textual 
figments like “individual” or “rights” to link disparate nodes on a conceptual field is 
insufficient as a method of political criticism. (Not least because of the deformation 
and disanalogies between and among textual figments, the theoretical matrices in 
which they assume meaning, and concrete political moves.) 
Ben Golder, joining Reynolds’s line of argument, describes Foucault’s rights-talk as a 
“counterinvestment” in rights, a move underlain by the “strategic pragmatism of the 
genealogist who seeks to use the available political resources of the time.”214 Not a 
recantation but an incantation. Building on Reynolds and Golder, I argue that what 
those like Wolin read as Foucault’s liberal turn is instead driven by a pragmatic-tragic 
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sensibility rooted in, among other things, interest in the prospect of lifesaving 
compromise. 
Golder writes: “Foucault now better perceives the ways… rights can function to 
contest and remake relations of power—but without ever losing sight of their (often 
paradoxical) limitations. His is a critical, but often quite ambivalent, appropriation of 
rights discourse. Rights emerge in Foucault’s (later) account as potentially useful, 
tactical instruments in political struggle, as political tools immanent and not exterior 
to the field of political combat.”215 Two threads can be pulled from this passage: 
Foucault’s obvious interest in what happens in political struggles216 (his pragmatism) 
and the shifting role played by his ambivalence toward rights. Foucault’s pragmatism 
is manifest in his interest in rights not as a theoretical object that can be extended, 
justified, universalized on one hand and critiqued, deconstructed, revealed as rotten 
on the other, but as “potentially useful, tactical instruments in political struggle.”217 
As tools.218 Damn whether the raft is Bolshevik or Menshevik: does it float? Like 
Dewey, Foucault is concerned “to imagine a future which is the projection of the 
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desirable in the present, and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization.”219 
Dewey and Foucault share this pragmatism. 
The source of Foucault’s ambivalence toward the use of rights is less obvious. Which 
valences is he torn between? The first valence is familiar: Foucault’s longstanding 
critique of an autonomous subject contests the neutrality and universality of rights 
claims.220 Employing the language of rights loops Foucault into processes of 
subjectivation he may not wish to countenance. Invoking rights is a risk. No one 
understands this better than Foucault. Why run this risk, then? This question brings 
up the second, tragic valence at play: the prospect of avoiding suffering and death, of 
securing some life-preserving degree of resistance against “intensification[s] of power 
relations.”221 This second valence gives Foucault’s use of rights its tragic core. 
Foucault’s appeals to rights are not best read as a credulous rapprochement with 
liberalism. Foucault mobilizes rights as a set of socially-constructed tools and 
procedures inflected with power. Consider this criticism of the French carceral 
system: “[the prison’s] internal rules . . . are always absolutely contrary to the 
fundamental laws that in the rest of society guarantee the rights of man.”222 Foucault 
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is not positing “fundamental laws” establishing “the rights of man” that prison 
officials are bound to obey. Consider what, exactly, the prison sets itself against: “the 
fundamental laws that in the rest of society guarantee the rights of man.”223 Foucault 
speaks from within the vocabulary that constitutes his object of analysis. This is the 
same ventriloquy present in much of his work.224 Yet, this ventriloquy does not 
vacate the possibility of making concrete political claims in a given context. To 
become more closely attuned to the limits and dangers immanent to the procedures 
and tools available to you is not to wallow in paradox, but to achieve a necessary 
condition for repurposing those procedures and tools for emancipatory ends.225 
In “Letter to Certain Leaders of the Left,” a 1977 article in Le Nouvel Observateur on 
disputes over the right of asylum, Foucault warns against “dangerous extensions of 
power and distortions in the area of recognized rights.”226 Again, Foucault’s claim is 
not something like “rights are being trampled by power,” but concerns instead certain 
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strategically assemble technologies, exchange, epistemologies, subjects…. Put simply, a protocol 
establishes ‘how to’ do something, how to compose the technologies, subjects, exchanges, affects, 
processes, and so on that make up a moment of health care practice,” or, for that matter, political 
practice. See Murphy, Seizing, 25-26. 




“distortions in the area of recognized rights.”227 The use of the phrase “recognized 
rights,” droits reconnus,228 keeps with Foucault’s analysis of rights as something made 
and remade, a discourse that involves practices of recognition rather than essential 
features. He invokes the “right” of asylum with a tiny genealogy, noting that “for 
thousands of years, the private practice of asylum has been one of those lessons that 
individual hearts have given to states,” and that what is now recognized by the 
international legal apparatus as a right to asylum emerges from the interplay of the 
“private practice[s]” of “individual hearts” and state recognition.229 
This contingent, rights-generating interplay does not block an instrumental approach 
to rights. Rights remain something that can be used in “a concrete, specific, and 
urgent case.”230 As William E. Connolly notes, Foucault is torn between his “drive to 
disturb the forces of normalization” and his “quest to sustain the preconditions of 
democratic life.”231 The tragic dimension of Foucault’s thought comes from the 
awareness that the “preconditions of democratic life” are fragile and constantly 
imperiled, and from the idea that at times one’s best hope for securing those 
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preconditions lies with tools and strategies, like rights, that involve processes of 
subjectivation whose effects are neither obvious nor unambiguous, and may be linked 
with the imperiling of democratic life to begin with. We are in danger, and our tools 
for defending ourselves put us in further danger. There is no transcendental right 
answer, only ways of thinking, moves, tactics, and strategies that allow further 
movement. This is tragic, because it means we will always be hurting, always on the 
run in some sense, but it is not nihilistic. It echoes Glaude’s, Dewey’s, Baldwin’s, and 
Morrison’s point that we must know our wounds cannot be healed, but press on.232 
One technique for this sort of self-defense lies with reconfiguring the status of the 
sciences as a theoretical and political object of analysis. 
 
§2.1.3 Science, technology, and social relations 
Dewey and Foucault are both interested in the ways that scientific inquiry enters into 
relations with the social systems and historical trajectories within and around it. 
Dewey, for his part, links scientific problems with everyday problems. The 
coextensiveness of concrete problems and scientific problems (or, perhaps, the 
recognition of those terms as preliminary distributions having to do with different 
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zones of comportment and practice rather than with a given epistemological status or 
essence) contributes to Dewey’s notion of science not as reading from the great book 
of nature, but as a set of practices and methods of inquiry that, at their best moments, 
allow certain humans in certain situations to be somewhat less wrong, to act slightly 
better than they otherwise might.233 
Dewey takes an instrumental approach to scientific inquiry. Scientific and 
technological shifts make available new technics, push on the boundaries of material 
constraints, and open new currents of thought in a given milieu. These overlapping 
shifts allow for the development of new tactics for altering political and social 
situations. This view requires a particular understanding of what scientific inquiry 
does. For example, how does Dewey understand a statement like “science tells us that 
water is H2O”? 
For Dewey, science does not “disclose” or “‘express’… the inner nature of things.”234 
Instead, “‘science’ signifies just that mode of statement that is most helpful as 
direction.”235 The statement “water is H2O” derives its meaning from the fact that 
understanding water as a chemical substance comprised of two hydrogen atoms 
covalently bonded with an oxygen atom makes it possible to “produce pure water” or 
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“test anything that is likely to be taken for water.”236 “Water is H2O” is not 
meaningful because it is a successful crayon-rubbing of the Book of Nature.237 It does 
not pull back the curtain on a fixed world. “Water is H2O” is a building block, a 
constituent for new directions, actions, capabilities, and understandings.238 Science 
consists in “the invention of an equipment, a technique of appliances and procedures, 
which” distinguishes “the authenticated from the spurious… by specific modes of 
treatment in specific situations.”239 Scientific postulates are composed and can be 
decomposed if more fruitful ways of understanding are formulated. For Dewey, the 
scientific method offers the least-bad way of discerning better courses of action in 
given circumstances. As Eric MacGilvray writes, albeit in a slightly different context, 
“Science for the pragmatist is not, as the caricature has it, a worldview that renders 
traditional ethical discourse obsolete, nor is it simply a method that can be applied 
indiscriminately to all kinds of social problems. Pragmatism treats scientific inquiry 
instead as an enormously successful set of practices... and aims to assess the 
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238 Dewey’s phrasing obscures the extent to which this “building block” is not merely a human 
contrivance. “Water is H2O” is heterogeneous achievement, won not only by scientific procedures 
but by hydrogen atoms, the balance of forces that comprise covalent bonds, borosilicate glass 
beakers, the epoxy resin of lab benches, the non-luminous flame of a Bunsen burner, and so forth. 
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implications of this success for our understanding of human capacities and 
purposes.”240 
Science is a method for “laying down a path in walking”241 rather than an 
epistemological clearing or a neutral vantage around which the world clarifies itself 
like the eye of a reversed tornado. To engage with scientific methods of inquiry is not 
to adopt a scientistic, deductive-nomological view of objectively-determined facts 
making up a fixed external world. Rather, science involves a contingent “trust in 
specific procedures” and the application of a “technique of appliances and 
procedures” embedded in experience.242 Dewey’s focus on appliances and procedures 
disrupts philosophical views of knowledge in which “the knower, however defined, is 
set over against the world to be known” and “knowing consists in possessing a 
transcript, more or less accurate but otiose, of real things.”243 The view of a knower 
set apart from what is known is mistaken because “if it be true that the self or subject 
of experience is part and parcel of the course of events”—and Dewey thinks it is 
true—“it follows that the self becomes a knower…. in virtue of a distinctive way of 
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partaking in the course of events.”244 When Dewey emphasizes concrete techniques 
and procedures, he is not gliding over the true import of scientific inquiry. 
Techniques and procedures for better action and knowing are science. And scientific 
methods of understanding constitute science’s chief contribution to social inquiry. 
“The significant distinction,” Dewey writes, “is no longer between the knower and the 
world; it is between different ways of being in and of the movement of things; 
between a brute physical way and a purposive, intelligent way.”245 Scientific 
procedures, embedded in experience, are techniques for intelligently distinguishing 
between different courses of action. 
Foucault helps Dewey on his path away from abstract considerations of “science” in 
the singular246 toward looking at sciences: different technologies of knowing drawn by 
specific historical and material loops.247 Dewey’s talk of “science” and “the scientific 
method” as extensions of a unified process belies the sympathies he and Foucault 
share in this area. For both Dewey and Foucault, the sciences are bundles of 
procedures, actions, materials, and techniques in concrete settings. Dewey wishes to 
take up one such constellation of procedures, which he simply calls “science” or 
“scientific inquiry,” for ethical, political, and social ends. In one sense, Foucault has 
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little interest in this undertaking. He mounts a cautionary rejoinder to Dewey’s 
enthusiasm for science by extending a point latent in Dewey: the various procedure-
constellations that have been called “science” occur in specific historical milieux, 
where they structure what can be articulated as knowledge, and the structures they 
countenance are shot through with power relations both as historical artifacts and as 
constitutive features of the procedures by which they produce objectivity.248 
In another sense, however, what motivates Dewey to draw on science as an ethical-
political tool is also what motivates Foucault to draw on rights as an ethical-political 
tool. Science, like rights-talk,249 like philosophical inquiry,250 like the tools offered by 
Marxism or psychoanalysis,251 is ultimately a method to “contrive ingeniously.”252 
Dewey and Foucault approach science, rights, and theory, their other features 
notwithstanding, as means to be repurposed against intensifying power relations,253 
the rapacious exploitation of the working class by “a vicious and incompetent 
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banking system,”254 cowardice among leaders on the Left in the face of the erosion of 
asylum rights,255 “illusions” that are “produced and circulated by those in power with 
a profusion that contrasts with their withholding of the necessities of life,”256 
governmental monopolies on “interven[ing] in the sphere of international policy and 
strategy,”257 the continued coexistence “of piled up real wealth of food and goods 
with privation and poverty,”258 and governments that “arrogate to themselves the 
right to pass off as profit or loss the human unhappiness that their decisions provoke 
or their negligence permits.”259 
A third point of contact between the thinkers arises when Dewey links the 
abandonment of “causal forces” in the natural sciences with the rejection of similarly 
dated ways of thinking in the social sciences.260 Dewey describes how, in the history 
of science, “causal forces” like “a force of combustion; of intrinsic nisus toward this 
and that; of heaviness and levity,” long thought to be essential features of the natural 
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world, were instead condensations of “a variety of complex occurrences.”261 Specific 
phenomena were gobbled up by abstract formulations  like “a force of levity” or 
“nature’s abhorrence of a vacuum.”262 Dewey celebrates the move away from this 
way of thinking in the sciences, and works to bring about a similar shift in his 
philosophical and social work. 
Foucault, meanwhile, writes that political philosophy still has not done away with an 
understanding of power as a substance possessed by sovereigns. Against this view, 
Foucault holds that “relationships of power have an extremely wide extension in 
human relations. There is a whole network of relationships of power, which can 
operate between individuals, in the bosom of the family, in an educational 
relationship, in the political body, etc.”263 Power relations aren’t well-described by the 
types of monolithic theoretical regimes used to define (once and for all) enormous 
and elusive terms like Authority or Justice. Power is not held like a scepter or cursed 
ring. Power relations are better approached the way Newton thought of gravity, or 
Einstein of space-time: a range of reciprocal effects that can’t be escaped, only 
described, manipulated, had their multiple instantiations experimented with.264 Power 
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wherever it’s operative entails ways of resisting whatever it’s doing just then, as a 
changing magnetic field cannot but generate an electric field. 
There is, of course, no context-independent link between decomposing the sciences 
into a suite of procedures and devolving power into relational fields.265 There are, 
however, analogous structures at play in the way Dewey and Foucault alter received 
understandings of science and power. Dewey, describing Darwin’s influence on 
philosophy, religion, and the sciences, makes a preliminary version of this connection 
himself. He writes that before the advent of The Origin of Species, “nature” was 
understood to “do nothing in vain; but all for an ulterior purpose…. Within natural 
sensible events there is therefore contained a spiritual causal force… apprehended by 
an enlightened reason.”266 This “design argument” underpins the casuistry whose 
decline Dewey described earlier. The design viewpoint sustains not only causal forces 
as valid explanations in the sciences, but also their theological and philosophical 
correlates: “Purposefulness accounted for the intelligibility of nature; and the 
possibility of science, while the absolute, or cosmic character of this purposefulness 
gave sanction and worth to the moral and religious endeavors of man. Science was 
underpinned and morals authorized by one and the same principle, and their mutual 
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agreement was eternally guaranteed.”267 By 1909, Dewey understands conceptual 
shifts in the sciences effected by Darwin to be linked with new technologies of 
understanding in philosophy and social inquiry. Dewey and Foucault’s reformulations 
of science, power, rights, and social inquiry echo the Darwinian reshuffling in the 
sciences and philosophy. Foucault and Dewey both understand large theoretical 
objects as tenuously binding diverse phenomena that occur in experience. In 
response, they decompose power into concrete, local power relations, push social inquiry 
toward a set of techniques for intelligent action, use rights as a means for fabricating 
political and ethical claims, and splinter science into diverse sets of procedures and 
appliances set in concrete historical milieux available for creative repurposing by and 
for democratic ends. 
There is some further ambiguity, however, about the relationship between Dewey 
and Foucault’s respective treatments (or lack thereof) of power. That ambiguity 
concerns the extent to which Dewey’s account of power, insofar as it can be 
extracted from him, stands on its own or whether it requires buttressing.  The next 
section discusses what Foucault’s account of power can contribute to Dewey. 
 
 
                                                 




I argued in chapter one that it’s not clear how Dewey’s pragmatism answers questions 
of power. I discussed two attempts to draw a theory of power from Dewey, one by 
R.W. Hildreth and one by Joel Wolfe. Hildreth claims that Dewey’s “experimental 
inquiry offers a potential source of critical reflection” and offers a “Deweyan 
conception” of power “as a complex capacity, defined by social customs and habits, 
and relative to the transactional fields of experience.”268 I argued that these 
formulations were not entirely native to Dewey, but instead Foucauldian, rendering 
Hildreth’s claim to have drawn on exclusively Deweyan resources somewhat 
precarious. Wolfe, for his part, argues that Dewey’s account of praxis naturally yields 
“a tacit theory of power.”269 For Wolfe, “Dewey’s philosophical starting point centers 
on praxis and the ways human action makes differences within and through a social 
medium” so as to “in effect” offer “a tacit theory of power.”270 But, as I argued in 
chapter one, offering a nuanced, contextualized account of praxis and action is not 
the same as offering an account of power relations. Wolfe does not show how Dewey 
moves beyond sophisticated accounts of action in a social context to an analysis of 
power. Hildreth and Wolfe do, however, locate sites in Dewey’s thought where a 
more robust analysis of power can attach and grow nerve endings. I’ll focus on how 
Wolfe’s reading of Dewey can be opened up and hooked into Foucault. 
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To support his argument that “Dewey’s philosophical starting point centers on praxis 
and the ways human action makes differences within and through a social medium, in 
effect furnishing a tacit theory of power,” Wolfe quotes Dewey’s Quest for Certainty, 
where Dewey argues that  
when theories of values do not afford intellectual assistance in framing ideas 
and beliefs about values that are adequate to direct action, the gap must be 
filled by other means. If intelligent method is lacking, prejudice, the pressure 
of immediate circumstance, self-interest and class-interest, traditional customs, 
institutions of accidental historic origin, are not lacking, and they tend to take 
the place of intelligence. Thus we are led to our main proposition: Judgments 
about values are judgments about the conditions and the results of 
experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the 
formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments. For whatever decides 
their formation will determine the main course of our conduct, personal and 
social.271 
 
Wolfe argues that this passage offers an “implicit” Deweyan account of power: 
“Examining what values control ways of functioning exposes what matters most and 
for what ends…. The structure of power, thus, arises from and can be analyzed by 
examining the ways actors operate to control events.”272 It remains unclear how, on 
Wolfe’s reading, Dewey makes the jump from offering reflections about what is 
meant by “values,” and the role these values play in “the formation of our desires, 
affections and enjoyments,” to an analysis of power. Does Dewey, for example, 
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intend that his reader understand the relationship between “the formation of our 
desires, affections and enjoyments” and “the main course of our conduct, personal 
and social” as involving operations that sustain systems of unequal relations between 
human beings? It seems that the most one can say here is Well, possibly. Foucault 
offers a lens for reinterpreting this paragraph and pushing forward Wolfe’s effort to 
synthesize a Deweyan account of power. 
A Foucauldian reading of the passage quoted above suggests that when Dewey 
worries that “prejudice, the pressure of immediate circumstance, self-interest and 
class-interest, traditional customs, institutions of accidental historic origin... tend to 
take the place of intelligence,” he is not offering a general warning against bias in 
decision-making. Instead, Dewey offers means for understanding how actions to 
improve collective conditions occur within a field of power relations that composes 
and compromises these efforts to begin with.273 When Dewey writes about “self-
interest and class-interest [and] traditional customs” infiltrating the capacity for 
intelligent decision-making, this can be understood as an attempt to describe how 
structures of power condition ways of thinking that appeared neutral and how these 
altered ways of understanding play out in a social reality defined by shifting power 
relations. This Foucauldian rendering complicates some of Dewey’s own assumptions 
about “intelligence” and theories of value “that are adequate to direct action.” Dewey 
understands intelligent means for guiding action as defined by their insulation from 
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“circumstance, self-interest and class-interest, traditional customs, institutions of 
accidental historic origin.”274 Intelligence stands at least partially outside relations of 
power. This leads to an approach to decision-making where the primary objective is 
to insulate intelligence from the operations of power—to find an incorruptible 
procedure for intelligent discernment. This leads Dewey in the direction of political 
and social theories premised on just/unjust, moral/immoral, upstanding/corrupt 
divisions and the defense of what is understood to fall on the proper side of those 
divisions. 
To read Dewey through Foucault is to imagine intelligence and power as intermingled 
rather than in mutual isolation. Dewey’s intelligent methods of action can be 
understood to inhabit the same space as the corrupting influences he fears. 
“Intelligence” and “prejudice, the pressure of immediate circumstance, self-interest 
and class-interest, traditional customs, institutions of accidental historic origin” are 
active within the same practices, woven into and from the same psychic and hylic 
fabrics. Intelligent methods for developing courses of action are generated and 
textured by circumstance and structures of power. This does not mean that critical 
applications of intelligence are impossible. On the contrary, recognizing the ways that 
intelligence is bound up with structures of power allows for a more nuanced 
approach to intelligent action in a social field formed and deformed by shifting power 
relations. 




Recognizing power as ever-present in intelligent discernment weakens Dewey’s 
tendency to insulate “intelligence” or “growth” from the corrupting influences that 
infiltrate it. A theory of the social premised, however implicitly, on insulating 
intelligent means of decision-making from corrupting influences isn’t just 
unsatisfying. Because it misses the ways that intelligence is veined with power from its 
inception,275 such an account sustains fairy tales about the purity of leftist causes that 
leave radicals forever surprised and hurt when radical movements fail or are coöpted. 
If you understand the core of your political efforts to be pure (and, more, if you 
understand this purity as operatively important such that losing your pure status is the 
same as losing full stop), then when this core turns out to involve compromise, grit, 
ugliness, people you’d rather not share a cab with, setbacks, crushing defeats, wet 
handshakes, and people who take concepts you imagine yourself to have reared and 
use them for things you consider cheap or counterproductive, you are inclined to find 
increasingly artful and recondite ways of embellishing your defeat so as to save your 
purity.276 You may even take to redescribing defeats so as to make them feel even 
more devastating, lest anyone get one over on you.277 
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Dewey’s account of the social is not just fruitfully supplemented by Foucault’s 
account of power. It requires it for its own conceptual coherence and to avoid 
forfeiting its political and ethical aims. It is pragmatism’s estrangement from power 
relations, not its proximity, that threatens pragmatic visions of a plural society. The 
popular observation that Dewey is “waiting at the end of the road” that Foucault has 
been traveling278 can be inverted. Foucault’s analysis of power extends back into 
Dewey’s account of society, reinvigorating Dewey and making possible a stronger 
pragmatism, a power-sensitive pragmatism. What the tautological definition of power 
pragmatism as a “pragmatism that pays attention to power relations” means as a 
practical matter is something like sedulous attention to the concrete feedback loops 
that sustain a situation (rather than abstractions arrayed in a conceptual field) that 
interrogates the ways that power deforms and conditions this sort of analysis to begin 
with. Please note the relation between the first and second parts of this definition. 
Power pragmatism does not reduce to “pay attention to feedback loops, also power.” 
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Attending to power relations becomes a reflexive mechanism of oversight and 
feedback operative within pragmatist analysis. It functions as a kind of fallibilist self-
awareness that guards, however imperfectly, against pragmatism’s slipping into 
incrementalism, the mere ratification of dominant interests, cooptation, and so on. 
In any event, the definition “pragmatism sensitive to power relations” does very little 
on its own, and I hope, in true pragmatist fashion, you won’t pay too much attention 
to it in isolation. Like all of us, it depends on being injected into a concrete situation 
to come alive.279 I turn to one such situation in chapter four, which argues that 
attention to critical infrastructure is a necessary component of radial politics. 
 
§2.2 Power pragmatism, realism, and cognitive-behavioral theory 
This final section—more of a coda, really—looks at two side-stories in the intellectual 
history of political theory from a power-pragmatist perspective.  These two stories are 
(i) a professed attention to the “real world” that appears in the conclusions of 
published work in political theory and (ii) the longstanding circuit of exchange 
between psychoanalytic theory and social theory. The first story has been alluded to 
in the introduction. It has to do with how small-r “realism” in theory highlights an 
orientation—shared by a variety of otherwise quite different theorists—characterized 
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with it.” See West, Evasion, 181. 
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by a modest, even prosaic, interest in what happens in the world. The unassuming, 
straightforward nature of this concern generally sits suspended in mild tension with 
the sophisticated and technically-difficult work undertaken by these books. The two 
lie apart, like flies on opposite corners of a web. Power pragmatism might, I suggest, 
work to generate a means of better navigating the strands of silk between the two. 
The second story is simpler: political theory has long exchanged ideas with 
psychoanalytic theory. These exchanges have often been fruitful. If political theorists 
now wanted to turn their attention to other schools of thought within psychotherapy, 
they might do well to explore what cognitive-behavioral theory has to offer. Hence: 
cognitive-behavioral political theory. 
§2.2.1 Realism in political theory 
What’s the relationship between a pragmatism attentive to power relations and 
“realist” political theory? What makes a political theory realist, anyway? Raymond 
Geuss and William A. Galston’s work on theoretical realism280 sheds some light in 
this area. Geuss and Galston posit a “realist” trend in political theory that spans 
Bernard Williams, Stuart Hampshire, John Dunn, Glen Newey, Richard 
Bellamy, Geoffrey Hawthorne, and John Gray, who are critical of what they 
regard as the moralism,  legalism, and parochialism of American liberal theory; 
‘left Nietzscheans,’ mainly American, such as William Connolly and Bonnie 
Honig; Machiavellians such as Chantal Mouffe and (in a different register) 
Mark Philp… some scholars influenced by Quentin Skinner and the 
                                                 
280 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); William 
A. Galston, “Realism in Political Theory,” Brookings Institution draft, 2007. 
111 
 
‘Cambridge historical school’; Judith Shklar, and her many admirers who 
endorse her anti-utopian skepticism… majoritarian democrats such as Jeremy 
Waldron… and finally, a small embattled band of American political scientists, 
Stephen Elkin chief among them.281 
For these small-r realists, the “high liberalism” of Rawls, Dworkin, and their 
hierophants “evades” rather than theorizes politics.282 As noted in the introduction, 
the realists—against attempts to construct ideal theories of politics and other 
attempts to abstract and decontextualize political situations in pursuit of formulas for 
justice that transcend historical, material, and cultural contexts—emphasize attention 
to the actual conditions in which politics occurs. This realist tradition is diverse, but 
its hallmarks include an interest in the operations of power, the deep 
contextualization (rather than abstraction) of political problems, and attention to the 
“actual outcomes” of a given course of action or way of thinking.283 
In contemporary political theory, this realist attention to context, power, and 
outcomes often hides in plain sight. Consider how often published work in political 
theory concludes with a turn toward lived experience. Even if a work’s central 
argument revolves around sophisticated ontological claims or debates over the 
mistranslation of a prefix in the footnotes to an abstruse text, its author will 
nevertheless close by appealing to the need “to heighten care for the world and the 
                                                 
281 Galston, “Realism,” 1. 
282 Ibid., 1-3. 
283 Geuss, Real, 10-16. 
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sweetness of life amid the dangers,”284 to “distort the present on behalf of what the 
present can become,”285 “to ensure the meeting of needs and to foster human 
flourishing,”286 “to bring about a new configuration of the world,”287 “to take better 
care of things, ourselves, and others,”288 and to work so that history “might be made 
in a more reasonable, less violent way.”289 
My point here is not to sneer at these appeals. (On the contrary.) These gestures are 
not empty. But why do they live, by and large, in political theory’s concluding 
paragraphs? Why do they so often mark a shift in the work’s tone and, sometimes, its 
stated aims? As Diana Coole—whose quote ends the foregoing list—acknowledges, 
her own close feels “like a rather modest and prosaic conclusion after the long 
digression through ontology.”290 A more jaded (or efficient) reader might object at 
                                                 
284 William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008), 146. 
285 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 263. 
286 Tony Monchinski, Education in Hope: Critical Pedagogies and the Ethic of Care (Baltimore: Peter Lang, 
2010), 189. 
287 Samuel Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 169. 
288 Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 136. 
289 Diana Coole, Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics after Anti-Humanism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), 255. In addition to the conclusion poetry just reeled off, realist frames of reference 
lie implicit in references to alternative economies in J.K. Gibson-Graham’s Postcapitalist Politics, 
Connolly’s ethos of critical responsiveness in The Ethos of Pluralization, or in the “cryptonormative” 
commitments Habermas accuses Foucault of harboring (see The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
270-276). In a sense, Habermas only chose the wrong prefix. What is interesting about Foucault’s 




this point: This isn’t all that interesting. You’ve simply isolated a general feature of 
conclusions. Every writer has a “conclusion voice” she puts on, like a gown at 
commencement, to fill out the end of talks, books, and eulogies. She says that she 
hopes the future will be better and we all ought to live more peacefully together and 
so forth. They’re throwaway lines—don’t read too much into them. 
On the contrary, the practice of conclusion poetry seems indispensable to me. These 
ethical-political confessions are most interesting for how they, gathered together, 
begin to sketch a solution set that theorists with otherwise divergent methodologies 
converge on, perhaps the only “consensus position” to be found in political theory. 
What does this consensus position, this cluster of exhortations, consist of? Coole 
describes her own conclusion as “modest and prosaic.” These two attributes 
characterize much of the closing exhortations. They are prosaic when they invoke in 
style and substance the everyday, what is common, what is present here and now. 
Their modesty surfaces when they relax high-flown ontological ambitions, streamline 
recondite epistemological arguments, invite high abstraction to visit the level of lived 
experience. Coole calls this a kind of “practical radicalism.”291 You might call it 
pragmatic. 
As it turns out, Galston and Geuss’s realism captures central features of the 
inconsistently-articulated cluster of positions expressed by different theorists in the 
conclusions to their books and articles. The more one attempts to tease out what 




these claims and exhortations have in common, the more their underlying 
orientations and commitments come to resemble those of power pragmatism. 
Theoretical realism meets power pragmatism where it offers an alternative conception 
of the relationship between politics and theory: one that is heuristic, limited, problem-
oriented, concerned about the real operations of power, and interested in abstractions 
only insofar as they lead to or make possible certain real outcomes. The “consensus 
position” at the center of contemporary political theory, then, is not a far-reaching 
solution to deep questions about the nature of justice or authority, but rather a kind 
of everyday pragmatism, Coole’s “practical radicalism.”292 This claim is intertextually 
broad, but also involute: it gets at what we have in mind when we describe a political 
theory as “realist” or ask if someone is concerned about “the real world.” Why ask 
about the relationship between theory and politics, or about the connection between 
ethical frameworks and the way human lives are carried out? Power pragmatism 
functions in part as a set of tools for locating, substantiating, and understanding what 
is being referred to or relied upon by ethical appeals to better versions of the real 
world.293 
                                                 
292 Coole, Merleau-Ponty, 255. This is not to say that everyone in the critical-theoretical academic 
constellation is aiming at precisely the same normative goals, all neutrally discoverable via consensus. 
More interesting is the resemblance among the concrete aims and procedures of those whose 
theoretical-abstract elaborations and defenses of their positions vary widely, and what those shared 
procedures and aims augur. Venn-diagram political theory. 
293  There is also an underexplored difference between falling into political-realism-as-acquiescence 




§2.2.2 Cognitive-behavioral political theory 
One way to express the realist dimensions of power pragmatism is to explore the idea 
of a “cognitive-behavioral political theory.” In psychotherapy, cognitive-behavioral 
theory (CBT) describes 
a broad class of present-focused interventions with a shared focus on changing 
cognition (thoughts, beliefs, and assumptions about the world), changing behavior, 
and building clients’ coping skills. Cognitive theory focuses on the rationality of 
one’s thinking patterns and the connections between thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. Behavior theory is not concerned with internal mental processes but 
rather how human behavior, whether adaptive or problematic, is developed, 
sustained, or eliminated through its external reinforcement. The nature of change in 
cognitive-behavioral theory is apparent in its hyphenated term. That is, clients can 
be helped to change in three ways: 1) cognitively, by teaching them how to 
identify and change distorted thinking; 2) behaviorally, by offering skills training 
to improve coping capability; and 3) experientially, by helping clients set up 
natural experiments so they can test the extent to which their beliefs about an 
event are rational.294 
                                                                                                                                                 
A lot of the [politicians] defending “political realism” are not good messengers for their case. 
They don’t believe in it as an actual good approach to politics. It’s just kind of what they’ve 
been doing.… If political realism is to be saved from the political realists, you’re gonna need 
people who advocate it not because it is the thing they’ve fallen into over a long career in 
which they have allowed themselves to get pretty appropriated by the political establishment. 
You’re gonna need people who come to it itself as a more exciting, philosophically interesting 
proposal. 
(Transcribed from discussion, The Weeds, Feb 12, 2016, 59:50 timestamp.) 
294 Jacqueline Corcoran, Building Strengths and Skills: A Collaborative Approach to Working with Clients 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36. Emphases in original. 
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This passage expresses many of pragmatism’s central tenets, including a 
reconstructive approach to thought and action, an account of selves as constituted by 
habits and trends of conduct, an interest in present-focused coping, the invocation of 
experience and experimentation, and attention to the way broader forces (e.g., 
currents of power) do not merely constrain but also constitute the behaviors that 
make selves and those selves’ capability to engage in meliorative work. Where 
psychoanalytic approaches might understand “neuroses” in terms of abstract links or 
conduits between structures of desire or childhood experiences and present 
disorders,295 CBT is inclined to understand dysfunctional modes of thought and 
behavior in terms of concrete patterns and the possibility of disrupting those 
patterns. Mark Williams gives the example of a client whose depression is linked with 
a belief that she is “never any good in any social encounter… that no-one really wants 
to know her.”296 Where a psychoanalyst might relate this belief back to unconscious 
psychic structures shaped by childhood experiences, a cognitive-behavioral therapist 
is more inclined to undertake collaborative strategies like task assignment and reality 
testing. A task-assignment-and-reality-testing approach “involves generating 
experiments that can treat such thoughts [‘no one wants to get to know me’] as 
experimental predictions” amenable to testing. This testing can be carried out in real-
world situations. A client might be asked to consider “what might she do before the 
                                                 
295 Theodore Shapiro and Robert N. Emde, Research in Psychoanalysis (Connecticut: International 
Universities Press, 1995),  69-70, 112-114. 
296  J. Mark G. Williams, “Depression,” in Science and Practice of Cognitive Behavior Therapy, ed. David M. 
Clark and Christopher G. Fairburn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 265-66. 
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next session that could test out either idea [and to] predict what might happen… 
what might go wrong, and what would she do if it did. The next session would then 
check whether the list of difficulties the client foresaw actually happened, or whether 
other unforeseen difficulties arose.”297 Reality testing can also be carried out in part 
via thought experiments “in which the client anticipates each detail of trying to carry 
out a task, such as going out with friends…. Each of the ‘roadblocks’ that have 
become evident during the rehearsal may now be discussed, and each may become 
the target of its own task assignment…. Each of these sub-tasks, although they 
appear insignificant, may turn out to be an important block to progress, and should 
not be minimized.”298  
Though its differences with psychoanalysis are clear, CBT does not wholly reject 
psychodynamic approaches to therapy. Indeed, handbooks on the CBT approach to 
depression include the technique of “dealing with underlying fears and assumptions,” 
which involves “investigat[ing] the way in which dysfunctional schemata and 
assumptions have built up over a lifetime, and how they influence day-to-day 
thinking…. The history of how such a fear or assumption [e.g., ‘Everyone must like 
me, or I can’t be happy’] has grown up and been reinforced through the client’s 
                                                 
297 Williams, “Depression,” 265. 
298 Ibid., 266. The difference between this kind of thought experiment and pernicious abstraction-
generalization described below (q.v. note 314) suggests that merely because you operate within the 
domain of thought and writing does not mean you are doomed to abstraction. 
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experience of relationships at home, school, and college will be discussed.”299 Pace 
strict behaviorists, this approach implicitly involves a psychodynamic understanding 
of dysfunction. Incorporating psychoanalysis in this partial, local way—as a specific 
technique—recalls Foucault and Dewey’s reappropriation of conceptual or 
institutional monoliths (rights, philosophy, science) as specific techniques with local 
application. 
Dewey, writing before the development of cognitive-behavioral therapy, argued that 
“even so ‘scientific’ a theory as modern psycho-analysis thinks that mental habits can 
be straightened out by some kind of purely psychical manipulation without reference 
to the distortions of sensation and perception which are due to bad bodily sets. The 
other side of the error [in psychotherapy] is found in the notion of ‘scientific’ nerve 
physiologists that it is only necessary to locate a particular diseased cell or local lesion, 
independent of the whole complex of organic habits, in order to rectify conduct.”300 
Political theory has tried the talking cure for a century, but the manipulation and 
remanipulation of symbols is as insufficient an approach as limiting oneself to crude 
alterations of the physical. As J.K. Gibson-Graham found in the Latrobe Valley, 
“rather than working mainly with language and discourse and counting on that to 
release and redirect affect, we found that with these groups… marginalized by 
economic restructuring… we needed to directly address embodied, habitual, and 
                                                 
299  Williams, “Depression,” 265-67. 
300 Dewey, Conduct, 33-35. 
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emotional practices of being.”301 Roderick J. Watts further argues that “in CBT, we 
find a technique for transforming how people think about the world, one that has 
enjoyed extensive empirical validation, yet no one has systematically applied it to the 
‘treatment’ of internalized oppression and the strengthening of critical 
consciousness.”302  What does a cognitive-behavioral political theory look like? 
This question is best approached by untangling a few of the difficulties cognitive-
behavioral political theory faces. While the parallels between cognitive-behavioral 
theory and power pragmatism may be strong, dangers and disanalogies sprout like 
weeds. Accusations of overestimating the rational capacities of autonomous subjects, 
which dog classical pragmatism, can be leveled against the cognitive-behavioral 
emphasis on subjects learning to more objectively evaluate their patterns of thought 
and action.303 CBT’s status as a therapy, intended for the treatment of a client within 
a given set of material, social, and professional parameters, generates further issues. 
Who or what is the object of “treatment” for cognitive-behavioral political theory? 
                                                 
301 Gibson-Graham, Postcapitalist, 152. 
302 Roderick J. Watts, “Integrating Social Justice and Psychology,” The Counseling Psychologist 32, no. 6 
(2004): 855-865. 
303 To be fair, Beck and Weishaar distance cognitive therapy from forms of therapy like rational 
emotive behavior therapy (REBT) that emphasize rationality. They note that “REBT theory states 
that a distressed individual has irrational beliefs that contribute to irrational thoughts and that when 
these are modified… they will disappear and disorder will clear up. The cognitive therapist, operating 
from an inductive model, helps the patient translate interpretations and beliefs into hypotheses, 
which are then subjected to empirical testing. An REBT therapist is more inclined to use a deductive 
model to point out irrational beliefs. The cognitive therapist eschews the word irrational in favor of 
dysfunctional because problematic beliefs are nonadaptive rather than irrational.” See Aaron T. Beck 
and Marjorie E. Weishaar, “Cognitive Therapy,” in Current Psychotherapies, ed. Raymond J. Corsini and 
Danny Wedding (Belmont, CA: Thomson, 2008), 265-66. 
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Society? That’s impossibly broad. A given “problematic situation”? Those who 
engage in reactionary patterns of thought and action? Baldwin’s “well-meaning” white 
student who claims to have “lost [his] conscience”?304 What’s the analogue of the 
therapist? Is it a community organizer? That seems too narrow. A political theorist? 
That seems too convenient. Some cross-section of human and nonhuman actants in a 
given problematic situation? Certain disanalogies will persist because the conceptual 
link between psychotherapy and political theory involves reference to incompatible 
structures and relations from the outset. 
However, a pragmatist dissolving of several dichotomies can help. Cognitive-
behavioral theory is especially useful for navigating situations in which victim and 
perpetrator live in the same body. In psychotherapy, this invokes therapeutic 
procedures having to do with self-harm, destructive thought patterns, self-defeating 
behaviors, depression, and so forth. Transported to political theory, these procedures 
become a new set of tools for untangling the recursive dimensions of political and 
social problems. Food insecurity, police violence, climate change, income inequality, 
sexism, and other systemic ills involve antagonists and protagonists who share the 
same social (and, sometimes, physical) body, who mutually co-constitute the same 
problematic situation, whose action and interaction sustain the feedback loops by 
which a situation is remade time and again. Much of the work of adapting advances 
in cognitive-behavioral therapy to political life consists in scrambling the division 
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between therapist and client.305 Instead of rigid divisions between healer and healed, 
envision currents of damage and recovery that cross and inhabit human bodies, actor-
networks, and material-social-psychological feedback loops. 
Still, psychotherapy starts with individual minds as its object of treatment, and so 
resists being extended to wider social and material spheres. Any application of 
cognitive-behavioral political theory will be somewhat catachrestic, like saying “the 
crowd remembers its grandma.” To think through this objection, it helps to ask what 
cognitive-behavioral therapy takes as its object of treatment. Beck and Weishaar write 
that cognitive-behavioral therapy involves “discovering what threads run through the 
patient’s present misperceptions and beliefs and linking them to analogous 
experiences in the past…. The immediate goal is to shift the information processing 
apparatus to a more neutral condition so that events will be evaluated in a more 
balanced way.”306 When “dysfunctional modes”307 are identified, cognitive therapy 
seeks to “(1) deactivate them, (2) modify their content and structure, and (3) 
construct more adaptive modes to neutralize them.”308 In essence, CBT aims to 
identify feedback loops that reproduce and deepen structures that sustain a disorder. 
                                                 
305 Certain CBT writers start down this path, departing from visions of a heroic analyst in favor of a 
collaborative approach. See Williams, “Depression,” 266. 
306 Beck and Weishaar, “Cognitive,” 264-65. 
307 At a societal level, think of dysfunctional modes as the sorts of feedback loops that, e.g., widen 
income inequality, retrench white supremacy, or paralyze the ability of a technologically-advanced 
civilization to respond to climate change. 
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Once these feedback loops have been identified, they can be disrupted, recomposed, 
or supplemented with more favorable relays. Understanding feedback loops as the 
primary site of intervention in cognitive-behavioral therapy increases the portability 
of its techniques to political and social theory. An analysis of feedback loops scales 
well: there’s no longer any need to gather nervously, like preliterate hunters encircling 
a mammoth, around a lumbering and ill-defined object of analysis like “modernity” 
or “sovereignty” or “violence.” As a given situation, trend, or idea is broken down 
into linked self-reproducing circuits comprised of human and nonhuman elements, it 
grows more amenable to cognitive-behavioral analysis and intervention. The specific 
cycles of behavior and cognition that constitute the operative, self-renewing core of a 
system of oppression, say, are subject to disruption and reconstruction in ways that a 
catch-all like “society” or “human nature” is not.309 Reconstructing the cognitive and 
behavioral constituents of self-reproducing and reinforcing circuits produces ripple 
effects that propagate through other feedback loops with connections (antagonistic, 
mutually reinforcing, resonant) to the remade circuit. These ripples spread, 
propagating through and reformulating networks of behavior, cognition, material 
flows, “nonhuman force fields,”310 and institutional structures, transforming existing 
                                                 
309 See again Latour’s criticism of “social stuff” in Reassembling the Social. 




feedback loops and creating new relays.311 These new loops and relays generate 
further ripples, which produce new moirés of interference and amplification. 
A longstanding circuit of exchange exists between psychoanalytic theory and social 
theory. Why is there no corresponding trade deal between cognitive-behavioral 
theory and political theory? There are contingent and historical reasons, to be sure: 
CBT has risen to prominence only in the last few decades, and “behavioral” is still a 
swear word in certain circles of social science. There is also the answer that cognitive-
behavioral therapy is light on theory proper. The quotidian cognitive-behavioral 
business of assigning insomniacs homework312 or giving suicidal soldiers “reasons for 
living” cards313 stands at distance from profound theoretical work. In psychoanalysis, 
                                                 
311 This sort of cognitive-behavioral propagation across nested feedback loops allows us to 
understand phenomena like the way that curbing police violence and industrial pollution in 
communities of color leads to more black and Latino doctors admitted to medical school and thence 
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the theoretical apparatus314 rises front and center, suggesting itself to social theorists. 
It seems a shame, however, for political theory to continue choosing the intellectual 
enterprises with which it exchanges DNA on the basis of assumptions of congruence 
between high-flown theories in one discipline and high-flown theories in another. It 
seems, also, a shame for political theory to deemphasize the necessity of everyday 




                                                 
314 Apropos here is CBT’s exploration of the relationship between abstraction and the inability to 
disrupt maladaptive thought patterns and behaviors: 
Mood and cognition spiral at times when there is no contrary information to interrupt the 
cycle or where the information that would normally interrupt it is accessed in a form which is 
too abstract or insufficiently detailed or imageable…. in the absence of sufficiently concrete 
alternative criteria, mood is itself used as the criterion of truth of a self-statement…. 
Depressed people are more likely to be over-general in their memories…. A large number of 
studies have found that depressed patients are more likely to respond to [memory] cues not 
by giving specific events (e.g., going for a walk last Tuesday) but by giving generic statements 
that summarize events (e.g., going for walks). 
Williams and others argue that “generic encoding and retrieval of events may inhibit reinterpretation 
and reschematization of the past… [and] has implications for problem-solving…. For example, 
[depressed patients] do not generate as many alternative solutions as non-depressed people do and 
what alternatives they do generate tend to be less effective (as rated by an independent judge) than 
those generated by non-depressed individuals.” One implication of this last point is that something 
like “left melancholy” is not “just” an emotional or aesthetic issue, but a tactical one. See Williams, 
“Depression,” 275-78. 
315 Ibid., 600. 
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§2.3 Bridge to chapter three 
In this chapter, I have discussed the ways Dewey and Foucault come together over 
issues of profundity, tragedy, futurity, scientific inquiry, and power. I have used these 
encounters to suggest some basic positions and dispositions constitutive of and 
amenable to a power pragmatist outlook: anti-profundity, impurity, tragic meliorism, 
instrumentalism, and an inbuilt analysis of power relations. I offered a formulation of 
power pragmatism as involving attention to concrete situations and the cycles that 
sustain those situations rather than turf wars over how abstractions ought to be 
linked in a conceptual field, and argued that concrete attention should be at once the 
instrument and object of an analysis of power. Moreover, I have suggested 
connections between a pragmatism that pays attention to power and realist tendrils in 
contemporary political theory, and begun to explore what a cognitive-behavioral 
political theory might look like. 
In chapter three, I turn to Shulamith Firestone as an example of a power pragmatist 







§3.1 Applying power pragmatism 
How can power pragmatism be applied to a specific context or way of thinking? In 
this chapter, I bring to light underappreciated aspects of Shulamith Firestone’s 
Dialectic of Sex, arguing that her understanding of science is a pragmatic one, and that 
her proposed use of nascent technologies to regender the future enacts a 
thoroughgoing power-pragmatism in its attention to actual feedback loops that 
sustain systems of domination and in its radical repurposing of material and technical 
resources to disrupt these feedback loops. 
 
§3.2 Firestone’s future 
“For the first time in some countries,” Firestone writes on the first page of The 
Dialectic of Sex, “the preconditions for feminist revolution exist.”316 What does this 
mean? What does Firestone understand the preconditions for feminist revolution to 
be? Why have these preconditions only come into being circa 1970, the year 
Firestone is writing? And how is Firestone’s cryptic extension of this claim, that “the 
situation is beginning to demand such a revolution,” different from similar calls in 
earlier (and later) feminist work? 
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The difference, for Firestone, is that advances in reproductive technology have made 
it possible to liberate women from reproductive labor in the same way advances in 
automation have made it possible to reduce the demands productive labor makes on 
workers. “The double curse, that man should till the soil by the sweat of his brow, 
and that woman should bear in pain and travail,” she writes, “would be lifted through 
technology to make humane living, for the first time, a possibility.”317 When 
Firestone writes about the “preconditions for feminist revolution,” she signals the 
idiosyncratic way that she views the possibility of social change. For her, the social 
field is bound up with material, biological, and technological forces. To a post-
Haraway readership, this is practically a platitude, but Firestone meant this 
observation to redirect feminism in a particular way. For her, feminism must make 
claims about “changing a fundamental biological condition.” Feminism has to target 
biological fundaments because “Nature produced the fundamental inequality—half 
the human race must bear and rear the children of all of them—which was later 
consolidated, institutionalized, in the interests of men. Reproduction of the species 
cost women dearly, not only emotionally, psychologically, culturally but even in 
strictly material (physical) terms: before recent methods of contraception, continuous 
childbirth led to constant ‘female trouble,’ early aging, and death. Women… 
maintained the species in order to free the other half for the business of the 
                                                 
317 Ibid., 230-31. 
128 
 
world.”318 Contemporary systems of oppression descend from an originary 
biological distribution of reproductive labor between men and women. 
Firestone’s invocation of “a fundamental biological condition” recalls feminist 
debates about sameness and difference. Are biological differences between men and 
women to be understood as strengths rather than weaknesses, or were these so-called 
“biological differences” a sham to begin with?319 Does any appeal to “nature” and a 
language of biological difference invoke a vocabulary of and for domination? 
Firestone’s response to the question at the heart of sameness/difference debates 
(“has nature made women inferior?”) is, in effect, “if nature is unjust, change 
nature.”320 The directness of this answer belies the sophisticated way Firestone 
thinks about the social conditions of women with respect to their biological and 
material conditions of existence. Instead of a sameness/difference frame of reference 
in which biology stands outside (in the sense of being prior or unalterable in many 
difference accounts and being unknowable or amorphous in sameness accounts), 
Firestone combines the best insights of each tradition: biology is a materially, 
technologically, and socially constructed entity, a sort of iterated practice and labor, 
but it is also real and knowable, with concrete effects. 
                                                 
318 Ibid., 232. 
319 Joan C. Williams, “Dissolving The Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond 
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory,” Duke Law Journal (1991): 296-323. 
320 This phrase belongs to Laboria Cuboniks, “Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation,” June 11, 
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Firestone’s recommendation, then, is to treat the biological conditions for oppression 
as malleable in the same way feminist thought has understood the cultural and 
institutional components of oppression to be open to contestation. This undertaking 
requires feminist interest in actual technoscientific procedures. Parthenogenesis, 
hormonal contraception, male birth control, in vitro fertilization, vasectomies, and 
intrauterine contraceptives all enter the fold as tools and techniques central to the 
project of feminist revolution, supplementing leaflets, voting, picketing, 
consciousness raising, and other forms of traditional activism. Engaging with 
technoscientific procedures demands that feminists take a keen interest not only in 
the sciences, but in the interrelations among science, technology, society, and the 
limits and powers of flesh. Understanding these interrelations further requires an end 
to an analysis of social totalities and movements as sufficient unto themselves,321 as 
partially insulated from—or having an expectation of being oppressed by—
technological change and the physicality of bodies. 
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Ultimately, Firestone envisions a future in which material and biological changes 
made possible by new technics can be used to dissolve family relations at the root. 
New reproductive technologies can eliminate pregnancy and childbirth, allowing the 
family to be replaced by a new set of relationships Firestone calls the “household.” 
Households would be comprised of ten or so friends, strangers, comrades. Women 
would no longer bear and raise a child within a nuclear family headed by a husband. 
Instead, children would be brought up, in these households, by “ten or so consenting 
adults of varying ages.”322 These adults would share in childrearing: “(minimal) 
responsibility for the early physical dependence of children would be evenly diffused 
among all members of the household.”323 Reconstructing the family in this way 
leads to “the end of family chauvinism, built up over generations, of prejudices 
passed down from one generation to the next, the inclusion of people of all ages in 
the childrearing process, the integration of many age groups into one social unit, the 
breadth of personality that comes from exposure to many rather to… few, and so 
on.”324 In a limited sense, this household structure is compatible with natural 
childbirth (as long as children have no privileged connection with their birth parents), 
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but as long as natural childbirth exists, not even “the ‘household’ can be a totally 
liberating social form.”325 
Biological motherhood inflicts pain and instills possessiveness. “A mother who 
undergoes a nine-month pregnancy,” Firestone writes, “is likely to feel that the 
product of all that pain and discomfort ‘belongs’ to her…. But we want to destroy 
this possessiveness along with its cultural reinforcements so that no one child will be 
a priori favored over another, so that children will be loved for their own sake.”326 
The effects of dissolving possessiveness ripple through society and radiate through 
generations:  
Adult/child relationships would develop just as they do today: some adults 
might prefer certain children over others [and vice versa]—these might 
become lifelong attachments in which the individuals concerned mutually 
agreed to stay together, perhaps to form some kind of non-reproductive 
unit…. All relationships would be based on love… uncorrupted by objective 
dependencies and the resulting class inequalities. Enduring relationships 
between people of widely divergent ages would become common.327  
As technical know-how and social comfort with alternative birthing techniques 
increase, “childbearing could be taken over by technology.”328 Advances in “modern 
embryology” will be used to “revolt against the biological family.”329 
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§3.3  Firestone and science 
Firestone is often understood as something of a biological and technological 
determinist—a forerunner of contemporary techno-utopianism in second-wave 
feminist clothing. As Sarah Franklin writes, “the famous Firestone fallacy appears 
primarily to circulate as a cautionary tale against all manners of theoretical errors—
from technological determinism and biological essentialism to 1970s feminist political 
naiveté.”330 Consider Maria Mies’s warnings in the 1980s about the “technocratic 
illusion many feminists pursue in the wake of Shulamith Firestone.” She warns that 
those who follow Firestone “think the new reproductive technology and genetics 
could, if they were in the control of women be used for finally abolishing men…. 
These women not only fail to realize that economic/political and military power is 
not in the hands of Lesbians.... Ultimately, all these arguments are based on a 
biologistic interpretation of a historical and social relationship.”331 Juliet Mitchell 
continues this argument when she writes that “Firestone’s argument for test-tube 
babies illustrates the absence of procreative relationships within the rise of 
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reproductive technologies. Thus the argument was made entirely within the terms of 
the ideology: women were mothers, women were oppressed, not to be oppressed 
meant not to be mothers or, at most, only part-time mothers.”332 Firestone, on this 
skeptical view, relies on a view of technology as a simple, straightforward intervention 
that overturns established systems of domination based on sex. For these critics, 
Firestone is insufficiently suspicious of the indeterminacy that inheres in the prospect 
of  technological intervention and insufficiently attentive to the historical, social, and 
cultural contexts within which a given set of technologies would necessarily operate. 
Firestone’s position is complicated. She, for example, maligns the contemporary 
technoscientific apparatus: “in the hands of our current society and under the 
direction of current scientists… any attempted use of technology to ‘free’ anybody is 
suspect.”333 She mocks “The Miracle-of-Modern-Science” narrative as “one of  a 
whole stockpile of arguments that, no matter how often they are disproven, keep 
bobbing up again.”334 I want to understand Firestone’s approach as a kind of 
instrumental pragmatism that is focused—with ruthlessness and precision—on 
domination rooted in sex difference. Firestone’s disposition toward the sciences starts 
with her critique of other leftist movements. Firestone traveled in various radical 
circles in New York City, including the Redstockings and New York Radical 
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Feminists, in the 1960s before leaving politics in the early ’70s. The Dialectic of Sex, 
published when Firestone was 25, is filled with criticisms, admonitions, and 
suggestions aimed at Firestone’s fellow “radicals.” She’s consistently concerned with 
actual outcomes and the strategies and tactics that contribute to those outcomes. For 
example, Firestone writes that her fellow activists often cleave too tightly to 
established routes of criticism: “Once again radicals have failed to think radically 
enough: capitalism is not the only enemy, redistribution of wealth and resources is not 
the only solution, attempts to control population are not only Third World Suppression 
in disguise.”335 A focus on social totalities, class-based movements, and government 
misuse of new reproductive technology, though indispensable in certain respects, 
misses the technoscientific, ecological, and sexual milieux that condition problems of 
class and capital and, just as importantly, the avenues for resistance afforded by new 
reproductive technologies. By refusing to entertain technoscientific tools as potential 
engines for leftist aims, radicals attempt to build a more egalitarian future with their 
hands tied behind their backs. Left-wing movements at the time unduly fear science, 
Firestone argues. They confuse “the misuse of scientific developments” with 
“technology itself.”336 “Radicals,” she writes, “rather than breastbeating about the 
immorality of scientific research, could be much more effective by concentrating their 
full energies on demands for control of scientific discoveries by and for the people. 
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For, like atomic energy, fertility control, artificial reproduction, cybernation, in 
themselves, are liberating—unless they are improperly used.”337 Reproductive science 
is on the cusp of breakthroughs with emancipatory potential, Firestone argues, but is 
restrained by “cultural lag and sexual bias.”338 “Already we have more and better 
contraception than ever before in history…. Present oral contraception is at only a 
primitive (faulty) stage…. Artificial insemination and artificial inovulation are already 
a reality. Choice of sex of the fetus, test-tube fertilization… the development of an 
artificial placenta…. Even parthenogenesis” are all on the way.339 
These advances, however, are slowed by social, cultural, and material constraints: 
“The money allocated for specific kinds of research [and] the kinds of research done 
are only incidentally in the interest of women when at all…. That women are 
excluded from science is directly responsible for the tabling of research on oral 
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contraceptives for males.”340 Consider as one example the halting steps taken 
toward the development of a full-scale artificial womb. 
By the early 2000s, teams led by Helen Liu at Cornell’s Center for Reproductive 
Medicine and Fertility had demonstrated the viability of growing mouse and human 
embryos in artificial environments, usually relying on some combination of 
endometrial tissue and artificial life support.341 A patchwork of statutory law, edicts 
from bioethics committees, and research decisions constrain experiments on 
exogenesis. New Hampshire state law, for example, maintains that “no preembryo 
that has been donated for use in research shall be transferred to a uterine cavity.”342 
From the perspective Firestone advances, the New Hampshire law and others like it 
(including the 14-day limitation on growing embryos in vitro) prevent new 
technologies from reshuffling the biological systems upon which structures of 
domination are based. To draw a line between the biological factors that structure 
social relations and technoscientific advances is to defend existing structures of 
domination. Firestone argues, in fact, that concern about the precarity of existing 
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power structures is the primary motivation behind resistance to reproductive 
technologies: 
Are people, even scientists themselves, culturally prepared for [new 
reproductive tech]? Decidedly not. A recent Harris poll… found a surprising 
number [of Americans] willing to consider the new methods. The hitch was 
that they would consider them only where they reinforced and furthered 
present values of family life and reproduction, e.g., to help a barren woman 
have her husband’s child. Any question that could be interpreted as a 
furthering of “sexual revolution” alone was rejected flatly as unnatural. But 
note that it was not the “test tube” baby itself that was thought unnatural… 
but the new value system, based on the elimination of male supremacy and the 
family…. It is clear by now that research in the area of reproduction is itself 
being impeded by cultural lag and sexual bias.343 
(The relationship between technoscience and power relations can be more insidious 
than mere insulation, however. Technoscientific changes in fetal viability can erode 
present levels of control women exercise over their reproductive systems.344 The 
development of a full artificial womb would push the viability of a fetus back from its 
present mark, 22 to 24 weeks, to zero weeks. Depending on the procedures used, 
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“Life begins at the moment of conception” could be experimentally substantiated. If 
it becomes not merely plausible, but repeatedly demonstrated, that fertilized embryos 
can be carried to term no matter their level of development, wombs become sites of 
political, ethical, and scientific contestation as never before.) 
The prospect of technoscientific advances being used to constrain or rechannel 
reproductive pathways underscores the importance of Firestone’s practical-but-
radical approach to science and technology. Firestone is intensely pragmatic: she 
focuses on outcomes and the prospects of altering really-existing situations in creative 
and radical ways. Firestone’s technoscientific orientation, as I have noted, is often 
criticized as naïve or credulous.345 In fact, she adopts a fairly shrewd (cynical, even) 
position toward the sciences and technoscientific work. She notes that technological 
advances “could be used… to intensify the apparatus of repression and to increase 
established power,” a prospect that, for Firestone, reinforces rather than cuts against 
the importance of attending to the “revolutionary significance” of new technologies 
and working toward the “control of scientific discoveries by and for the people.”346 
Just as Dewey understands science as “an equipment, a technique of appliances and 
procedures,”347 Firestone regards technoscientific advances as a set of tools in various 
stages of maturity that can be as useful in revolutionary hands as devastating when 
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put to reactionary ends. Her stance comes out clearly in a brief discussion of 
computer-enabled automation and governance (“cybernation”): 
Cybernation, like birth control, can be a double-edged sword. Like artificial 
reproduction, to envision it in the hands of the present powers is to envision a 
nightmare.… the increased alienation of the masses, the intensified rule of the 
elite (perhaps cyberneticians), baby factories, increased government efficiency 
(Big Brother), and so on. In the hands of the present society there is no doubt 
that the machine could be used—is being used—to intensify the apparatus of 
repression and to increase established power…. But again, as with the 
population explosion, and birth control, the distinction between misuse of 
science and the value of science itself is not often kept clear. In this case, 
though perhaps the response may not be quite so hysterical and evasive, we 
still often have the same unimaginative concentration on the evils of the 
machine itself, rather than a recognition of its revolutionary significance.348 
Firestone’s work suggests that pragmatism and radicalism are not opposed ways of 
thinking. Instead, they rely on one another. Radicalism helps to keep pragmatism 
from slipping into a milquetoast incrementalism.349 Radical political moves demand 
pragmatism because, as Firestone recognizes, the index of what is “truly radical” in 
given situation reflects the effects and countereffects of the course of action that is 
actually being undertaken, not the intellectual purism of the participants.350 This is 
not to call for blind action or activity for its own sake. On the contrary, acting 
radically in a given situation means acting intelligently, attending to concrete 
encumbrances and tools. 
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The final point Firestone’s work invites us to consider has to do with instrumentality. 
 
§3.4  On instrumentality 
   Rationalism must itself be a feminism. 
— Laboria Cuboniks 
In his Eclipse of Reason, published in 1946, Max Horkheimer offers an influential 
critique of instrumentality. Horkheimer first distinguishes between reason as a faculty 
for use by humans (subjektive Vernunft, “subjective reason”) and reason that inheres in 
the world beyond human designs (objektive Vernunft, “objective reason”). For 
Horkheimer, dangers inhere in the subjective use of reason. He is concerned that a 
reason never employed for its own sake, never “without reference to some kind of 
subjective gain or advantage,” assumes an instrumental quality.351 And “if reason itself 
is instrumentalized,” he worries, “it takes on a kind of materiality and blindness, 
becomes a fetish, a magic entity that is accepted rather than intellectually 
experienced.”352 
Horkheimer wants to move beyond a scientistic instrumentality toward a more 
rigorous form of reason that does not, as he thinks pragmatism does, depart from an 
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analysis of the social order. This project is consonant with a power pragmatist view. 
Indeed, it seeks to open a theoretical space similar to that of power pragmatism. 
Horkheimer (writing near the end of World War II) prosecutes this project by way of 
a critique of “instrumentality.” Insofar as he means an instrumentality blind to 
questions of power and that therefore only furthers entrenched interests, I join him in 
his condemnation. In fact, Horkheimer’s avenue of inquiry here presages the 
concerns discussed in chapters one and two of this dissertation about the idea that 
Dewey’s pragmatism is blind to the ways that power relations condition possibilities 
for social change. I am inclined to fix this pragmatist blind spot with thinkers like 
Firestone and Foucault, who have an intense interest in power relations, domination, 
and the social order. Horkheimer is inclined to avoid pragmatism wholesale and stay 
within the tradition of dialectical rationality. (It is possible that the Frankfurt school 
path and Dewey-Firestone-Foucault path meet somewhere in the vicinity of left 
accelerationist and neorationalist streams of thought.)353 
Horkheimer accuses pragmatism, and Dewey in particular, of advancing a 
“subjective,” and therefore instrumental, view of reason. He writes that 
pragmatism, which assigns to anything and anybody the role of an 
instrument—not in the name of God or objective truth, but in the name of 
whatever is practically achieved by it—asks scornfully what such expressions 
as ‘truth itself,’ or the good that Plato and his objectivistic successors left 
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undefined, can really mean…. The reduction of reason to a mere instrument 
[by pragmatism] finally affects even its character as an instrument. The anti-
philosophical spirit that is inseparable from the subjective concept of reason, 
and that in Europe culminated in the totalitarian persecutions of 
intellectuals… is symptomatic of the abasement of reason.354  
Pragmatism’s interest in the usefulness of ideas allies it with a species of virulent anti-
intellectualism because it understands reason as a tool for accomplishing a given set 
of ends rather than a freestanding practice that adequately accounts for questions of 
the social order and power. In a certain sense, Horkheimer’s critique of the 
pragmatists doesn’t leave him too far from Dewey’s own views on reason. Recall 
Horkheimer’s claim that “if reason itself is instrumentalized, it takes on a kind of 
materiality and blindness, becomes a fetish, a magic entity that is accepted rather than 
intellectually experienced.”355 Dewey, too, seeks to understand reason as intellectually 
experienced rather than as a kind of magic or abstraction disconnected from 
experience. Moreover, Horkheimer links formalistic reason to the practice of making 
nature calculable, which is in turn associated with being interested in reason insofar as 
it can be used to accomplish certain “subjective” ends.356 But, as several examples 
later in this chapter show, it is possible to be interested in calculability and the 
usefulness of ideas while still attempting to undertake collective projects to improve 
social conditions. Firestone’s own project, for example, remains unafraid of 
                                                 
354 Ibid., 53. 
355 Ibid., 23. 
356 Ibid. 4-6, 41-57. J.C. Brendzen also makes this point that Horkheimer (not to mention Adorno) 




calculability and instrumental reason because of how they can be repurposed to 
destroy domination rooted in sex difference. To rethink subjective reason and applied 
technology in the way Firestone has is to draw nearer to the possibility of an 
instrumentality more suited to radical undertakings in different milieux. 
Instrumentality in this sense returns to the root of the word: īnstrūmentum: tool, 
provision, equipment.357 Not an uncritical instrument for any end whatever, but 
instead equipment for navigation and intervention in topologies formed and 
deformed by fields of power. 
“Once the philosophical foundation of democracy has collapsed,” Horkheimer 
writes, “the statement that dictatorship is bad is rationally valid only for those who 
are not its beneficiaries, and there is no theoretical obstacle to the transformation of 
this statement into its opposite.”358 In one sense, this despair at where the flight of 
objective reason leaves you is understandable, especially in 1945. I think, however, 
that there is reason for hope on this score. What secures democratic practices from 
dissolution is a pullulating interplay of political, material, social, and historical vectors 
that secure (and redefine) self-determination, intelligence, democracy, and growth at 
varying rates. Where Horkheimer and Dewey in fact agree is that, for example, 
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arguing that a chemical company should not dump poison into a local river because 
there exist philosophical principles that render this action illegitimate is less 
compelling than the fact that dumping poison will destroy the town downstream and 
damage the community that sustained the chemical company to begin with. It’ll kill 
kids. As William Weaver (drawing from the same Foucault interview that appears in 
the introduction to this dissertation) argues, “‘the “best” theories do not constitute a 
very effective protection against disastrous political choices; certain great themes such 
as “humanism” can be used to any end whatever.’ Only in activity, only in a praxis, 
only in an applied ethic do we find any measure of safety against disaster. We should 
concentrate on making our theory play a role in our practice rather than thinking of it 
as something which should naturally steer practice from above.”359 As you might 
remember from the introduction, Foucault continues this line of thought: 
I do not conclude from [the tenuous link between theory and political choices] 
that one may say just anything within the order of theory, but, on the contrary, 
that a demanding, prudent, ‘experimental’ attitude is necessary; at every 
moment, step by step, one must confront what one is thinking and saying with 
what one is doing, with what one is. I have never been too concerned about 
people who say: ‘You are borrowing ideas from Nietzsche; well, Nietzsche 
was used by the Nazis, therefore…’; but, on the other hand, I have always 
been concerned with linking together as tightly as possible the historical and 
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theoretical analysis of power relations, institutions, and knowledge, to the 
movements, critiques, and experiences that call them into question in reality.360 
How, then, to develop a closer link between “the historical and theoretical analysis of 
power relations” and to real outcomes, real struggles? Shulamith Firestone, I am 
arguing, offers a blueprint for just this sort of undertaking. 
  
Consider an instrumentality not blind to currents of power (including those that run 
through it). Imagine communally undertaken technoscientific endeavors that 
supplement the idiosyncratic form the sciences exist in today, sustained and 
constrained as they are by particular networks of capital flows (research councils, 
grant-writing, the institution of tenure, the rise of contract research organizations,361 
the multibillion-dollar endowments of research institutions jutting above an ocean of 
student debt like icebergs in a warming sea). The sciences, as is well documented, do 
not stand apart from the capital flows and cultural-material hierarchies that sustain 
them.362 For example, ongoing reproducibility crises in the sciences can be traced in 
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part to the fact that what can’t be published in prestigious journals cannot contribute 
to the careers, and therefore the material security, of researchers.363 Consider the 
byzantine system of U.S. patent laws that enshrine forty-fold price increases for 
lifesaving treatments as sound business strategy.364 Consider the inefficiencies in the 
production of new treatments to begin with. The average new drug absorbs $359 
million in development costs and take eight to twelve years to move from preclinical 
testing to patients.365 Finally, consider the fact that the United States government, the 
largest funder of scientific research in any country, spends more resources on R&D 
for defense than on basic research.366 “Between a third and half of the world’s 
scientists and engineers,” Daniel Deudney points out, are “at work on weapons 
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once cost $1 a pill but the price increased sharply in 2010, after GlaxoSmithKline sold the drug to a 
different company, CorePharma. CorePharma, in turn, sold the drug to another company, Impax 
Laboratories, and Turing bought Daraprim in August.” See Carolyn Johnson, “How an obscure 
drug’s 4,000% price increase might finally spur action on soaring health-care costs,” Washington Post, 
September 21, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/09/21/how-an-
obscure-drugs-4000-price-increase-might-finally-spur-action-on-soaring-health-care-costs/. 
365 R. D. Heilman, “Drug development history, ‘overview,’ and what are GCPs?” Quality Assurance 4 
(1995): 75-79; G. M. Stave and R. Joines, “An overview of the pharmaceutical industry,” Occup 
Medicine 12 (1997): 1-4. 
366 “Historical Trends in Federal R&D,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
accessed January 24, 2016, http://www.aaas.org/page/historical-trends-federal-rd.  
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projects.”367 There is no ineradicable reason that this litany of inefficiency, 
misallocation, and exploitation must be true of scientific practice. As the following 
examples will suggest, scientific inquiry can be democratized much in the way 
Firestone imagined. 
 
Scientific inquiry requires patience, cooperation, honesty, communication, intelligent 
discernment, and engagement with the material world. These qualities aren’t just 
compatible with democratic practices. They demand and are reinforced by them. 
                                                 
367 Daniel Deudney, “Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace,” Worldwatch Paper 55, 
Worldwatch Institute (1983), 18. 
Fig. 1. “Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,” American Association for the 




Democratizing science doesn’t just mean effecting a more equal distribution of the 
products of applied science via financial and legal changes (e.g., supplementing the 
pharmaceutical patent system with a prize system).368 Democratizing the sciences also 
means undertaking concrete technoscientific projects in democratic-egalitarian ways. 
Examples of these projects are widespread. Many biopunk and -hacking projects 
cultivate technical know-how in service of emancipatory ends. In 2015, Ryan 
Hammond, a queer “tactical biologist” living in Baltimore, launched the Open Source 
Gendercodes project, which aims to develop “an open source platform for the 
production of sex hormones.”369 Hammond argues that “allow[ing] ‘laypeople’ to 
grow sex hormones would not only call into question the cultural and institutional 
frameworks that govern queer and trans bodies, it would also challenge the current 
system of pharmaceutical production. Can we imagine a communal system of 
pharmaceutical production in which biological materials are collectively owned?”370 
Hammond’s is not merely a stylized call for collective control of the means of 
pharmaceutical production, but a concrete plan. He aims to develop a transgenic 
strain of the tobacco plant, Nicotiana tabacum l., that can produce testosterone, 
estrogen, and other sex hormones. As long as scientific knowledge about the 
production of sex hormones remains immured in institutional frameworks, 
                                                 
368 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Prizes, Not Patents,” post-autistic economics review no. 42 (2007): 48-49; see also 
Marlynn Wei, “Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 
2005,” Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law (2007). 





Hammond argues, trans people’s relationship to their own bodies remains 
pathologized. Using N. tabacum’s own metabolic pathways to produce sex hormones 
develops and disseminates technoscientific know-how (e.g., Hammond plans to 
return to the Baltimore Underground Science Space and teach others the techniques 
he’s developed), destabilizes established scientific and medical hierarchies, and builds 
technoscientific practices that engender alternative means of survival in concrete, 
immediate terms. Molecular biologist Ellen Jorgensen argues that DIYbio projects 
like Hammond’s, contrary to being scattershot or irresponsible, often stage more 
explicit ethical engagements than “proper” science. She points out that, contrary to 
media fears that biohacking communities would create “mutants” or manufacture 
biological weapons, different DIYbio communities met in 2011 and democratically 
formulated a common code of ethics.371 
Engineering knowledge can be spread to great effect as well. At Barefoot College in 
Rajasthan, older women from non-electrified villages learn how to construct and 
maintain solar roof arrays, batteries, solar lamps, wiring, and other electrical 
projects.372 Bunker Roy, founder of Barefoot College, echoes Firestone when he 
argues that democratizing science and engineering isn’t merely a nice idea on its own 
                                                 
371 Available at https://diybio.org/codes/. See Ellen Jorgensen, Biohacking—you can do it, too, 
accessed February 23, 2016, 
https://www.ted.com/talks/ellen_jorgensen_biohacking_you_can_do_it_too?language=en. 
372 Bunker Roy, Anil Joshi, and Ajmer District, “Solar electrification of remote and inaccessible 




terms. It’s essential to the success of applied technoscientific undertakings, because 
“a technology just dumped on rural villages cannot be successful. The village 
community has to be prepared to understand, accept and own it. Village communities 
can run solar units on their own if they are trained to not only maintain but also to 
fabricate the equipment.”373 Just as Firestone argues that engagement with 
technoscientific research is essential for the success of political projects, Roy argues 
that this sort of engagement is necessary for the technical success of engineering 
projects and therefore in how these successes augment the capabilities of those 
engaged in them. He notes that “the collective confidence the communities have 
shown in taking responsibility to decide their needs for themselves and ultimately 
own the project” is manifest in “the involvement of rural women in the 
dissemination of this sophisticated technology. For the first time solar technology has 
been demystified and… women have demonstrated how effectively they could 
manage and control the technology to improve their quality of life…. For the first 
time [these] women have demonstrated their competence and confidence to handle 
technology at the village level and provide service in their own community…. The 
innovation is in involving the whole community in selecting semi-literate women as 
engineers to provide a vital technical service in non-traditional areas.”374 
                                                 
373 Roy, “Solar electrification,” 28-29. 




Humans also mobilize technoscientific knowledge as a means of self-defense. 
Consider the way that the residents of Flint, Michigan, were forced to “become 
citizen scientists” in response to the presence of lead in the town’s drinking water.375 
Marc Edwards, a civil engineer involved in testing Flint’s water, points out that “Half 
the water industry does not understand what these people learned on their own to 
protect their children.”376 Anna Barry-Jester describes how, when residents were told 
about the levels of lead in their water, 
although some expressed shock and concern over how they would pay for 
bottled water or a filter… many expressed relief at having the concerns they’d 
been expressing for months validated. “One woman said to us, ‘You mean 
that’s the results for my tap? That’s empowering.’ She actually used the word 
                                                 
375 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, “What Went Wrong in Flint,” FiveThirtyEight, January 26, 2016, 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-went-wrong-in-flint-water-crisis-michigan/. 
376 Quoted in Barry-Jester, “Flint.” 
Fig. 1. Afghan and Indian women work on solar lamps in Rajasthan. From Bunker Roy, “Learning from a 
barefoot movement,” July 2011, https://www.ted.com/talks/bunker_roy?language=en. 
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‘empowering.’”… How could finding poison in your water be empowering?… 
When you’ve spent nearly a year being told by public officials that your own 
experience isn’t what you think it is, even grave news can be rewarding. 
Dozens of Flint’s residents who had been gathering data and information for 
nearly a year knew something wasn’t right. While state and federal agencies 
almost obsessively focused on proving that they were meeting federal 
regulations, rather than taking a deeper look at whether Flint’s drinking water 
was safe, residents begged them to pay attention to the valuable data they’d 
collected through their bodies and research.377 




For the residents of Flint, lead microgram-per-deciliter (µg/dL) measurements 
offered lifesaving purchase in a political fight. It is not clear where Flint citizens’ 
mastery of water-quality metrics fits in the hierarchies of instrumentality and varieties 
of reason. Does their measurement of lead µg/dL in their drinking water and blood 
reflect mere calculability, the insidious creep of scientific rationality, human hubris, 
and so on? Or is it more likely that, by mastering water quality measurements and 
blood tests, the residents of Flint strategically repurposed their own edge of a 
technoscientific apparatus related to water and blood contamination in order to claim 
for themselves and their children a more survivable future? 
Open Source Gendercodes, biohacking, Barefoot College, Flint’s citizen-scientists: 
these are but a few of the innumerable projects that democratically mobilize 
Fig. 3. Flint’s water, viewed two different ways. Visualization by Ritchie King and Ella Koeze, “What 




technoscientific tools.378 As I will argue in chapter four, projects focused on 
developing replacement technologies for existing infrastructure services (e.g., the way 
you get potable water, calories, heat, shelter, internet access, and so on) have the 
potential to reshape what is possible in the domain of radical political projects. There 
is no reason that democratizing science means lowering standards or sacrificing rigor. 
Recall that women were resisted (and still are)379 in the sciences for fear they’d reduce 
the rigor of serious research. The history of science went another way, however: 
Rosalind Franklin photographed DNA, Chien-Shiung Wu overturned the law of 
conservation of parity, Jocelyn Bell Burnell discovered pulsars, Françoise Barré-
Sinoussi helped to discover HIV. 
The current set of institutional practices recognized as science remain warped by the 
capital flows that support them. The contemporary scientific research archipelago is 
exemplary at some things and mind-bogglingly bad at others. Efforts to alter the legal 
and financial structures that insulate and constrain funded science today are 
necessary, but must be accompanied by democratic attempts to seize and redeploy 
technoscientific know-how. 
 
                                                 
378 Rapid cost decreases of techniques like DNA sequencing, materials like polyethylene plastics, and 
hardware like integrated circuits have made projects like these increasingly feasible. For modeling of 
these cost decreases, see J. Doyne Farmer and Francois Langford, “How predictable is technological 
progress?” Research Policy 45, no. 3 (2016): 647–665. 
379 Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., “Science faculty’s subtle gender bias favors male students,” PNAS 
109, no. 41 (2012): 16474–16479. 
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§3.5 Pragmatic-radical technoscience 
Consider again Eric MacGilvray’s argument that “science for the pragmatist is not, as 
the caricature has it, a worldview that renders traditional ethical discourse obsolete, 
nor is it simply a method that can be applied indiscriminately to all kinds of social 
problems. Pragmatism treats scientific inquiry instead as an enormously successful set 
of practices that have profoundly reshaped the way… we interact with our 
environment and aims to assess the implications of this success for our understanding 
of [our] capacities and purposes.”380 It is not necessary to choose between, on one 
hand, science as a kind of bald naturalism, reductive physicalism, positivist 
calculability or, on the other hand, as a frictionless and arbitrary practice that offers 
no purchase on the world. Firestone exemplifies the power pragmatist approach to 
science insofar as she (i) pairs a Deweyan emphasis on science as concrete techniques 
and appliances for inquiry with an acute sensitivity to domination, and, following 
from this, (ii) argues that technoscience and domination are intimately linked at many 
joints, and that these linkages remind us of the fact that (i) can alter the conditions 
that sustain (ii). The Dialectic of Sex offers a roadmap for using and conceptualizing 
technoscience: recognize the inextricability of material and biological forces from the 
social field, understand science as layered procedures for enacting, recognizing, 
manipulating, and remaking material forces, and mobilize scientific procedures for 
                                                 
380 MacGilvary, “Five Myths,” 501. 
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disrupting the material and biological conditions and feedback loops that sustain 
systems of domination. 
This, I argue, is Firestone’s lasting contribution: a pragmatic-radical approach to 
technoscience that directs theoretical practice toward efforts to devise a means for 
the destruction of systems of domination, bequeathed to those wish to build a more 
survivable world not in fantastic isolation from the present, but within it. If anyone 
has carried forward Foucault’s hope for “a demanding, prudent, ‘experimental’ 
attitude [that] links together as tightly as possible the historical and theoretical analysis 
of power relations, institutions, and knowledge, to the movements, critiques, and 
experiences that call them into question in reality”381 and Dewey’s injunction to 
“imagine a future in which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to 





                                                 
381 Foucault, Reader, 374. 




§4.1  Upstream 
In this chapter I’d like to introduce a minor tradition on the periphery of 
contemporary political thought called stacktivism and to argue that one way of 
putting the combination of Dewey and Foucault called power pragmatism to work 
involves a stacktivist outlook. I discuss how the stacktivist movement helps focus 
critical energy on the way infrastructure conditions political possibilities. I also argue 
that building non-metaphorical means of life support is an essential project for radical 
politics. 
 
§4.2  Stacktivism 
When you turn on the heat in winter, 
you’re turning on this service that’s 
directly connected to the structure of 
global capitalism. And then the enormous 
structure of global capitalism is maintained 
largely by the force of the American 
government, and to some degree the 
Europeans and the Chinese, and then their 
intelligence services protect that status quo 
from any kind of disruption. It’s the 
closing of the loop between the provision 
of critical infrastructure and the need for 
defense and security service that gets in 
your lives that’s the core tension of why 
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we can’t make progress against these 
forces. As long as we’re dependent on a 
system of global oppression to give us 
cheap natural resources, and to maintain 
the wealth disparity between us and the 
poor of the world, those systems of 
oppression serve our basic needs, and as a 
result we cannot get free of them… The 
only way of getting out of this is to get 
into a position where we’re no longer 
dependent… on the standing means of 
political oppression for our basic survival 
needs. 
– Vinay Gupta 
It’s London, it’s 1854, it stinks. The houses of Soho sit on top of cesspools. When 
these cesspools fill up, the city dumps its sewage into the Thames. In late August, the 
inhabitants of Soho begin to die. That they are dying of cholera is unmistakable: 
Few diseases have a clinical presentation as striking as that of cholera. Massive 
watery diarrhoea, up to 1 L per hour, can lead to hypotensive shock and death 
within hours of the first symptom…. Death rates in untreated patients with 
severe cholera can exceed 70%.... The characteristic rice-water stool of cholera 
develops with continued purging; this term refers to the similarity of the stool 
to water in which rice has been washed. Vomiting is a common feature, 
particularly early in illness. 
Dehydration and electrolyte abnormalities are the most important 
complications of cholera. Patients can be lethargic, and might have sunken 
eyes, dry mouth, cold clammy skin, decreased skin turgor, or wrinkled hands 
and feet. Kussmaul breathing [a kind of labored hyperventilation] can occur 
because of acidosis from stool bicarbonate losses and lactic acidosis associated 
with poor perfusion. The peripheral pulse is rapid and thready, and can 
become difficult to palpate as blood pressure drops; urine output decreases 
with time. Muscle cramping and weakness due to electrolyte losses and ion 
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shifts (particularly potassium and calcium) are common. In children, depletion 
of glycogen stores and inadequate gluconeogenesis can lead to severe 
hypoglycaemia, shown by altered consciousness, seizures, or even coma.383 
One hundred seventy-two die of cholera in 72 hours. By the 1850s, London’s 
graveyards are overflowing. The dead are stacked beneath churches, dumped into 
sewers. No one has any illusions about what these bodies mean. The cholera 
epidemic of 1848-49, which killed between 54,000 and 62,000 Londoners (from a 
population of ~2.9 million), hangs over the city like a shroud. 
Into the breach steps a physician named John Snow. Through painstaking interviews, 
water sampling, and legwork, Snow constructs a “ghost map” of the cholera deaths in 
Soho. 
                                                 





Fig. 4. John Snow’s “ghost map.” Note the central X, denoting the contaminated Broad Street pump, 
surrounded by death-dots. 
Gradually, Snow becomes more convinced that cholera did not come from “bad air,” 
as the miasmists of his day argued. Instead, he begins to suspect that London’s water 
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is the primary conduit for the disease. Snow, conducting days of interviews and 
tracking down drinking water sources, identifies one public water pump, on Broad 
Street, as the center of the outbreak. “Snow had built a convincing statistical case 
against the pump,” Steven Johnson writes. “Of the eighty-three deaths recorded [by 
one source], seventy-three were in houses that were closer to the Broad Street pump 
than to any other public water source. Of those seventy-three, Snow had learned, 
sixty-one were habitual drinkers of the Broad Street water. Only six of the dead were 
definitively not Broad Street drinkers…. The ten cases that fell outside the… Broad 
Street pump were equally telling: eight appeared to have a connection Broad Street. 
Snow had established new causal chains back to the pump water.”384 Snow presented 
his case to the Board of Governors and Directors of St. James Parish, who—though 
skeptical—ordered the Broad Street pump handle to be removed. The epidemic 
subsided. 
By examining the details of how a person in Soho got drinking water every morning, 
Snow was able to understand how minor but deeply-set infrastructural features—in 
this case, a porous barrier between a private cesspool and the Broad Street pump 
well—altered the historical, political, and social trajectories of London.385 Snow 
engaged in an early form of stacktivist analysis. By removing the pump handle from 
the Broad Street well, Snow effected an informed but experimental intervention into 
                                                 
384 Steven Johnson, The Ghost Map (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006), 153. 
385 Ibid., 179. 
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the way critical services are delivered. His crucial move, so obvious in hindsight it is 
easy to underestimate, was to trace a thread of causation from a one-meter iron pump 
handle across interlocking layers of material, technical, social, and biological systems 
to the V. cholerae bacteria in the small intestines of Londoners. For these reasons, 
Snow is a foundational figure for the way of focusing political energies called 
“stacktivism.” 
The term stacktivism,386 coined by the writer Jay Springett, first surfaced in political, 
artistic, and cypherpunk circles in the United Kingdom in the early 2010s. Stacktivists 
attend to the infrastructural supports that make possible certain political, social, and 
material realities. A “stack” just denotes the layered pile of technologies a person’s 
lifestyle is built on. When Benjamin Bratton, for example, writes about “The Stack,” 
he describes the levels of technology that make global computing possible as a 
vertically-arranged, “modular, interdependent… multilayered structure” that includes 
                                                 
386 Stacktivism is not an institutionalized field of thought. There is no Journal of Stacktivism Studies. (If 
you’re interested, the International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, founded in 2004, provides technical 
grist for the infrastructure studies mill, albeit without stacktivism’s political inflection. There was also 
some attempt to establish an Open Journal of Critical Infrastructure Studies in 2013, but I can’t find 
evidence that this took off.) Established academics like Keller Easterling, Ash Amin, and Benjamin 
Bratton conduct work that embraces a critical approach to infrastructure (for example, Amin argues 
that “Urban flows of staples such as information, electricity, sanitation, water, housing, and education 
will remain central arbiters of the capacity… to face the future. The difference between abjection and 
bearable survival will be regulated—as is already the case for more than a billion residents living on 
the breadline—by whether the poor can have access to the staples of life as public goods.” See 
“Surviving the Turbulent Future,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 31 [2013]: 153), but 
they do not use the term stacktivism. 
(As usual, I set no special status or claim of ownership over any one term—I’m just as happy to 
discuss “critical approaches to critical services,” “politicoinfrastructurism,” “life-support braids,”  or 
any other plausible-sounding handle as I am stacktivism.)  
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“infrastructure at the continental scale, pervasive computing at the urban scale, and 




The trick is to begin thinking of how critical services like food, water, energy, shelter, 
medical care, and communication emerge from their own stacks, to map how the 
components of these stacks are tied together vertically (how much of Chile’s Salar de 
Atacama salt flats reside inside your house in the form of lithium-ion batteries?), to 
map how technology stacks are horizontally interleaved with one another (delivering 
                                                 
387 Benjamin Bratton, The Stack (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 3-5. 
Fig. 5. “Diagram by Metahaven of the six layers of The Stack.” See Benjamin Bratton, The Stack (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2015). This minimalist visualization, like Bratton’s book, schematizes the stack that supports 
cloud computing. There are other stacks, of course, like those that make possible the delivery of fluoridated 
water in cities or those that make it possible to heat buildings in winter, and these stacks interleave like 
decks of cards partially shuffled into one another. 
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heat and desalinating water may both rely on the same power lines), what the political 
components of these stacks are, and how they can be reformulated. 
For example: the power button on your computer in Baltimore is directly linked to 
macrophage activity in the lungs of miners in southwestern Pennsylvania. If you live 
in Maryland, about 44% of your electricity comes from burning coal to produce 
steam to spin turbines. Much of the coal that feeds the city of Baltimore is mined in 
Greene County, Pennsylvania, at the Bailey Mine Complex, barged to Anne Arundel 
County, and burned at the Brandon Shores Generating Station to produce steam to 
produce electricity.388 Electrons run from Brandon Shores through aluminum 
conductor steel-reinforced cables into your food processor or the worn-out light 
fixture over your bathroom mirror. 
                                                 





Fig. 6. Coal storage silos at the Bailey Mine Complex in Greene County, PA. Katelyn Ferral and 




Thinking about the stack of technologies that makes your lifestyle possible lends an 
enabling literalism to political and ethical questions. It means redescribing a given 
situation in terms of the components that sustain the survival and wellbeing of those 
in the situation. A lumbering abstraction like “homelessness” dissolves into concrete 
questions: “How many square meters of clean horizontal surfaces that can be used 
for sleeping do we have in this neighborhood? Are these horizontal surfaces 
accessible? Can they be cooled and heated? Can they be made safe for women, queer, 
trans people?”389 
                                                 
389 See Shaun Donovan, “Ending Homelessness in Our Time: Why Smart Government Is Key,” 
Public Manager 40 (2011): 23-27; James Surowiecki, “Home Free?” The New Yorker, September 22, 
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Most human deaths fall into six categories: too hot, too cold, hunger, thirst, illness, or 
injury.390 Groups of humans have developed different life-support systems for 
delaying the time at which they will die from one of these causes. This is true at every 
scale, from a single human striking flint in the woods to workers clocking in at the 
Brandon Shores Generating Station to the shackle hoist operator at a slaughterhouse. 
Stacktivists map the operational scales of different life support systems with simple 
critical infrastructure maps, or SCIMs, like this one:  
                                                                                                                                                 
2014; Tom Baker and Joshua Evans, “‘Housing First’ and the Changing Terrains of Homeless 
Governance,” Geography Compass 10 (2016): 28. 
390 Vinay Gupta, “Dealing in Security: understanding vital services and how they keep you safe,” v3.2, 





As Vinay Gupta argues, “the way that we provide basic life support” has changed. “If 
you think about the old world, the farms and the villages that our ancestors all came 
from—in that world your water came from a well, and if your well got contaminated 
you got sick and that was pretty much the end of the story. Where we are now today, 
your water comes from enormous reservoirs and then it’s processed in factories and 
tested for quality and then it comes out your tap. But all of that system is still solving 
Fig. 7. A simple critical infrastructure map. This SCIM “shows how a typical western individual is protected 




the same problem you’re solving with a well…. We [have] started to build larger-scale 
infrastructure to keep us alive.”391 To be sure, these life-support systems are the 
product of political struggles informed by values about who is entitled to life and who 
is not. “One of the things the Luddites understood,” as Jay Springett argues, “was 
that certain technologies internalize certain ideologies.”392 But the stacks of 
interlocking technologies that make your life possible also represent the terrain of 
current and future political struggles, and their making and unmaking of human life is 
itself a site of justice and injustice worth contesting politically. Keller Easterling 
extends and complicates Springett’s point that technologies internalize ideologies 
when she writes that “infrastructure has often been groomed as either an instrument 
of militarism, liberalism, or universal rationalization.… [but] the less dramatic or 
upstaged histories—regarding the growth of international organizations, the division 
of the radio spectrum, or the creation of the satellite, fiber-optic, and mobile 
telephony networks” demand attention as well. In fact, they demand more attention: 
“The things that make infrastructure space powerful—its multipliers (e.g., zones, cell 
phones, spatial products), its irrational fictions, or its undeclared but consequential 
activities—are perhaps the very things” that constitute the most fecund grounds for 
political struggle.393 Easterling urges a technically-informed, infrastructurally-sensitive, 
                                                 
391 Transcribed from Vinay Gupta, “One Network One World,” presentation at Observe Hack Make, 
September 2, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CTCrWNYGTE.  
392 Jay Springett, “Seeing the Stack,” The Thought Menu, April 2, 2015, 
http://opentranscripts.org/transcript/seeing-stack/.  
393 Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft (New York: Verso, 2014), 21-23. 
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“less self-congratulatory, less automatically oppositional, but potentially effective and 
sneakier set of techniques [for political struggle]. Techniques like gifts, pandas, 
exaggerated compliance, gossip, rumors, remote controls, entrepreneurialism…. This 
extended repertoire of form-making that’s both more elusive and powerful: 
multipliers, remotes, topologies, or subtraction, among others, techniques of active 
form, become techniques for this political art.” Easterling argues that these subtler 
techniques make sense when you realize that “power is already present in these 
[political, infrastructural, economic] networks. It’s not necessarily an obstacle, but 
rather a means to amplify or leverage or exploit…. A sneakier David wouldn’t bother 
to kill Goliath, but use Goliath to do the work…. Not tense binaries of resistance, 
but release into a new territory.” “Righteousness,” she argues,  
is often fooled by the sneaky way that the world works…. And what one finds 
is not an epic binary tale of enemies and innocents, but that a little epidemic of 
rumor or duplicity finally captures the world’s attention….  Dissent’s often 
left shaking its fist at an effigy, or exhausting itself in escalating the very 
tensions that it hoped to diffuse…. Insisting on ‘proper’ forms of political 
resistance forecloses on the very dissensus that it wishes to instigate. So just as 
many of the most powerful regimes use proxies and doubles and this kind of 
extrastatecraft, I’d like to imagine an unwitting, maybe even unwelcome, 
auxiliary or cohort that helps the more righteous activists with an unorthodox 
form of activism. And don’t mistake this for equivocation or collusion. And 
it’s not a position for the pure or faint of heart, since it involves swimming in 
some of the same waters with all of the other shills and butlers and confidence 
men.394 
                                                 
394 Transcribed from a lecture given by Easterling on the San Francisco campus of the California 
College of the Arts, November, 2012, accessed February 26, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBvo9Ch92r8. Romand Coles echoes Easterling’s point about 
not shielding oneself from action that feels dirty or compromised when he argues that coöptation 
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The systems that allow you to maintain the blood sugar and hydration levels that 
allow you to participate in a die-in or write a chapter for an edited volume are as 
constitutive of political action as the ideational and cultural drivers and stakes of 
those actions. One thinks of the story Michael Hardt relates in Examined Life: 
For my generation in the mid-eighties, when I was in my twenties, just getting 
involved with politics in a serious way, it seemed like the only way to—the 
only outlet for revolutionary desire was to go to Central American and 
somehow participate in or at least observe their revolutions. So a lot of people 
went to Nicaragua. I, with my friends, was mostly interested in El Salvador. 
The defining moment came for me at a meeting in El Salvador with the group 
of students at the University of El Salvador…. At a certain point, a friend 
there said, “Look, we’re really grateful for these North American comrades 
who come to help, but what would really be best for us is if you all would go 
home and make revolution in the U.S. That would really be better than trying 
to come help us here.” 
And it was true of course. I don’t think any of these North Americans were 
particularly helpful in Nicaragua and El Salvador, et cetera. And but I said at 
that point, “You know, Reagan’s in the Whitehouse, I have no idea what it 
would mean to make revolution in the U.S. I just don’t have any…” 
And he said, “Look, don’t you have mountains in the U.S.?” 
                                                                                                                                                 
ought to run both ways: “[The Left] ha[s] too often avoided asking how we might create interfaces 
between radical democratic dynamics and neoliberal dynamics in ways that enable us to co-opt some 
of the latter in ways that enhance the former in potentially transformative ways. Though we have 
often and rightly criticized the politics of capitalist co-optation, we have failed to ask whether and 
how we might generate a politics of radically democratic co-optation that moves in a different 
direction” Is it surprising that a group that shamelessly coöpts and bends to its ends every vocabulary 
and tactic it can lay hands on might make rapid progress against a group animated by fears of “being 
coöpted,” that winces at the implications of its own strategies, that makes profitable sport of 




And I said, “Yeah, we have mountains.” 
He says, “It’s easy. You go to the mountains, you start an armed cell, you 
make revolution.” 
And I thought, “Oh shit.” 
You know? It just didn’t correspond to my reality. Those notions of 
constructing the armed cell, especially constructing the armed cell in the 
mountains, and then sabotaging things. It didn’t, it didn’t make any sense at 
all. We really had no idea how to do it. Not just we didn’t know practically, 
like we didn’t know which rifles to take up to the mountains…. The whole 
idea of what it involved was lacking.395 
No one will say forming an armed cell in the mountains is not the truly radical move. 
From where I am sitting in Baltimore, I could drive to West Virginia, purchase AR-
15s, M107s, and so forth, and form an armed cell in the Blue Ridge Mountains 
outside of Washington, D.C. I’d have to get someone to cover my classes, but I could 
recruit some friends and do it tomorrow. Yet we know what would happen: even if 
we weren’t detained or killed by Virginia State Police tactical response units, we’d be 
at risk of starvation or dying of exposure. There’d be no way to get a cell signal, 
medical supplies, or potable water. It is, as Gupta argues, this “closing of the loop 
between the provision of critical infrastructure and the need for defense and security 
service [that is] the core tension of why we can’t make progress against these forces.” 
The same goes, of course, for activism and left-political work that does not involve 
forming armed cells. Few things better define the position of the contemporary left 
                                                 




activist and thinker than being calorically dependent on far-reaching, militarily-
defended structures of global capitalism while at the same time undertaking the 
conceptual labor of dismantling those structures on cultural and intellectual terrain. 
The first step is to move beyond simple hypocrisy framing396 and to recognize, with 
stacktivism, the omnipresence of this question and the recognition that the 
infrastructural components of this problem are not accounted for, that sophisticated 
cultural and textual criticism have been leveraged against a problem that is at root 
more about avoiding cholera outbreaks than it is (or, at least, before it is) about fine-
tuning the critique of the critique of the critique of late capital.397 “The only way of 
getting out of” the feedback loop wherein leftists agitate against global capitalism 
while being within the closed loop of capitalism as the delivery mechanism for critical 
services, Gupta argues, “is to get into a position where we’re no longer dependent… 
                                                 
396 E.g., You claim to want to dismantle capitalism but you buy food at a grocery store! Bang! This 
stream of critique is largely indistinguishable from children pretending to shoot each other on 
playgrounds, complete with mock swaying and fainting and indeterminacy over what constitutes 
being shot and how long you have to stay dead as a gesture of recognition of having lost. 
397 See also Joy James’ questions about the relationship between black intellectuals and nonelite black 
activism: “Speech acts hardly function as a form of political… radicalism when severed from the 
struggles of nonelite communities. To explore this ‘activism’s’ relationship to political organizing, we 
must ask and answer a number of questions. How do we distinguish between the experiential acts in 
political organizing that create the subject matter for the radical rhetoritician and the literature or 
speech that is commodified as black revolutionary performance. How does mere… writing about 
radicalism within a corporate institution qualify one as a ‘radical’? How does the literary or academic 
radicalism of elites supersede or mitigate the radical acts of nonelites that create the subject matter 
for their work?... Redefining radical activism as the literary production of nonactivists is apt to be a 
disingenuous political act. If intellectuals need only to declare themselves as militant rather than be 
recognized by or organize with activists, then politics as a phenomenon is supplanted by the 
individualism of the political egoist.” See Joy James, Transcending the Talented Tenth (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 186-88.  
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on the standing means of political oppression for our basic survival needs.”398 How is 
this possible? 
Questions about how the means of survival399 are distributed apply in Halicarnassus 
in 350 BCE, in Alaska in 1741, in London in 1854, in Flint in 2014.  The answers 
illuminate from beneath how these societies are organized. Which lives matter and 
which do not? What type of labor is remunerated, and why? Does anyone, in actual 
fact, think of the children? Asking about the means of not dying derives a kind of 
universalizability from the facts that (i) everyone can die, (ii) most people die if their 
means of survival go away, (iii) the means of survival for those that have access to 
them are contingent upon really-existing political and economic systems, (iv) the 
means of survival for those who do not have regular access to them are also 
provisioned based on really-existing political and economic systems, which is to say 
that (v) most people’s actual survival is linked to the organization of the political and 
                                                 
398 Gupta, “One Network.” 
399 I don’t mean to fixate on “bare survival” here, nor to imply that questions of flourishing do not 
matter. However, I do think there is a basic, Maslowish order of operations at play here in which 
survival figures centrally in part because it allows one to do the other things like flourish. The reverse 
is not true. My focus on survival is also motivated by the fact that about one third of the ~60 million 
human deaths per year are deaths from poverty, and so an interest in how to avoid dying is not a 
kind of “what-if” apocalypse fetishism, but of practical interest to most of the human beings on 
planet Earth. This Gupta point is worth repeating: “Collapse,” for the citizens of rich countries, 
means “living in the same conditions as the people who grow your coffee.” See Gupta, “Time to 




economic systems within which they live.400 These points, I think, are obvious, but 
also all the more important for their obviousness. 
Trying to figure out how not to die—on behalf of yourself and others—grows 
actionable lines of inquiry and opens onto a braided stream of possible workarounds, 
all while remaining sensitive to factors like relative urgency and power differentials.401 
The way basic life-support systems are organized is—no less than culture, politics, 
religion, or geography—a fundamental and differentiating feature of different 
societies. Gupta, speaking at The Dark Mountain festival (a conference centering on, 
among other concerns, the idea of civilizational collapse) points out that “collapse,” 
for his audience, will mean not a comic-book apocalypse, but rather “living in the 
same conditions as the people who grow your coffee.”402 Thinking about means of 
survival is not just a prudent thing to do in the case of coastal inundation from rising 
sea levels, the breakdown of the global ocean conveyor belt, widespread crop failure, 
ocean acidification, and so on. Thinking about actual means of survival is to invite 
                                                 
400 Note that those in position (iii) and those in position (iv) may have opposed interests. A perfectly 
flat distribution of global GDP leaves everyone on Earth with about $11,000 per person per year. 
This is something of a demotion for those in rich countries (average per capita GDP in the United 
States is about $53,000), but a life-altering improvement for “the people in the world [who] are still in 
the process of solving the basic problems of how they stay alive… [those] trying to figure out how 
not to be too hot, too cold, hungry, thirsty, ill, or get injured,” many of whom live on <$500 per 
person per year. See Gupta, “Time.” 
401 See Jay Springett, “Stacktivism and the Means Not to Die From,” talk delivered at the New 
Luddism panel at Immaterial Labour Isn’t Working, April 21, 2013, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xXMQYha_8Dk.  
402 Gupta, “Time.” 
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into political theory the set of questions that animate the lives of a plurality of the 
human beings on planet Earth. 
 
§4.2.1  Exit wounds 
We’ll have to know how to fight, how to 
pick locks, how to set fractures and deal 
with throat infections; how to build a 
pirate radio transmitter; how to set up 
street cafes; how to aim straight; how to 
gather together scattered knowledge and 
set up wartime agronomics; understand 
plankton biology; soil composition; study 
the way plants interact and thus rediscover 
lost intuitions; get to know possible uses 
for and connections with our immediate 
surroundings, and the limits we can’t go 
beyond without exhausting them; and we 
have to start to do all that today. 
–  The Invisible Committee, The 
Coming Insurrection 
 
The central problem with the prospect of rapid radical political and cultural 
transformation is that if you disassemble the stacks of interlocking technics that 
support human life, many people will die because you’ve removed the way they get 
calories, potable water, medical treatment, and heat. The question, then, is how to 
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dismantle existing systems of oppression without also dismantling the life-support 
systems with which they’re cogrown. 
A sensible plan for radical transformation, therefore, will start with a plan for taking 
care of basic human needs: an alternative technology stack for keeping human beings 
alive so that they don’t die when the standard systems of feeding and caring for them 
fail or are removed. Gupta argues that “you don’t [convert to a new life-support 
stack] by pulling the old one down. You [convert] by building a new one, prototyping 
it, bootstrapping it from the resources of the old, proving that it works, and then 
pulling the population across.”403 As Bratton points out, stacks are “intrinsically 
modular,” so each is “also a platform, and an interface even, for the redesign and 
replacement of the Stack-we-have with a Stack-we-want.”404 To think about radical 
transformation—up to and including revolution—without thinking about 
infrastructure is to neglect that engineering and politics are embedded in each other. 
Because any plan for political transformation must start with some kind of life-
support plan, it makes sense to start working on these types of plans and to bring this 
work explicitly into the political-theory fold. Working to diagram and assemble 
alternative life-support stacks has the potential to convert cycles of radical action 
from self-defeating to self-reinforcing. As activists and thinkers are increasingly able 
                                                 
403 Gupta, “One Network.” 
404 Benjamin Bratton, The Stack, xviii. “Or perhaps,” he cautions, “with the Stack-we-want-the-least.” 
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to live with partial independence from405 existing stacks, and to not get enmeshed in 
questions about who’s going to call in sick to work or argue with Comcast this week, 
they are able to think, agitate, and act in a more engaged manner, which opens space 
for further political-material-technical moves that strengthen alternative stacks, which 
engenders further agitation and thought, which restarts the cycle. For example, 
Bitcoin’s role as a functional component of an alternative financial stack (i) 
demonstrates the technical viability of blockchain-based experiments to create 
alternative stacks for education, personal identification, energy markets, housing, 
carbon emission tracking, and so on, and (ii) pulls developers, users, and billions of 
dollars in wealth from existing financial stacks into alternative ones, which creates the 
material, technical, and social grist for further developments. To be sure, purchasing 
baby formula or pizza with a blockchain currency is not itself a shatteringly radical 
move, especially if the supply chains for what you have bought can still be traced 
through to structures of degradation, exploitation, and accumulation. This is why 
building alternative stacks for the production and transport of energy, food, heat, and 
information that interleave with alternative financial structures like blockchain 
currencies remains a critical and self-reinforcing task.406 
Developing alternative life-support stacks opens up ways of rethinking radical 
separatism. The alternative and libertarian right have long hosted “preppers,” who 
                                                 
405 (As I’ll argue, partial independence from does not always mean physically outside of.) 
406 For further work along these lines, see Terranova, “Red Stack Attack!” 381-99. 
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practice a kind of consumerist self-sufficiency intended to guard against societal 
collapse. “Prepping” usually consists of buying canned goods, jugs of water, weapons, 
ammunition, first aid kits, flashlights, and so on, storing them on clip shelving in a 
cabin or vacation home, and waiting. Stacktivism opens the possibility of combining 
the prepper mindset with the point that collapse is already here, or arriving soon, for 
much of the world. It is striking how closely “prepper” websites, often dismissed as 
fantastic, engage with practical questions about the conditions for human survival: “4 
Ways To Preserve Food In A Solar Oven,” “My Off-Grid Water Solution,” “How to 
Make a Gas Cache,” “The Complete Guide to Foraging Wild Greens in North 
America.”407 A left prepperism could mean carving out spaces of survival408 not only 
                                                 
407 Prepper Website – Preparedness, Survival & Alternative News, Todd Sepulveda, accessed 
9/20/16, http://www.prepperwebsite.com. 
408 Preppers, generally speaking, love military hardware. Do left-preppers? It depends what sort of 
threat is most salient, but it’s probable that left preppers would sit closer to antifascists and others 
who argue for well-armed people’s militias than to liberals who favor strong gun control. Well-armed 
left militias may offer a form of resistance against certain kinds of political violence,* but increasing 
the availability of firearms increases the risk of mass shootings, accidental deaths, and suicides. See, 
e.g., M. Miller, D. Azrael, D. Hemenway, “Firearms and violence death in the United 
States,” in Reducing Gun Violence in America, ed. D.W. Webster and J.S. Vernick (Baltimore MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
In a liberal democracy with relaxed gun laws and many deaths from gun suicides and homicides, gun 
control by a centralized authority is likely to reduce gun deaths. If, on the other hand, you live in an 
increasingly illiberal society, your concerns might be different. Malcolm Harris, in a review of a 
collection of Spanish Civil War writing edited by Pete Ayrton entitled ¡No Pasarán!, outlines this fear: 
The first [anecdote] is from the village of Fuenteguinaldo, and it happened in 1936 but 
wasn’t revealed publicly for 70 years: 
Apparently, the Falangists asked the priest to draw up a list of all the reds and atheists in the 
village … They went from house to house looking for them. At nine o’clock at night, they were 
taken to the prison in Ciudad Rodrigo, and at four o’clock in the morning, were told they were 
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in cultural or intellectual terrain, but also in concrete, technical, material ways.409 See, 
for example, the work of the technopolitical collective Hermicity (“hermit city”), 
                                                                                                                                                 
being released, but, at the door of the prison, a truck was waiting and, instead of taking them 
home, it brought them here to be killed. 
The second comes from the failed coup attempt in 1981: 
I was living in a village in Castille with fewer than two hundred inhabitants. I became friendly with 
a young socialist who was a local councillor. When I met him one day, he was looking positively 
distraught. He had just found out that in February of that year, on the night Colonel Tejero burst 
into Parliament and the tanks came out onto the streets, the local priest had gone straight to the 
nearest military barracks intending to hand in a list of local men who should be arrested; my 
friend’s name was at the top of the list. 
Someone puts your name on a list and you disappear. And maybe all the people who care 
enough to look for you disappear too. And no one hears what happened until everyone you 
ever knew is dead. That is, if you’ll excuse my language, the fucking bogeyman. It scares the 
hell out of me. 
(See Malcolm Harris, “The Fascist Bogeyman,” September 21, 2016, 
https://medium.com/@BigMeanInternet/the-fascist-bogeyman-137b8c8b4c0e#.hgiayiy6l. Italics 
Harris.) There exist worlds where Harris’s bogeyman poses a greater threat than Adam Lanza, James 
Holmes, Cho Seung-Hui, Anders Breivik, or the abrupt permanence of gun-enabled suicide. The 
question is both how we know we’ve crossed into that world (“By the time the threat seems serious, 
the knives are already out,” Harris writes of nascent fascist movements) and what kind of choices we 
are willing to make when we have crossed that threshold—what norms we are willing to leave behind 
and to take up. 
* The literature around this claim is multi-sided and colorful. Expect to be hip-deep in Nazi gun 
control theory (see Andrew Zelman and Richard Stevens, Death by Gun Control [Hartford, WI: Mazel 
Freedom Press, 2001], and various critical responses, e.g. Bernard Harcourt, “On Gun Registration, 
the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun Laws” Fordham Law Review 73 [2004])  and also in Black 
Panther assertions of the right to arm oneself against the state (see Curtis J. Austin, Up Against the 
Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party [Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, 
2008]; and Quinn Lester, “War is Politics With Bloodshed,” forthcoming, 2017). 
409 This distinction may become more urgent as proto-fascist movements seize power in more 
countries. It is possible that, if this dissertation were being written in the middle of a Trump 
administration instead of at the dawn of one, it would include an argument for power pragmatism 
along these lines: 
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which envisions “A large, beautiful and otherwise uninhabited area. Small, sturdy, 
comfortable micro dwellings with electricity provided by the sun. Weekly deliveries of 
Soylent, fresh water and other necessities by drone. And for the cypherpunks that 
wish for it, a stable internet connection…. Decentralized technologies increasingly 
allow for decentralized living. By combining the latest innovations in meatspace 
technology [and] smart contracts… Hermicity has created an accessible suite for 
individuals to establish off-grid living.”410 
                                                                                                                                                 
For a time, people believed that making convincing arguments mattered. For a while, 
depending on how you read history, it did. There seemed to exist parties, ruling coalitions, 
and electorates that were interested in what could be shown, via argument and evidence, to 
be true. 
That is looking more and more historically contingent, a strip of light we have passed out of 
and may one day pass into again. For now, however, we will have to realize that 
sophisticated arguments designed to show how you are correct are going to have to take a 
backseat to sophisticated thinking about what to do in order to survive. Means of survival, tactics, 
resistance, the construction of alternative infrastructure stacks: these will be the stuff of any 
“political theory” worthy of the name. Cultural criticism, defacing power, clever readings of 
intricate and gorgeous texts: well, if these defeated fascism, we’d be in a very different 
situation. 
(I hope that this footnote will one day be regarded as an overreaction.) 
410 Yung Pure, “Hermicity: Applications in Decentralized Living and Achieving Peak Emotion,” 
Hermicity, publication date listed as 2024, accessed July 29, 2016, 
http://hermicity.org/hermicity_rainbow_paper.pdf.  (I am wary of the primacy groups like 
Hermicity place on physical separation—I’d be more inclined to use the same technics to develop a 
mesh of livability within current urban zones than to build an atomistic “hermit city,” but the 
portmanteau of “shared city” is a bit dicey. As Andre Gorz writes: the answer “to the capitalist 
system is neither a return to the household economy and village autarky, nor the total, planned 
socialization of all activities: it consists, rather, in socializing the sphere of necessity… in order to 
reduce to a minimum, within everyone’s life, what needs to be done, whether we like it or not.” See 
Gorz, Ecologica [New York: Seagull, 2010] , 116.) 
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Life-support infrastructure planning moves beyond understanding separatism as a 
radical gesture that one either has the gumption for or not. Understanding someone’s 
degree of involvement in a given cause as a matter of gumption, voluntarism, 
personal responsibility, or righteousness411 risks pitching every new terrain of contest 
as one of those familiar, noble uphill battles the Left starts at the bottom of and stays 
there. Here’s a prosaic example about the shortcomings of this sort of thinking. In 
the winter of 2013-2014, when Johns Hopkins’ graduate school was in the midst of a 
debate over its proposed reorganization, the JHU Deanery abruptly offered a $4,000-
per-year raise to students below their fifth year whose departments voted to accept 
the administration’s plan. This incentive appeared to split the grad students: those in 
their first year stood to make an additional $16,000 if the plan went through, those in 
their second year $12,000, those in their third year $8,000, those in their fourth year 
$4,000, and those in their fifth year and beyond nothing at all. 
At one point, a fellow PhD candidate of mine (a fifth year) argued that the more 
junior students weighing their options “just want the money.” His thinking was that 
the graduate students and faculty who had been united in their opposition to the plan 
had done so for principled reasons and (partially) out of commitment to left political 
ideas. That anyone would abandon those positions for a cash payout signaled venality 
and a failure of vision. There is another way of looking at the situation, of course: one 
group (the Johns Hopkins administration) controls enormous wealth (both personally 
                                                 
411 (which understanding reflects a variety of fundamental attribution error) 
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and institutionally). The other group (grad students) lacks the means to insulate 
themselves from questions about food security, healthcare, childcare, and rent. When 
one side can alter the other side’s ability to feed themselves or to see a doctor, there 
can be little question of the venality or shortsightedness of She Who Takes the 
Money. She doesn’t take the money because she lacks the political commitments and 
foresight of more senior graduate students. She takes the money because she needs to 
buy groceries, because rent is $880/month in Charles Village, because her JHU health 
plan has a $5,250 out-of-pocket maximum. The question is, as before, about who is 
able to get calories, shelter, heat, and so on, and what sort of system their access to 
these things supervenes on. The solution to the Deanery’s maneuver to split the grad 
students was not for junior grad students to be made of “sterner stuff” (which 
sternness, it turns out, often reduces to being independently wealthy or on your 
parents’ healthcare plan). Rather, it was to establish a union with a strike fund and to 
have terms for the consistent and fair remuneration of all grad student workers set 
out in a negotiated contract so that issues of who eats and who can afford medical 
care are not settled by administrative fiat. 
Humans and the other animals—I am not aware of any exception to this—act with 
respect to the structures built around and within them. More flexible, resilient, 
efficient, less-constrained ways of getting food or information or energy—if they can 
be defended from forces that will assuredly come to disassemble them—can hollow 
out previous ways of supplying those needs. The presses of the encyclopedia 
Britannica had nearly run for a quarter of a millennium before an open-source, free 
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encyclopedia with essentially zero paid editorial oversight called Wikipedia emerged. 
The combined value of the four largest US coal producers fell from $34 billion in 
2011 to $0.15 billion in 2015.412 Changes in information technology, materials 
science, and manufacturing procedures change the terrain of political contest. Cheap, 
efficient solar panels aren’t just for homeowners in Arizona who want to reduce their 
electrical bills. They’re also a means of charging a phone without ever connecting to a 
grid connected to a coal-fired plant near Glen Burnie connected to miners’ lungs in 
southwestern Pennsylvania. Or for powering a neonatal health center in Somalia.413 
Independence from does not denote escape from. This fact is important to remember when 
building an alternative life-support stack within an existing one. Separatist 
movements tend to overrate the emancipatory potential of physical space and the 
capacity of physical distance from centers of political power to be a shield from 
exploitation, domination, and despoliation. In practice, separatist movements have 
had to confront the fact of being infrastructurally, materially, hydrologically tied to 
the systems they were trying to escape. When a community’s shortages become acute, 
                                                 
412 Trevor Houser and Peter Marsters, “The Hidden Cause of America’s Coal Collapse,” Rhodium 
Group, February 22, 2016, http://rhg.com/notes/the-hidden-cause-of-americas-coal-collapse.  
413 “The health centre, a recent addition to Garowe Hospital, provides life-saving emergency 
obstetric care to almost 30 women each day…. Since its installation, the solar power system has 
helped to… reduce Garowe Hospital’s average monthly electricity bill from $6,000 to $30.” See 
UNFP Somalia, “A Solar-Powered Maternal and Neonatal Health Centre for Somalia,” 29 January 
2015, http://somalia.unfpa.org/news/solar-powered-maternal-and-neonatal-health-centre-somalia.  
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distance can intensify, rather than weaken, these ties.414 Hunger, sanitation, and 
morale become real problems. Digging your own outhouse and accepting limited 
access to medical care can rapidly become intolerable if you know that indoor 
plumbing and antiseptic gauze are on sale just down the road. Willpower, like any 
resource, is finite.415 An alternative stack cannot be a practical large-scale replacement 
for the dominant stack until a large array of technical and practical challenges have 
been worked out. 
Creating the preconditions for a more just world means shifting the lived experience 
of rejecting the dominant technology stack and the systems of oppression that it 
sustains and that sustain it. A choice between 
a. a carbon-intensive, consumptive lifestyle in which you spend >50% of 
your waking hours doing something you despise so that you can afford to 
continue doing so until you become physically and mentally unable to 
continue and/or the system you’ve paid into collapses in a welter of blood 
                                                 
414 The history of perhaps the best-known of these communities, The Farm in Lewis County, 
Tennessee, is a parable about the centrality of infrastructure to alternative communities. The story of 
The Farm doesn’t just involve 1970s counterculture and radical politics: it’s also made up of two-
burner Coleman stoves, sewage lines and giardia outbreaks, flour mills, kerosene lamps, 12 Volt 
trickle charging, and slow-scan ham TV transmitters. See Albert Bates, “Lifeboats: A Memoir,” 
Mariposa Group, accessed August 14, 2016, http://www.mariposagroup.org/thefarm.htm. A stroll 
around Zuccotti Park—the mess hall, library, sanitation facilities, evolving patchwork of nylon 
shelters, rows of charging laptops and smartphones—in the fall of 2011 underscores the necessity of 
understanding infrastructure as a central, rather than peripheral, concern for radical movements. 
415 See Roy F. Baumeister et al., “Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource?” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998): 1252–1265 and Roy F. Baumeister, “Ego Depletion and Self-








b. a life in which you engage in non-coerced work and have many of the 
same amenities you’d otherwise have, plus cleaner air and water, 
doesn’t just seem more appealing on a personal level: it tilts the terrain on which 
groups mobilize toward a self-reinforcing stitching-together of an alternative world 
and away from the uncertain prospect of a “revolution” that risks swapping one set 
of leaders and control-points for another set. As Easterling argues, 
well-rehearsed theories, like those related to Capital or neoliberalism[,] 
continue to send us to the same places to search for dangers while other 
concentrations of authoritarian power escape scrutiny. Moreover, the less 
dramatic or upstaged histories—regarding the growth of international 
organizations, the division of the radio spectrum, or the creation of the 
satellite, fiber-optic, and mobile telephony networks—have often been treated 
as bureaucratic or technical footnotes…. The things that make infrastructure 
space powerful—its multipliers (e.g., zones, cell phones, spatial products), its 
irrational fictions, or its undeclared but consequential activities—are perhaps 
the very things that make it immune to righteous declaration and prescription. 
The rational, resolute, and righteous, while cornerstones of dissent, are 
sometimes less consequential than the discrepant, fictional, or sly.416 
This recalls and combines Dewey’s rebuke about “the impotence and harmfulness of 
any and every ideal that is proclaimed wholesale and in the abstract, that is, as 
something in itself apart from the detailed concrete existences whose moving 
                                                 
416 Easterling, Extrastatecraft, 22-23. Sic. 
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possibilities it embodies”417 with Foucault’s description of his own work as “working 
through things little by little, of introducing modifications that are able if not to find 
solutions, at least to change the given terms of the problem.”418 
Sly tinkerers and wayward engineers have embodied Dewey and Foucault’s approach 
where they have begun to develop viable alternative technology stacks. When a 
critical mass of subareas (or, at least, the domains whose overlap makes human 
survival possible) have workable alternative infrastructures, older stacks may come to 
resemble the sad malls no one visits any more. (A mall still infested, however, with 
old-world snakes, lashing out in all directions, which will require political struggle and 
social safeguards to prepare for museum display.) The broad base of fundamental 
advances in materials, manufacturing, energy, computation, and so forth needed to 
supply grist for an alternative stack419 exist, and certain artistic, engineering, and 
political collectives, like Hermicity, the P2P Foundation, those involved in the 
Ethereum project, and Open Source Ecology are already putting the pieces together 
                                                 
417 Dewey, Reconstruction, 129-30. 
418 Michel Foucault, “An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Essential Works of Foucault, vol. 3, ed. 
J.D. Faubion (New York: Penguin, 1994), 288. 
419 The prospect of an alternative technology stack worth transitioning to has been envisioned by, 
among others, Andre Gorz: “The battle between ‘proprietary software’ and freeware represents the 
opening salvo in the central conflict of the age…. High-tech self-providing equipment is rendering  




in certain domains.420 Open Source Ecology’s Global Village Construction Set project 
aims to create open-source blueprints for low-cost versions of the 50 industrial 
machines needed to replicate modern life: cement mixers, sawmills, bulldozers, 
agriculture tractors, seeders, well-drilling rigs, hay cutters, bakery ovens, 
microcombines, press forges, and so forth.421 A Global Village Construction Set, 
freely available to anyone with an internet connection, democratizes and decentralizes 
the set of tools needed to build and maintain critical infrastructure services. Similarly, 
the P2P Foundation aims to develop an “open knowledge commons” that builds the 
technical and organizational means of moving away from existing resource-extraction 
and intellectual property paradigms. Using commons-based standards for sharing 
information rather than exclusionary standards is not merely valuable for its own 
sake. As P2P argues, when “naturally shareable goods are made artificially scarce… 
through legal repression or technological sabotage,” the results can be “particularly 
grievous for life-saving or planet-regenerating technological knowledge.”422 Hitching 
technical and scientific advances to processes of capital accumulation is regrettable 
not only because it involves exploitation and produces inequality, but also because it 
sequesters the tools needed to build a survivable future. 
                                                 
420 See Pure, “Hermicity” and Michel Bauwens, “The Post-Capitalist Strategy of the P2P 
Foundation,” July 11, 2016, http://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-07-11/the-post-capitalist-
strategy-of-the-p2p-foundation. 
421 Open Source Ecology, Global Village Construction Set, accessed October 31, 2016, 
http://opensourceecology.org/wiki/Global_Village_Construction_Set. 
422 Michael Bauwens, “10 Ways to Accelerate the Peer-to-peer and Commons Economy,” P2P 




Note that the stacktivist outlook does not embrace technological determinism. As 
Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek document, technological changes are part of a 
shifting terrain on which political contests occur: “The use of masks is met by new 
legislation against it; kettling is met by apps that track police movements; the 
recording of police violence is met by its criminalization; mass protest is met by heavy 
regulation that renders it boring and sterile; non-violent civil disobedience is met by 
violent police brutality. Political tactics are a dynamic field of forces, and 
experimentation is necessary in working around new state and corporate impediments 
to change.”423 Technological changes do not determine any outcome in advance. 
Rather, they are in constant exchange with economic currents, material flows, and 
political struggles. What a newly-viable set of techniques can do, as a part of this 
shifting field, is render courses of action more or less feasible. It can even, as Gorz 
argues, engender life paths that were unworkable before: “existing tools or tools 
currently in development… point towards a future in which it will be possible to 
produce practically all that is necessary and desirable in cooperative or communal 
workshops; in which it will be possible to combine productive activity with learning 
and teaching, with experimentation and research, with the creation of new tastes, 
flavours and materials, and with the invention of new forms and techniques of 
agriculture, building and medicine.”424 None of this is locked in by a deterministic 
                                                 
423 Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work 
(Brooklyn: Verso, 2015), 171. 
424 Gorz, Ecologica, 40-41. 
189 
 
process: “I do not say that these radical transformations will come about. I am simply 
saying that, for the first time, we can wish them to come about. The means exist, as 
well as the people who are methodically working toward their realization.”425 The 
non-deterministic elements of this outlook can be highlighted by reviewing Langdon 
Winner’s discussion of determinism in Marx: “Marx calls our attention to the fact that 
each generation is strongly conditioned or informed by a technological inheritance that 
it in no sense ‘chose.’ While it is always possible that a particular generation might 
wish to review this inheritance, scrutinize the patterns that technics gives to life, and 
make new choices on the basis of this critique, such a procedure is not in fact 
something that occurs to anyone to do.”426 The argument of Gorz and of this chapter 
is, of course, that such a procedure is something that should occur to anyone to do, 
and that this task is now being pushed forward in a variety of engineering and 
political settings. It is possible to agree about sociotechnical systems partially 
conditioning political life while disagreeing over the idea that “the sociotechnical 
context into which we are born must simply be accepted as given.”427 Recognizing 
that a sociotechnical context can be altered to enable more survivable futures is, in 
fact, one way of leaving a certain kind of determinism behind. 
                                                 
425 Ibid., 41. 




The transition Gorz envisions and that P2P, Hermicity, and others are working to 
realize will involve converting existing energy-supply stacks from extractive, polluting, 
highly centralized networks of coal plants to cleaner, distributed power based on 
networks of solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage. This transition will 
involve removing the centralized production of beef, which harms the planet as well 
as the animals on both sides of the fence, from the feeding-people stack.428 The new 
stacks will rise within and alongside the old ones: as invisible skyscrapers, growing 
through cities and people. 
 
§4.3 Further rivers 
Meanwhile, of course, the concrete 
troubles and evils remain. 
 – Dewey 
 
Theories, beliefs, and actions are mutually constituted by the feedback loops they 
share with one another. These braided loops are themselves hooked into changing 
social, political, and material conditions as both cause and effect.429 Different theories 
                                                 
428 Jennifer Dillard, “A Slaughterhouse Nightmare: Psychological Harm Suffered by Slaughterhouse 
Employees and the Possibility of Redress through Legal Reform,” Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & 
Policy, forthcoming,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016401. 
429 Take, e.g., William E. Connolly’s point that “the introduction of an idea” like “institutional racism 
into political life” pushes the bounds of who’s considered racist, what racist action is, with 
determinate legal-material-social-economic effects. In this sense, “conceptual revision is not, then, a 
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and theoretical pursuits have different relationships to concrete outcomes. Even if 
the nature of these differences is multilayered and ambiguous, theories’ links with, 
situatedness within, and ability to alter broader political and material feedback loops 
ought to be taken under consideration by political theorists. Or, to borrow Dewey’s 
formulation, we ought to recognize “the tragic need for the most realistic study of 
forces and consequences” to be folded into philosophical inquiry.430 
One part of this consideration involves the extent to which a given political theory 
ought to be reflexively influenced by the concrete outcomes to which it contributes. 
My aim is not to demand that theory guide practice as if from above, but to point out 
how practical considerations operate at the core of even abstruse theoretical work 
and to highlight the feedback loops that turn over there. Extending and reworking 
those feedback loops presents one way of exploring the jungle that lies between 
theories and the worlds they are deployed in.431 
“Suppose,” Eve Sedgwick writes, “one takes seriously the notion… that everyday 
theory qualitatively affects everyday knowledge and experience; and that one doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                                 
sufficient condition of political change, but it is indispensable to significant political change.” See The 
Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 202-203. 
430 Dewey, Reconstruction, 130. 
431 This suggestion can also be thought of as calling for a reworking and reassertion of the role of 
reflective equilibrium in political theory. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 29-32, 134; Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, “Constructivist underpinnings 
in Donald Schön’s theory of reflective practice: echoes of Nelson Goodman,” Reflective Practice 7, no. 
3 (2006): 277–286; and Negarestani, “Labor of the Inhuman,” parts I and II. 
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want to draw much ontological distinction between academic theory and everyday 
theory; and suppose that one has a lot of concern for the quality of other people’s 
and one’s own practices of knowing and experiencing. In these cases, it would make 
sense—if one had the choice—not to cultivate the necessity of a systematic, self-
accelerating split between what one is doing and the reasons one does it.”432 If 
someone (not me, certainly) were to make the grave and impossible-to-prove remark 
that virtually every political theorist she knows, from the Marxists on up, proceeds in 
daily lived experience as some variety of tolerant social democrat—is this to 
immediately inaugurate a discussion of hypocrisy that proceeds by way of accusation 
and counteraccusation?433 Or can it be the opening for a different sort of discussion, 
one focused on the means of divergence, the relationship between lived experience 
and the institutional application of stylized myth, the feedback loops and reciprocal 
relations that must operate at the junctures between abstraction, experience, and 
action?434 One way of moving forward means taking seriously Dewey’s proposition to 
                                                 
432 Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading,” 144-145. 
433 “What we do seem to talk about incessantly,” Judith Shklar writes of intellectuals, “is hypocrisy, 
and not because it hides cowardice, cruelty, or other horrors, but because failures of honesty and of 
sincerity upset us enormously, and they are vices which we can attack directly and easily. They are 
easier to bear, and seem less intractable. Nevertheless, to make hypocrisy the worst of all the vices is 
an invitation to a Nietzschean misanthropy and to self-righteous cruelty as well. That is why 
hypocrisy and those who hate it are of compelling concern to anyone who puts cruelty first.” See 
Judith N. Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First,” Daedalus 111, no. 3 (1982): 26-27. A related Horkheimer 
remark: “If you produce revolutionary writings in a nonrevolutionary situation without engaging with 
the positive aspects of a culture, it always seems somehow hopeless.” See Adorno and Horkheimer, 
New Manifesto (New York: Verso, 2011), 108-109. 
434 Though there are many exceptions—indeed, entire minor traditions—it is the case that much of 
the published work in political theory involves sophisticated point-plotting on an abstract plane. The 
writer’s experientially-derived opinions remain latent or unemphasized. This partially explains, as I 
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move away from an approach in which “the social philosopher, dwelling in the region 
of his concepts, ‘solves’ problems by showing the relationship of ideas,” and toward 
putting into practice a critical theory enlivened by “the sum-total of impulses, habits, 
emotions, records, and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and undesirable in 
future possibilities, and which contrive ingeniously in behalf of imagined good.”435 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that pragmatism requires an inbuilt analysis of 
power relations to avoid defeating its own aims. A Foucauldian analysis of power 
relations helps pragmatism avoid becoming a rubber stamp for or dupe of dominant 
interests. Dewey and Foucault share several non-obvious inclinations, including anti-
profundity, anti-purity, tragic meliorism, and instrumentalism. These shared stances 
suggest that Foucauldian understandings of power can be layered into a pragmatist 
analysis without overwriting core pragmatist ideas. This new pragmatism takes an 
unlikely avatar in Shulamith Firestone, who employs a radical pragmatism focused on 
destroying domination rooted in sex difference. Firestone’s interest in using 
                                                                                                                                                 
have written in earlier chapters, sudden jinks at the end of works of political theory toward occurent 
considerations of human welfare and survival. A writer’s actual beliefs about how to act in a concrete 
situation and why are filtered darkly through reworkings of old books. This practice is common 
enough that it is easy to forget how odd it is that competing interpretations of Nietzsche or debates 
over how to read Rousseau should be proxy battles about or forecasts of what the interpreter’s 
concretely-held beliefs could be. This institutional application of stylized reading also risks the rise of 
rituals that demonstrate one’s purity, socially-transmitted obsessions with faultfinding, and a politics 
of personal exoneration. 
435 Dewey, Reconstruction,191-94. 
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reproductive technology to degender the future enacts a ruthless power-pragmatism 
in its attention to the feedback loops that sustain systems of domination and in its 
radical repurposing of technical systems to disrupt these feedback loops. 
Finally, I moved on to stacktivism, a collection of ideas at the periphery of 
contemporary theory that broadens Firestone’s approach. Stacktivism’s central lesson, 
I argue, is the simple idea that political and infrastructural processes are bound up 
together, and that attempting to enact radical politics without a new infrastructural 
system—without a way of pumping water, growing food, or delivering healthcare—is 
like doing origami with water. No matter how well-crafted your directions, how 
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